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THE EXTENSION CLAUSE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT’S JURISDICTIONAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
Alex Glashausser* 
Abstract: This Article challenges the prevailing doctrinal, political, and 
academic view that the Extension Clause—which provides that “[t]he judi-
cial Power shall extend” to nine types of cases and controversies—justifies 
legislative attempts to strip the U.S. Supreme Court of appellate jurisdic-
tion. Legislators have repeatedly introduced bills seeking to prevent the 
Court from hearing cases on politically charged topics such as marriage, 
religion, and abortion. Scholars have relied on the Extension Clause to 
advance three arguments in support of such jurisdiction-stripping: (1) that 
“judicial Power” is not jurisdiction, and thus jurisdiction is not constitu-
tionally protected; (2) that “shall” is not mandatory, and thus the clause 
need not be obeyed; and (3) that to “extend” a power is not to grant it but 
merely to define its potential outer reaches, and thus Congress is respon-
sible for deciding what to allow the Court to hear. As the Article explains, 
however, the text, context, and drafting history of the Extension Clause re-
veal the fallacy of those conventional justifications. Just as other constitu-
tional provisions guarantee the jurisprudential independence of federal 
judges so that they can do their jobs without fear of reprisal, the Extension 
Clause prevents Congress from taking certain cases away from the Su-
preme Court and thus secures the Court’s jurisdictional independence. 
Introduction 
 Addressing Parliament in an October 1775 speech that unwittingly 
galvanized Americans’ resolve, King George III lamented that the re-
bels had “assumed to themselves legislative, executive, and judicial 
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powers, which they already exercise in the most arbitrary manner.”1 
The next July, in his condemnation of British “Tyranny” over the colo-
nies, Thomas Jefferson in turn charged that the king had “obstructed 
the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for estab-
lishing Judiciary Powers.”2 Little could either foresee that after the 
Revolution was won and “[t]he judicial Power of the United States” 
constitutionally vested in “one supreme Court,”3 the power would again 
be unjustly obstructed—this time by the U.S. Congress. In countless 
bills through the years, including a string of recent ones on hot-button 
issues, American legislators have refused to assent to the full establish-
ment of the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.4 
 A single month in 2011 is illustrative. On March 2, a group of four-
teen U.S. representatives introduced the Marriage Protection Act, 
whose sole operative provision sought to prevent judicial review of the 
federal statute shielding states from having to recognize same-sex mar-
riages: “[T]he Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction . . . to 
hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation of, or the 
validity under the Constitution of [the Defense of Marriage Act].”5 Six 
days later brought the We the People Act, an attempt to bar the Court 
from adjudicating “any claim involving . . . the free exercise or estab-
                                                                                                                      
1 David McCullough, 1776, at 11, 67–68 (2005) (noting the impact of Americans’ 
reading of the speech in print early in 1776). 
2 The Declaration of Independence paras. 2, 10 (U.S. 1776). 
3 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
4 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 
869, 872 (2011) [hereinafter Grove, Structural Safeguards] (referring to “[c]ountless bills” 
in the past century that would have stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in cases 
about issues “ranging from reapportionment to the use of ‘under God’ in the Pledge of 
Allegiance”). Tara Grove has exhaustively grouped jurisdiction-stripping attempts by era, 
id. at 888–916, and analyzed the political and constitutional reasons that most such efforts 
fail, id. at 916–32 (concluding that “structural safeguards” in Article I were designed to, 
and have in fact served to, protect the Supreme Court’s power). See also Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250, 260–68 (2012) [here-
inafter Grove, Article II Safeguards] (explaining incentives for the executive branch to op-
pose the legislature’s jurisdiction-stripping proposals). For other historical overviews of 
jurisdiction-stripping bills, see Dawn M. Chutkow, Jurisdiction Stripping: Litigation, Ideology, 
and Congressional Control of the Courts, 70 J. Pol. 1053, 1061–63 (2008) (empirically analyz-
ing hundreds of enacted bills and concluding that Congress restricts federal jurisdiction 
for reasons of efficiency rather than ideology); Alex Glashausser, A Return to Form for the 
Exceptions Clause, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1383, 1386–87 (2010) (briefly recounting trends); Helen 
Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge to Judicial Review, 41 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 1003, 1007–10 (2006) (summarizing bills since the 1820s). 
5 H.R. 875, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011); see Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C 
(2006)). 
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lishment of religion; . . . the right of privacy, including . . . reproduc-
tion; or . . . the right to marry without regard to sex or sexual orienta-
tion.”6 A week after that came the Sanctity of Life Act, aiming to stop 
the Court from reviewing any laws or practices regulating abortion.7 
 Though most jurisdiction-stripping bills fail,8 their recurring 
threats are Damoclean, and sometimes one of the bills becomes law. 
For example, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 barred federal courts 
from exercising “jurisdiction to hear or consider” habeas corpus peti-
tions filed by “enemy combatant[s].”9 Three years after its enactment, 
that statute was struck on the specific ground that it violated the Sus-
pension Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution (protecting the writ 
of habeas corpus),10 but the more general issue of congressional con-
trol of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is timeless.11 Given that the 
jurisdiction and even existence of inferior courts are constitutionally 
precarious,12 the stripping of jurisdiction from the Supreme Court 
could leave state courts as the protectors of federal rights. Thus, even 
beyond the evident separation-of-powers implications of one branch’s 
control of another, the issue is also one of federalism. 
                                                                                                                     
 Article III of the Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power 
shall extend” to various types of cases and controversies.13 Despite the 
 
6 H.R. 958, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). 
7 H.R. 1096, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011); see Maggie McKinley, Note, Plenary No Longer: 
How the Fourteenth Amendment “Amended” Congressional Jurisdiction-Stripping Power, 63 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1213, 1214–16, 1242 (2011) (citing the bill as a prime example of a jurisdiction-
stripping attempt that runs afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
8 See Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 4, at 268–86 (outlining the reasons for the 
failure of such bills across four distinct political eras); Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra note 
4, at 871–83 (sketching the political dynamics that defeat most such bills); cf. James E. 
Pfander, One Supreme Court: Supremacy, Inferiority, and the Judicial Power of the 
United States 145 (2009) (contending that as long as the Supreme Court retains broad 
supervisory authority over inferior courts, particular instances of jurisdiction-stripping pose 
“little threat”). 
9 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 
2742 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2006)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008). 
10 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33; see infra text accompanying notes 73–78 (discussing 
the context of the Court’s decision). 
11 The question of the extent to which Congress may restrict the Court’s jurisdiction 
has been called “one of the most difficult in the law of the federal courts.” Mark Tushnet, 
“The King of France with Forty Thousand Men”: Felker v. Turpin and the Supreme Court’s Delib-
erative Processes, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 164. 
12 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (giving Congress discretion about whether to “ordain and es-
tablish” inferior courts); see also infra note 142 (speculating about whether congressional 
control over the existence of inferior courts includes complete control of their jurisdiction). 
13 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
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revolutionary resonance of the “judicial Power,” however, that phrase 
has supplied one of the chief academic justifications for the usurpatory 
bills. Scholars have argued that the “judicial Power” is not coextensive 
with “jurisdiction” and thus that although the Court’s judicial power 
per se is inviolate, its jurisdiction may be stripped.14 Such disingenuous 
differentiation would have confounded Jefferson, who objected not 
only to the denial of “Judiciary Powers” to the colonies but also to Brit-
ain’s attempts to “extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us.”15 
 The verb in that accusation— “extend” —has been coopted for a 
second defense of the bills. The “exten[sion]” of the judicial power, 
some scholars insist, merely sets a ceiling that limits the potential reach 
of the power.16 Under that view, the decision about the “exten[t]” to 
which the Supreme Court should be entrusted with the judicial power, 
up to that limit, is left to Congress.17 
 A third pillar of scholarly support has been the common conten-
tion that the constitutional “shall” (in “[t]he judicial Power shall ex-
tend”) is not mandatory and allows room for legislative discretion 
about how much jurisdiction the Court should have.18 Thomas Paine 
                                                                                                                      
 
14 E.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and 
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696, 708, 751–52 
(1998) (noting “confidently” the drafters’ distinction between the terms and concluding 
that “the ‘Judicial Power shall extend to’ language could not mean ‘jurisdiction shall be’”); 
Daniel J. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1569, 1573 n.14 
(1990) (citing with approval a comment from a representative in the First Congress that 
“the failure to give the federal courts jurisdiction does not divest them of the judicial pow-
er”); Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Tradi-
tional View, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 671, 705 n.167 (1997) (“At most, the judicial power auto-
matically extends to all such cases. Jurisdiction does not.”). 
15 See The Declaration of Independence paras. 9, 31 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
16 E.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 721–23, 753. 
17 E.g., John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and 
the Text of Article III, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 203, 212 (1997) (defending the traditional view 
based on a paraphrasing of the Extension Clause as “The judicial power may be used to 
decide . . .” or “The judicial power shall be capable of deciding . . .”); Liebman & Ryan, 
supra note 14, at 721–23, 753 (arguing that the editing of the clause about cases and con-
troversies from “shall be” to “shall extend” changed the jurisdictional floor to a ceiling); 
Velasco, supra note 14, at 703–04 (citing a dictionary definition of “extend” to support the 
claim that Congress’s right to control jurisdiction stems from a “natural reading of the text 
of the Constitution”). 
18 E.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of 
Judicial Power 37–38 (2d ed. 1990) (casting doubt on whether “shall” implies a mandate 
as opposed to the future tense); Harrison, supra note 17, at 212, 217 (deriding the notion 
that the Extension Clause’s “shall” means “must” and paraphrasing the clause as “The ju-
dicial power may be used to decide . . .”); Velasco, supra note 14, at 702–04 (arguing that 
“shall” is not mandatory and concluding that “the words ‘shall extend’ are more permis-
sive than mandatory; they are better interpreted as ‘can include’ rather than as ‘must in-
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might have seen the lack of sense in that claim. His 1776 rejection of 
monarchical rule relied on the biblical verse “The Lord shall rule over 
you,” explicated by his own apt commentary: “Words need not be more 
explicit.”19 
 The explicit words of Article III, along with their context and his-
tory, show that the truth of the three apologies for legislative arrogation 
is far from self-evident. As bills aimed at shielding sensitive statutes 
from judicial review proliferate, the time has come for the Supreme 
Court to reject congressional tyranny and declare jurisdictional inde-
pendence. 
 After an overview of the relevant constitutional provisions in Part 
I,20 Part II of this Article recognizes the semantic space between the 
terms “judicial Power” and “jurisdiction” but denies that jurisdiction is 
thus vulnerable.21 Acknowledging the slipperiness of the word “shall,” 
Part III explains that regardless of whether it is read as a mandate or as 
a statement about the future, the word leaves no discretion for Con-
gress to withhold constitutionally granted jurisdiction.22 Part IV rejects 
the premise that “extend[ed]” power is merely potential, subject to a 
legislative trigger; it argues instead that an extension of power is the 
functional equivalent of a grant of power.23 The Article concludes by 
noting the widespread acceptance of the importance of judges’ juris-
prudential independence in the constitutional design and urging simi-
lar recognition for the Supreme Court’s jurisdictional independence.24 
I. One Flawed Theory, Two Clauses of Article III 
 At the time delegates gathered in Philadelphia to write a Constitu-
tion, the United States had but a scintilla of a national court system. 
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress had 
established the Court of Appeals in Prize Cases to exercise jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                      
clude’”); cf. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1573 n.14 (suggesting that even if “shall” is manda-
tory, the mandate is only that when the judicial power is exercised, “the exercise must be 
by article III courts”). 
19 Thomas Paine, Common Sense 54 (Edward Larkin ed., Broadview Editions 2004) 
(1776) (emphasis added). 
20 See infra notes 25–51 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 55–163 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 164–244 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 245–399 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 400–411 and accompanying text. 
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in cases of capture.25 Congress was also authorized to appoint courts to 
try piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, but instead it had 
delegated such matters to state judges.26 Land disputes between states, 
or between people claiming rights under the grants of different states, 
were resolved through a procedure superintended by Congress.27 In 
the states, appellate reviews of trial judgments were often performed by 
legislative and executive officials, as well as judges.28 In Great Britain, 
the nation Americans most often looked to as a model, the House of 
Lords acted, according to Sir William Blackstone, as “the supreme 
court of judicature.”29 Federalists who gathered in Philadelphia envi-
sioned a robust national judiciary as a crucial element of a stronger 
general government.30 
 In Article III of the new Constitution, their vision took hold. It was 
particularly important for the Federalists to clarify that judicial power 
lay with courts rather than with a legislature.31 And they did. “The judi-
cial Power of the United States” was to be vested not in any legislative or 
executive body but only in “one supreme Court” and, potentially, in 
                                                                                                                      
25 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1; see also Erwin C. Surrency, 
History of the Federal Courts 13–15 (2d ed. 2002) (detailing the court’s origins and 
modest caseload). 
26 Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1; see also Surrency, supra note 
25, at 11–12 (noting that such courts never materialized). 
27 See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, paras. 2–3 (setting out a precise 
procedure for resolving such disputes); Surrency, supra note 25, at 12 (noting that the 
procedure was rarely used). 
28 Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original Intent and Article III, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 
75, 105 (1995) (quoting Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, at 36 (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds., 1990)) (“The ultimate reviewing authority 
of judicial proceeding was not vested exclusively in the judiciary in any state.”). 
29 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *56, quoted in Wells & Larson, supra note 
28, at 103–04. At the Convention, James Madison referred to the House of Lords as “the 
supreme tribunal of Justice.” 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 130 
( June 6), 139 (Madison’s notes) (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter Records]. In each 
citation of Farrand’s Records, to orient the reader, I have included the page number for the 
start of the day in question followed by the page number for the specifically relevant mate-
rial, along with a parenthetical indication of the source. The most common sources are the 
official but somewhat sparse journal kept by the Convention’s secretary, William Jackson, 
and the thorough notes of Madison. When applicable, I have cited multiple sources within 
Records. 
30 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Execu-
tive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1199 (1992) (noting the delegates’ focus on 
constraining “excessive legislative power”). 
31 See, e.g., 1 Records, supra note 29, at 130 ( June 6), 134–35 (Madison’s notes) (re-
cording Madison’s comment that the need to establish a body to guard against the “incon-
veniences of democracy” by securing private rights and dispensing justice may have been 
the prime motivation for the Convention). 
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“inferior Courts.”32 That power would extend to nine categories of cas-
es and controversies.33 Congress would decide whether to establish in-
ferior courts, a prerogative that might entail full control over their ju-
risdiction.34 But legislative control over the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court would be limited to relatively minor details, such as timing rules 
for litigants or allowing the Court to hear certain cases as original mat-
ters rather than waiting for appeals.35 
 Today, however, the picture drawn at the Federal Convention 
hangs upside down. The prevailing theory holds that the appellate ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court is largely at the mercy of Congress.36 
Scholars disagree about the restraints, if any, on legislative control.37 
                                                                                                                      
 
32 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
33 Id. art. III, § 2. 
34 See id. art. III, § 1. The extent of legislative control of the jurisdiction of inferior 
courts is beyond the scope of this Article. See infra note 142 (citing authority for the view 
that Congress’s power with respect to the existence of inferior courts implies power over 
their jurisdiction). 
35 See Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1442–43 (discussing the permissible scope of legisla-
tive regulation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction). 
36 See William R. Casto, An Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control 
over Federal Jurisdiction, 7 Const. Comment. 89, 94 (1990) (defending the theory of “ple-
nary power”); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An 
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 908 (1984) (finding “compel-
ling” reasons to conclude that “there are no substantial internal limits on Congress’ article 
III power to limit the Court’s appellate jurisdiction”); Harrison, supra note 17, at 206 
(“The textual reading . . . according to which Article III grants Congress broad power over 
the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction . . . has come to be referred to as the orthodox, 
or traditional, interpretation.”); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress, the Constitution, and the Appellate 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the Exceptions Clause, 24 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 385, 423–24 (1983) (calling congressional power over the Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction “plenary” and dismissing contrary arguments); Peter J. Smith, Textualism and 
Jurisdiction, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1883, 1894 (2008) (“Under the traditional view, . . . Con-
gress has considerable—if not unlimited—power . . . to strip the Supreme Court of appel-
late jurisdiction.”); Velasco, supra note 14, at 763 (defending “the orthodox position that 
Congress possesses nearly plenary authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts”); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1005 
(1965) (defending the position that “Congress has the power . . . to strike at what it deems 
judicial excess by delimitations . . . of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction” and 
finding “no basis” for limits on that power within Article III). 
37 Scholars acknowledge limits imposed by constitutional provisions beyond Article III. 
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction 
Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 Vill. L. Rev. 900, 902–
03, 918–23 (1982) (conceding the possibility that other constitutional provisions, such as 
the Equal Protection Clause, might in some circumstances restrain congressional power). 
Some stress that Congress may not deny litigants a federal forum for constitutional claims. 
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for 
Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 Va. L. Rev. 
819, 821–22 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to 
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But the basic premise of the judiciary’s dependence on the legislature 
for jurisdiction has gone almost unchallenged.38 In fact, the Court itself 
has been complicit in its own subservience.39 
 No practical pathogen has caused this disorder. With apologies to 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s famous overheated dictum about judicial 
obligation,40 the power to exercise jurisdiction is not a duty to do so in 
every case. For most of the past century, the Supreme Court has largely 
controlled its own workload, hearing most “appellate” (in the constitu-
tional sense) cases via the discretionary writ of certiorari rather than 
“appeals” per se.41 There is thus no basis for concern that allowing the 
                                                                                                                      
 
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17, 67 (1981); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 129, 140–41 (1981) (arguing that legislative attempts to “manipu-
lat[e] jurisdiction” to defeat enforcement of constitutional rights are generally impermis-
sible). But cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1401 (1953) (calling state courts “the 
primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases . . . the ultimate ones”). 
38 Robert Clinton’s theory holds that the cases and controversies listed in the Exten-
sion Clause must be within the jurisdiction of a federal court, but not necessarily the Su-
preme Court. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided 
Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 751–53 (1984). Akhil 
Amar embraces mandatory federal jurisdiction for what the Extension Clause describes as 
“all Cases,” but not for mere “Controversies.” Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Arti-
cle III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 238–41 (1985). 
Though it is tempting to ascribe significance, as Amar does, to the “all” that appears three 
times in the list of nine categories, a close look reveals its selective presence and absence to 
have no impact on Congress’s authority to control federal jurisdiction. That analysis is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
For a more thorough overview of the scholarly literature about the propriety of juris-
diction-stripping, see Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1390–99. 
39 Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation 
of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1515, 1561 (1986) (“Ironi-
cally, the federal judiciary itself created the jurisdictional insecurity that continues to 
plague it.”); Jerome T. Levy, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court: A Reappraisal, 22 Intramural L. Rev. N.Y.U. 178, 183 (1967) (“[T]he governmental 
body most ready to assert the power of Congress to deprive the Court of its appellate juris-
diction has been the Court itself.”); see infra notes 71–72 (citing cases in which the Su-
preme Court has acquiesced to congressional control of its jurisdiction). 
40 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“We have no 
more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which 
is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”). 
41 Since 1925, and even more so since 1988, most cases have arrived at the Supreme 
Court through the discretionary writ of certiorari. Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Juris-
diction § 10.3.2, at 702–05 (6th ed. 2012) (tracing the history of the distinction between 
appeal and certiorari). Exercising its “judicial discretion,” the Court grants that writ only 
for “compelling reasons.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. Even when hearing cases on appeal (as opposed 
to certiorari), the Court has on occasion declined to exercise its jurisdiction. See, e.g., 
Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (citing a “duty to decline jurisdiction” when a 
question presented is not “substantial”). It also remains free to apply precedents about 
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full constitutional complement of appellate jurisdiction, including even 
cases of incomplete diversity,42 would overwhelm the Court.43 
 The orthodox understanding of congressional control rests on two 
provisions in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution, namely, the 
Extension Clause and the Exceptions Clause: 
The judicial Power shall extend to [nine types of cases and con-
troversies]. In [two types of cases], the supreme Court shall 
have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before men-
tioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, 
both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make.44 
 One of the standard arguments advanced by proponents of the 
conventional view is that the “Exceptions” permit Congress to strip ap-
pellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court.45 That interpretation may 
have superficial appeal, as well as the imprimatur of practice and prece-
                                                                                                                      
justiciability and fashion doctrines of abstention for itself much like those invoked, with 
the Court’s approval, by inferior courts. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) 
(holding that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. 
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941) (holding that federal courts should abstain from 
cases in which a federal constitutional question could be avoided by a state court determi-
nation of the meaning of state law). 
42 As it is, though permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006), the Supreme Court rarely 
chooses to hear cases whose only basis for federal jurisdiction is complete diversity. See 
Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 Ariz. L. Rev. 
917, 946 (1996) (noting that the Court “routinely” denies certiorari in such cases). 
43 The question of what types of substance-neutral jurisdictional regulation would be 
constitutionally appropriate is beyond the scope of this Article. See Glashausser, supra note 
4, at 1441–43 (probing that issue). 
44 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). 
45 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Amending the Exceptions Clause, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 971, 1003 
(2008) (“The Exceptions Clause is the broadest grant of congressional power in the origi-
nal Constitution not found in Article I, and it gives Congress wide authority to alter and 
abolish federal court jurisdiction.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 
96 Va. L. Rev. 1043, 1087–89 (2010) (acknowledging broad power under the Exceptions 
Clause as long as inferior courts retain “ultimate authority . . . to declare and enforce fed-
eral law”); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 
Harv. L. Rev. 603, 608–09, 612–13 (1992) (referring to the “venerable principle” that the 
Exceptions Clause grants Congress “substantial control” over the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion); Redish, supra note 37, at 901 (explaining the “common sense interpretation” that 
the Exceptions Clause offers “fairly broad authority to curb Supreme Court appellate ju-
risdiction”); cf. James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Super-
vise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1435–36 (2000) (acknowledging “broad power” 
to make exceptions as long as the Supreme Court retains its “traditional powers of superin-
tendence” of the inferior courts). 
1234 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1225 
dent.46 But as I have explained in detail in an earlier article, the Excep-
tions Clause, properly understood, allows Congress merely to shift cases 
from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to its original jurisdiction, so that 
the Court can hear the cases earlier—not, as most insist, to shield cases 
from its review altogether.47 In short, the word “Exceptions” applies to 
the “appellate” form of the Court’s jurisdiction, rather than to the exis-
tence of “Jurisdiction.” Though the bare text of the Exceptions Clause 
may be somewhat ambiguous and thus open to various potential inter-
pretations,48 its drafting history confirms that it was designed to expe-
dite cases, not to eliminate them.49 A thorough explication of the Ex-
ceptions Clause is beyond the scope of this Article, but this basic 
background may help illuminate the broader debate. 
 The orthodoxy’s other constitutional argument—the one ad-
dressed here—relies on the Extension Clause. If my previous article 
about the Exceptions Clause substantially disarmed the orthodoxy, the 
current one about the Extension Clause aims to leave it defenseless, 
revealing the theory of congressional control to be wholly untenable. 
Absent an analysis of the Extension Clause, the propriety of stripping 
the Supreme Court of jurisdiction would still be debatable; even if one 
acknowledges that congressional “Exceptions” transform appellate ju-
risdiction into original jurisdiction rather than eliminating it, one 
could cling to the contention that Congress need not “extend” the full 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514–15 (1869) (citing the “express 
words” of the Exceptions Clause and dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the 
ground that Congress had, during the pendency of the appeal, repealed the jurisdictional 
statutory provision relied on by a habeas corpus petitioner). One of the three recent bills 
described above—the We the People Act—cites the Exceptions Clause as its constitutional 
basis. H.R. 958, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011); see supra text accompanying note 6. The other two 
are silent on that issue. See H.R. 1096, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011); H.R. 875, 112th Cong. 
§ 2(a) (2011); supra text accompanying notes 5–7. 
47 Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1401–02. Some other scholars have embraced this mi-
nority interpretation of the Exceptions Clause. See Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The 
Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to 
Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1006, 1013, 1037 (2007); Laurence Claus, Constitu-
tional Guarantees of the Judiciary: Jurisdiction, Tenure, and Beyond, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 459, 460 
(2006) [hereinafter Claus, Constitutional Guarantees]; Laurence Claus, The One Court That 
Congress Cannot Take Away: Singularity, Supremacy, and Article III, 96 Geo. L.J. 59, 78–79 
(2007) [hereinafter Claus, One Court]. As a doctrinal matter, of course, Chief Justice Mar-
shall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison rejected the notion that Congress could expand the 
Court’s original jurisdiction. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–75 (1803). The etiology of how 
the conventional view developed will be the subject of a future article. 
48 Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1400–02. 
49 Id. at 1403–34. 
2012] The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence 1235 
range of appellate jurisdiction in the first place.50 If one recognizes, 
however, that the Extension Clause sets not just the ceiling but also the 
floor of the Court’s jurisdiction, the conventional account loses its last 
leg to stand on.51 
 As sketched above, scholars seeking to prop up the orthodox in-
terpretation have attacked the three terms at the front of the Extension 
Clause: “judicial Power,” “shall,” and “extend.”52 Each of the three lines 
of attack purports to explain how it is that calibrating the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction rests with Congress, a body 
mentioned nowhere in the clause.53 As discussed below in Parts II, III, 
                                                                                                                      
50 Under such a reading, Congress could use its power under the Exceptions Clause to 
expand the set of cases whose form of jurisdiction would be original but could still set the 
overall level of the Court’s jurisdiction below the putative ceiling of the Extension Clause. 
Perhaps Congress could withhold jurisdiction even over cases whose jurisdiction would, if 
it existed at all, be constitutionally settled as original. Though scholars advocating the con-
ventional view have largely shied from that possibility, it is not structurally inconceivable. 
See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 755 (speculating that the Original Jurisdiction 
Clause “might leave the legislature with the power to decide whether to confer supreme 
court jurisdiction over those disputes, while embodying a strong presumption in favor of 
doing so and a requirement that any such jurisdiction be original”). 
51 If one were to acknowledge the Extension Clause’s guarantee of jurisdiction but in-
sist that the Exceptions Clause allows Congress to take it away, one would embrace an awk-
ward, if not wholly unimaginable, posture in which one constitutional provision is an un-
qualified grant to the judiciary but another is a legislative license to undo that grant. See 1 
William Winslow Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the 
United States 616 (1953) (criticizing the view that the exceptions power is “uncondi-
tioned by the earlier absolute provisions of Article III”); Amar, supra note 38, at 241 n.120 
(opining that such an interpretation “should not be lightly indulged if an alternative read-
ing is possible”); Akhil Reed Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1651, 1654 (1990) (calling such an interpretation “awkward”); cf. Calabresi 
& Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1163 (observing that advocates of mandatory jurisdiction 
maintain that for the jurisdiction-stripping power to be textually explicit, either the Vesting 
Clause or the Extension Clause would need to refer to the superseding power of the Ex-
ceptions Clause). But see Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the Interpreta-
tion of Article III, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1633, 1635–36 (1990) (arguing that regardless of the 
meaning of other provisions of Article III, the Exceptions Clause unambiguously empow-
ers the legislature to restrict jurisdiction); Velasco, supra note 14, at 712 n.196 (arguing as a 
backup that “[r]egardless of whether the judicial power and jurisdiction refer to two dif-
ferent concepts or are synonymous, the Exceptions Clause is not limited by, but rather 
controls, the words ‘shall extend’”). As one scholar recently put it, such “constitutional 
tension” suggests that “Article III is at war with itself.” Grove, Structural Safeguards, supra 
note 4, at 870–73 (arguing that the tension is resolved by “structural safeguards” of Article 
I that save Article III from itself). 
52 See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
53 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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and IV, each of the three is flawed.54 And thus so is the theory of the 
Court’s jurisdictional dependency. 
II. The Jurisdictional Past (and Present) of the  
“Judicial Power” 
 To justify the stripping of the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction, some scholars have emphasized that the subject of the Ex-
tension Clause is the “judicial Power,” not “jurisdiction.”55 As this Part 
explains, however, that shallow distinction overlooks the deeper inter-
dependence of the two concepts. The constitutional drafting history 
sheds bright light on their relationship, in that for most of the Federal 
Convention, the subject of the clause was in fact “jurisdiction.”56 The 
late edit to “judicial Power” had nothing to do with facilitating legisla-
tive control of the Court’s jurisdiction. The power was to be resolutely 
judicial and would inherently retain a jurisdictional dimension. 
A. A Judicial—Not Legislative—Power 
 The most salient characteristic of the “judicial Power” may be the 
most obvious: it is judicial. Such truisms can smack of facile tautological 
sophistry. For example, when Chief Justice John Roberts announced 
that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop dis-
criminating on the basis of race,”57 he was subtly equating invidious 
majoritarianism with affirmative action.58 And Yogi Berra’s dictum that 
“[i]t ain’t over ’til it’s over”59 conflates the plausible and the possible.60 
But sometimes a judicial power is just judicial. 
 In a different context, the Supreme Court recently expanded on 
that fundamental tenet of Article III: “‘[T]he “judicial Power of the 
United States” . . . can no more be shared’ with another branch than 
‘the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto 
                                                                                                                      
54 See infra notes 55–163 and accompanying text (discussing the term “judicial pow-
er”); infra notes 164–244 and accompanying text (discussing the term “shall”); infra notes 
245–399 and accompanying text (discussing the term “extend”). 
55 See infra notes 110–124 and accompanying text. 
56 See infra notes 130–163 and accompanying text. 
57 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
58 See id. at 709–11 (holding that a school assignment plan designed to achieve racial 
balance violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
59 Phil Pepe, The Wit and Wisdom of Yogi Berra, at xii (2002). 
60 That conflation, of course, flagrantly contravenes the “Twiqbal” pleading standard. 
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680, 683 (2009) (highlighting the importance of a line 
between “plausible” and “conceivable”); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007) (same). 
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power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to override a 
Presidential veto.’”61 In other words, the Article III power is not just 
primarily judicial, but solely judicial. 
 The context for that pronouncement was the 2011 case of Stern v. 
Marshall, in which the Court held that a federal statute authorizing 
bankruptcy courts to adjudicate state-law tort counterclaims in bank-
ruptcy proceedings violated the U.S. Constitution by vesting the judicial 
power in courts whose judges lack the protections of Article III.62 Un-
dergirding the holding was the principle of separation of powers: “Arti-
cle III could neither serve its purpose in the system of checks and bal-
ances nor preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking if the other 
branches of the Federal Government could confer the Government’s 
‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.”63 From that premise, the 
Court reasoned that “in general, Congress may not ‘withdraw from ju-
dicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a 
suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.’”64 
 One might think that a Court with such an emphatic view of the 
judiciary’s independence would likewise frown on legislatively with-
drawing from federal courts’ cognizance cases and controversies that 
are listed in the Extension Clause. To be sure, a particular concern 
about congressional aggrandizement—seizing power from another 
branch for itself—may have animated Stern.65 When confronting sepa-
ration-of-powers issues, the Court has often viewed such power grabs 
with special skepticism.66 But stripping the Court of jurisdiction ap-
                                                                                                                      
 
61 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 1)) (omission in original). 
62 Id. at 2600–01, 2620. 
63 Id. at 2609. 
64 Id. (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 284 (1856)). 
65 See id. at 2624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (framing an inquiry about whether Congress 
sought to aggrandize its own authority). 
66 See, e.g., Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 
501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991) (“To forestall the danger of encroachment ‘beyond the legislative 
sphere,’ the Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on the Congress. It may 
not ‘invest itself or its Members with either executive power or judicial power.’” (quoting J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928))); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 733–34 (1986) (holding a congressional attempt to assume executive power to be un-
constitutional); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959–62 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (detail-
ing, in the context of a decision overturning a provision authorizing the legislative veto of an 
executive determination, the constitutional framers’ concern about the legislative exercise of 
judicial power); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (“The Framers regarded the checks 
and balances that they had built into the tripartite Federal Government as a self-executing 
safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the 
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proaches aggrandizement in substance, even though it may not be 
formally equal to legislative assumption of that power. By selectively 
eliminating judicial review, Congress in effect performs its own review 
of its enactments, implicitly concluding that they are constitutional. 
 In any event, if, as the Stern majority proclaimed, Congress may not 
even dilute the judicial power by conferring it in original form on non-
Article III entities—despite the possibility of appeal to Article III 
courts—on the ground that “[a] statute may no more lawfully chip away 
at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it en-
tirely,”67 then it might seem to follow that Congress could hardly strip 
away the power to decide certain disputes from the Article III judiciary 
altogether. But in the midst of exalting Article III’s Section 1 (vesting 
the judicial power in federal courts), the majority’s opinion subtly nod-
ded to the conventional view of jurisdiction-stripping that eviscerates 
Section 2: “When a suit is made of ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at 
common law . . . ,’ and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdic-
tion, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges 
in Article III courts.”68 
 Who is it that needs to bring the suit within those bounds? An in-
nocuous answer might be “the plaintiff,” but if so, the word “brought” 
would seem unnecessary. The more likely implicit answer is the conven-
tional one, namely, that federal courts—including the Supreme Court— 
have no jurisdiction unless Congress affirmatively brings cases and con-
troversies to them by enacting jurisdictional statutes within the bounds 
of the Extension Clause. As to inferior courts, that view may have merit, 
based on Congress’s discretion about the courts’ existence,69 but that 
understanding is the norm even as to the Supreme Court. Perhaps the 
                                                                                                                      
other.”). See generally Walter Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the Presi-
dent and Congress, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 513, 521–26 (2000) (summarizing the history 
and application of the “anti-aggrandizement principle”). 
67 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620 (stressing that even seemingly “innocuous” intrusions on the 
judicial power unconstitutionally “compromise the integrity of the system of separated 
powers”). 
68 Id. at 2609 (emphasis added) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)). 
69 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448–49 (1850) (upholding Congress’s 
right to define inferior courts’ jurisdiction “as a necessary consequence” of its power to 
establish such courts); Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to Control 
the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
45, 46–47 (1975) (restating the traditional argument that the power to disestablish courts 
necessarily includes the power to limit their jurisdiction); cf. Larry W. Yackle, Federal 
Courts 60–61 (1999) (agreeing with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheldon but criticiz-
ing the Court’s reliance on the “‘greater power’ syllogism”). 
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Stern majority used the passive voice because the standard view is so 
commonplace as to be understood even when not spelled out. Or per-
haps next to Stern’s ringing language about the separation of powers, it 
would have been embarrassing to emphasize that the responsibility for 
adjudicating the suits listed in the Extension Clause resides with the Ar-
ticle III judiciary only to the extent that Congress sees fit to allow. 
 Regardless of what signal the Stern majority meant to send, there is 
little reason to think that the Supreme Court is ready to embrace the 
view that its own jurisdiction is constitutionally enshrined. In 1799, the 
Court announced that “[i]f congress has given the power to this Court, 
we pos[s]ess it, not otherwise . . . .”70 And after similar pronounce-
ments through the years,71 the same principle held true in 1996: 
“[O]ur appellate powers . . . ‘are limited [by Congress].’”72 
                                                                                                                     
 More recently, in 2006, a majority of the Supreme Court in Ham-
dan v. Rumsfeld managed to avoid exploring “Congress’ authority to im-
pinge upon [its] appellate jurisdiction” on the ground that the jurisdic-
tion-stripping statute in question—the Detainee Treatment Act of 
200573—did not apply to the case at hand.74 Though five justices re-
ferred to “grave questions” about that putative legislative authority, 
those questions apparently focused on the narrow issue of the constitu-
tionality of withdrawing jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions.75 
Indeed, two years later, those same five justices held for the Court that 
the statute violated Article I’s Suspension Clause and thus had no occa-
sion to address the broader impingement question.76 Three justices, all 
 
 
70 Turner v. Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799). 
71 E.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 567 (1962) (noting with approval that 
“Congress has consistently with [Article III] withdrawn the jurisdiction of this Court to 
proceed with a case then sub judice”); Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 507–08, 
514–15 (1869) (dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Congress 
had, during the pendency of the appeal, repealed a jurisdictional statutory provision relied 
on by the habeas corpus petitioner); Daniels v. R.R. Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1866) 
(“In order to create [appellate] jurisdiction in any case, . . . an act of Congress must supply 
the requisite authority.”); Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) (“[T]he Su-
preme Court possesses no appellate power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of 
Congress . . . .”). 
72 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 661 (1996) (quoting Durousseau v. United States, 10 
U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810)). 
73 Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739, 2742 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(e)(1) (2006)); see supra text accompanying notes 9–10 (discussing the statute). 
74 548 U.S. 557, 574–76 (2006). 
75 See id. at 566, 575, 638. 
76 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730, 732–33 (2008). Although the Supreme 
Court did not directly address that more general issue in striking down the Detainee Treat-
ment Act, some scholars have seen broader implications in the decision. See Pfander, supra 
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of whom were in the Stern majority,77 dissented in Hamdan and directly 
rejected the argument that Congress could not control the Court’s ap-
pellate jurisdiction.78 
 Still, a Court willing to embrace Stern’s robust view of the judicial 
power and the impermissibility of spreading it to non-Article III entities 
should be able to acknowledge the independence of that same power 
from legislative restriction. If (un)constitutionality has a continuum, 
stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction is more egregious— re-
gardless of the putative distinction about whether or not the legislative 
branch formally acquires any power79—than allowing bankruptcy 
courts to adjudicate common law claims. Under the statutory scheme 
invalidated by Stern, Article III courts retained appellate jurisdiction to 
review bankruptcy court judgments on such claims;80 the harm was 
thus temporary and ultimately curable,81 as with an unwarranted re-
quirement to exhaust state remedies before pursuing an action under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court.82 In contrast, if Congress has with-
drawn jurisdiction over the type of case or controversy at issue, no Arti-
cle III court will weigh in during the life of the litigation; such harm 
can be permanent and dispositive, as with the unconstitutional nullifi-
cation of the writ of habeas corpus.83 The maxim notwithstanding, jus-
tice denied can be worse than justice delayed. 
                                                                                                                     
 Indeed, legislative restraints on federal jurisdiction undermine 
both purposes Stern cited for the separation of powers. One is “to pro-
 
note 8, at 161–62 (suggesting that the Court’s non-dogmatic analysis “would presumably 
inform the Court’s evaluation of [other] jurisdiction-stripping legislation”); Martin J. Katz, 
Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The Imperial President Meets the Imperial 
Court, 25 Const. Comment. 377, 395 (2009) (arguing that the majority implicitly decided 
that, in constitutional cases, Congress may not preclude all federal jurisdiction). 
77 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2599 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.). 
78 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas & Alito, JJ.). The 
Hamdan dissenters cited the Exceptions Clause in support. See id. But most statements by 
the Court about its jurisdictional subjugation do not specify any constitutional text. See, 
e.g., Barry, 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 119 (citing only “the constitution of the United States”). 
79 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text (discussing the anti-aggrandizement 
principle). 
80 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2603–04, 2618–19. 
81 But cf. id. at 2611 (noting the “limited” nature of appellate review, in that Article III 
courts would defer to the findings of fact of bankruptcy courts). 
82 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168, 183 (1961) (holding that plaintiffs need not 
exhaust state remedies before invoking § 1983 to obtain jurisdiction in federal court); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing any person deprived of rights under color of state 
law with a private right of action in federal court). 
83 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33 (holding that suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus by the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was unconstitutional because substitute 
procedures provided by the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 were inadequate). 
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tect each branch of government from incursion by the others.”84 The 
putative authority of Congress to prevent the judiciary from doing its 
job—which often happens to include reviewing the constitutionality of 
congressional acts—invites such an incursion. The other is to “protect 
the individual.”85 On that note, a central purpose of the federal judici-
ary is to safeguard federal rights and interests that might not receive 
proper respect in state courts.86 In Stern, the Supreme Court protected 
litigants from having to start in a non-Article III court; one hopes the 
Court will one day recognize that the conventional view of congres-
sional power raises the federalism concern that litigants may be (un-
constitutionally) stopped from ever reaching any federal forum at all. 
 That day does not seem to be at hand, however. The Supreme 
Court continued its complicity in the conventional view in the 2012 
case of Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC.87 The case turned in part 
on whether a specific jurisdictional statute trumped the general federal 
question jurisdictional provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.88 Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that federal “ju-
risdiction” exists over any claim arising under federal law, with a crucial 
caveat: “unless Congress divests federal courts of their § 1331 adjudica-
tory authority.”89 
 Section 1331, of course, would be substantively superfluous absent 
the conventional view that Congress may divest federal courts of their 
Article III judicial power. Justice Ginsburg thus implicitly acquiesced to 
that view, but by resorting to lexical camouflage, she hid from its glare. 
For what is “adjudicatory authority” but “judicial Power”? And if the 
“judicial Power” of the United States “shall extend” constitutionally to 
“all Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the United States,” how can 
Congress divest that power? One might argue that Congress’s discre-
tion about whether to establish inferior courts in the first place implies 
discretion to control their jurisdiction, a point that lies beyond the 
scope of this Article.90 But as to the Supreme Court, it is harder to ex-
plain the supposed fragility of the “judicial Power.” The awkwardness of 
                                                                                                                      
84 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2011)). 
85 Id.; see also id. at 2615 (calling Article III a “guardian of individual liberty”). 
86 See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 69, at 29 (noting the subtle distinction between federal 
law and federal interests). 
87 132 S. Ct. 740, 744–45 (2012). 
88 Id. at 753. 
89 Id. at 749 (emphasis added). 
90 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (citing authorities asserting legislative 
power to control the jurisdiction of inferior courts). 
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evoking Article III’s language presumably drove Justice Ginsburg to 
seek refuge in the Orwellian “adjudicatory authority.” 
 Whatever her reasons for choosing that phrase, Justice Ginsburg’s 
opinion in Mims equated “adjudicatory authority” with “jurisdiction,” in 
effect acknowledging the common-sense notion that if courts have “ad-
judicatory authority” —or in plainer language, judicial power—then 
they have jurisdiction. 
B. The Interdependence of Jurisdiction and the Judicial Power 
 The constitutionally granted “judicial Power” is not interchange-
able with “jurisdiction,” but neither is it unrelated.91 It is simply more 
expansive.92 The argument that the distinction between those terms 
permits legislative control of the Supreme Court’s appellate “jurisdic-
tion” is thus unfounded. 
1. The Fluidity of the Terms 
 As many have recognized, jurisdiction—the power to “hear and 
determine” disputes, as the Supreme Court has called it93—is but a spe-
cific dimension of judicial power,94 serving as a threshold or gateway to 
the power’s other facets.95 A court’s general judicial power also in-
                                                                                                                      
91 See A. Michael Froomkin, Still Naked After All These Words, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1420, 
1421–23 (1994) (calling the terms “not inevitably synonymous” and discussing their inter-
relationship). 
92 See Amar, supra note 38, at 231 n.88 (referring to the judicial power as including ju-
risdiction); Leland E. Beck, Constitution, Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics 
of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 9 Hastings Const. L.Q. 773, 783 
n.32 (1982) (noting that the term “encompasses not only the authority to hear and deter-
mine cases,” but also powers inherent to courts). 
93 United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 709 (1832) (“The power to hear 
and determine a cause is jurisdiction . . . .”); see also infra text accompanying notes 333–378 
(discussing the history of the phrase “hear and determine”). 
94 See David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress’ Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 
1999 BYU L. Rev. 75, 82–83 (referring to jurisdiction as one “dimension” of judicial power, 
distinguishable from the dimension of “judicial potency” with respect to cases within a 
court’s jurisdiction); cf. William A. Sutherland, Notes on the Constitution of the 
United States 518 (1904) (“Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine the subject 
matter in controversy between the parties to a suit; to adjudicate or exercise judicial power 
over it.”); Velasco, supra note 14, at 711 (“[T]he judicial power is the general power of the 
judiciary while jurisdiction is the authority to exercise that power in a given case.”). 
95 See Charles Warren, Congress, Constitution, and the Supreme Court 55 
(1930) (“Judicial power comprises the functions exercised by a Court after it has obtained 
jurisdiction.”); Froomkin, supra note 91, at 1422 n.10 (calling jurisdiction a “prerequisite 
to the exercise of judicial power”). 
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cludes, for example, the specific powers to issue judgments,96 to wield 
certain remedies,97 and to control the attorneys before it,98 as well as 
other “inherent” powers.99 
 The argument that jurisdiction is not inherently part of the “judi-
cial Power” of the Extension Clause would have more force if the clause 
read something like this: “The judicial Power shall extend to the full 
range of remedies available at common law.”100 Because the actual text, 
however, extends the judicial power not to certain remedies but to cer-
tain categories of legal disputes, the inference is reasonably clear that 
the clause addresses the jurisdictional dimension of the power—in oth-
er words, the set of disputes that the courts, vested with the power by 
Section 1 of Article III, are able to hear and determine. 
 The word “jurisdiction” itself is hardly static. It can signify not only 
the ability to hear and determine a case but also the subject matter of a 
case; that meaning is apparent in the Extension Clause’s category of 
                                                                                                                      
96 See Samuel Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United States 314 
(New York, Banks & Bros. 1891) (defining judicial power as that “of a court to decide and 
pronounce a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a 
case before it for decision”). 
97 See Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 70–71 (1924) (citing “inherent judicial 
power” as the source of authority to hold parties in contempt). Despite Marbury v. Madi-
son’s insistence on treating a writ of mandamus as a type of jurisdiction, see 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803), it may be better viewed as a separate aspect of judicial pow-
er—an understanding under which the decision was wrongly decided. After all, the Judici-
ary Act of 1789 set out “jurisdiction” over various cases while granting the Supreme Court 
the “power” to issue certain writs, order parties to produce evidence, and grant new trials. 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13, 14, 15, 1 Stat. 73, 80–83 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (2006)); see Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 443, 456–59 (1989) (parsing the usage of “jurisdic-
tion” and “power” in the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
98 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17 (authorizing the power to punish contempt and 
to “establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of] business”). The Supreme 
Court has often referred to the ability to control attorneys as part of the judicial power. 
E.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378–79 (1867) (discussing the power to admit 
and disbar attorneys). 
99 See Edward F. Cooke, A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution 94 (6th ed. 
1995) (describing “judicial power” as “the power of a court to hear and pronounce a 
judgment and carry that judgment into effect,” in contrast to “jurisdiction,” which is “the 
authority of a court to exercise judicial power in a specific case”); Warren, supra note 95, 
at 56 (describing judicial power as the power “to enter judgment, to issue execution, to 
enjoin, to commit for contempt, or to do any of the other things which the Court per-
forms as a judicial body”). 
100 In the absence of any constitutional language about jurisdiction, some observers 
might have argued that Congress had full control; others that there must be implicit limits 
to avoid encroaching on states; and others that jurisdiction would continue as before, in 
the small range of prize cases heard by national courts under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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“all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” Indeed, it would 
have been odd to describe courts as having “jurisdiction” over cases of a 
certain “jurisdiction.” 
 The term can also refer to general governmental authority or sov-
ereignty.101 And it can mean geographic territory. Confusion among 
those senses resulted in the Article IV prohibition of the creation of 
new states “within the Jurisdiction of any other State.”102 Some states 
had asserted claims to western territory beyond their borders, and del-
egates to the Federal Convention specifically substituted “Jurisdiction” 
for “limits” to allay a concern that one state might be “within the as-
serted limits” of another yet beyond its authoritative “Jurisdiction.”103 
 As Article III took shape at the Convention, the versatility of “juris-
diction” was all too evident in the Extension Clause. For most of the 
summer, the operative draft of the clause used it in three ways: “The 
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to . . . all cases of Admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction; [and] to controversies between two or 
more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) 
. . . .”104 In the face of such looming inelegance, it is no surprise that, in 
late August, the phrase “judicial Power” intervened as the subject of the 
clause or that the word “jurisdiction” was reserved to allocate cases be-
tween original hearings and appeals.105 
 “Jurisdiction” was the natural word to use with “original” and “ap-
pellate.” It would have been unthinkably clumsy to refer to a court’s 
original or appellate “judicial power.” And the choice of “judicial Pow-
er” as the Extension Clause’s subject linked Section 2 of Article III to 
the previous section, which vested that power in the Supreme Court 
(and potentially in inferior courts); the Vesting Clause in turn echoed 
the introductions of the legislative and executive powers in the open-
ings of Articles I and II.106 Since the first days of the Convention, dele-
                                                                                                                      
 
101 For example, at the Federal Convention, Connecticut’s Roger Sherman opposed a 
resolution requiring oaths by state officials about observing national laws as “unnecessarily 
intruding into the State jurisdictions.” 1 Records, supra note 29, at 192 ( June 11), 203 
(Madison’s notes). 
102 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3. James Wilson, writing not as a constitutional drafter but as 
a Supreme Court justice, asserted the Court’s constitutionally granted power over states in 
terms that, in context, he treated as interchangeable: “jurisdiction,” “judicial power,” and 
“judiciary authority.” See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 465 (1793) (Wilson, J.). 
103 2 Records, supra note 29, at 457 (Aug. 30), 463 (Madison’s notes). 
104 See id. at 176 (Aug. 6), 186 (report of the Committee of Detail) (emphasis added). 
105 Id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
106 The Vesting Clause addresses the judicial power “of the United States.” U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 1. Some scholars have seized on that qualifier to distinguish the judicial power 
from the unadorned “executive Power” vested by Article II. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, 
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gates had referred to the three coordinate “powers”107—the same ones 
King George III had lambasted colonists for using108—and a midsum-
mer draft of the Constitution had stated that “[t]he Government shall 
consist of supreme legislative, executive, and judicial Powers.”109 Keep-
ing “jurisdiction” at the head of the Extension Clause would have nei-
ther sufficed stylistically nor communicated the full range of authority 
granted to the national courts. 
2. A False Dichotomy 
 The expansiveness of “judicial Power” and protean nature of “juris-
diction” are hardly reasons to doubt the Extension Clause’s role as a ju-
risdictional grant to the Supreme Court. But defenders of the ortho-
doxy have seized on the distinction between them to argue that even if 
the “judicial Power” shall extend over the listed cases, Congress retains 
control over “jurisdiction.”110 Julian Velasco’s position is illustrative. He 
                                                                                                                      
 
supra note 30, at 1196. The distinction, they insinuate, makes the power granted in Article 
III’s Vesting Clause more susceptible to congressional control than that granted in its Arti-
cle II counterpart. See id. (hinting that “of the United States” limits the judicial power). As 
a critic has pointed out, the distinction is of little import unless the President is purported 
to have executive power beyond that “of the United States.” See Froomkin, supra note 91, at 
1425 n.22 (faulting the “over-literal mindedness” of the distinction); cf. infra note 278 (dis-
cussing the impact of the phrase “herein granted” in the Vesting Clause of Article I). 
Moreover, the phrase “of the United States” helps signal that individual states retain judi-
cial power. At any rate, the judicial power referred to in the Extension Clause unmistakably 
refers to that of the Vesting Clause, namely, that “of the United States.” And the presence 
(in the Article III Vesting Clause) or absence (in the Extension Clause and in the Vesting 
Clauses of Articles I and II) of the clarifying qualifier hardly diminishes the elegance of the 
Extension Clause’s evocation of the parallel powers of other branches. 
107 The “Virginia Plan,” introduced by Governor Edmund Randolph, resolved that 
“the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound 
by oath to support the articles of Union.” 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 22 
(Madison’s notes). Though that reference was to state governments, it was clear that the 
delegates viewed those three “powers” as the pillars of the new national government. See, 
e.g., 1 Records, supra note 29, at 62 ( June 1), 67 (Madison’s notes) (summarizing the 
debate about the need to define executive “powers” as distinct from legislative and judici-
ary “powers”); id. at 130 ( June 6), 139 (Madison’s notes), 141 (Robert Yates’s notes) (re-
ferring to “the Executive,” “the Judiciary,” and “the Legislature” as “distinct powers”); id. at 
460 ( June 29), 469 (Madison’s notes) (summarizing the exhortation by Connecticut’s 
Oliver Ellsworth to “[l]et a strong Executive, a Judiciary & Legislative power be created”). 
108 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
109 2 Records, supra note 29, at 163 (Wilson draft for the Committee of Detail). 
110 E.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 708, 751–52 (noting “confidently” the 
drafters’ distinction between terms and concluding that “the ‘Judicial Power shall extend 
to’ language could not mean ‘jurisdiction shall be’”); Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1573–74 
n.14 (citing with approval a comment from a representative in the First Congress that “the 
failure to give the federal courts jurisdiction does not divest them of the judicial power”); 
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sees no inconsistency in arguing that “the Constitution explicitly grants 
Congress control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction” (un-
der the conventional interpretation of the Exceptions Clause) but ac-
knowledging that “Congress has no control over the judicial power.”111 
After all, he rationalizes, “it is only the judicial power, not jurisdiction, 
that ‘shall extend’ to the enumerated cases.”112 
 It is one thing to note that the concepts are not identical but an-
other to suggest that they do not even overlap. Jurisdiction, after all, is a 
prerequisite to the exercise of other facets of the judicial power.113 Ve-
lasco apparently could envision a judiciary with plenty of abstract power 
but no actual jurisdiction.114 As a theoretical construct, that could 
work, but as a constitutional foundation, it has no basis.115 Elsewhere, 
even Velasco seems to admit that jurisdiction is a dimension of the judi-
cial power. In analyzing a rejected proposal at the Federal Convention 
for “the Judicial power [to] be exercised in such manner as the Legisla-
ture shall direct,”116 he posits that the proposal would have given Con-
gress “plenary authority not only over jurisdiction, but over the judicial 
power.”117 Once those two terms are understood to be interdependent, 
it becomes hard to explain how one can be “irrevocably vested” (as 
Velasco admits) in the judiciary while the other is (as he posits) subject 
to “nearly plenary” congressional control.118 
                                                                                                                      
Velasco, supra note 14, at 705 n.167 (“At most, the judicial power automatically extends to 
all such cases. Jurisdiction does not.”). 
111 See Velasco, supra note 14, at 711 (noting that the judicial power is “irrevocably vest-
ed”). He later hedges that bet: “Regardless of whether the judicial power and jurisdiction 
refer to two different concepts or are synonymous, the Exceptions Clause is not limited by, 
but rather controls, the words ‘shall extend.’” Id. at 712 n.196. 
112 Id. at 711, 716. 
113 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
114 See Velasco, supra note 14, at 711, 716. 
115 See Froomkin, supra note 91, at 1423 (“[W]ithout jurisdiction a court has no ‘judi-
cial Power.’”). 
116 2 Records, supra note 29, at 431 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
117 Velasco, supra note 14, at 732–33. 
118 See id. at 711, 765 (acknowledging the permanency of judicial power and embracing 
the traditional view of congressional control of jurisdiction). Even under President Frank-
lin Roosevelt, who famously tried to control the Supreme Court in various ways, the U.S. 
Department of Justice recognized the interdependence of jurisdiction and judicial power. 
In a memorandum evaluating a jurisdiction-stripping proposal, an assistant solicitor gen-
eral opined that although Congress could restrict the Court’s “jurisdiction,” its “judicial 
power” was “exempt from legislative interference,” and thus the Court’s judicial review 
function could not be taken away under the guise of jurisdictional regulation. Memoran-
dum from Warner W. Gardner, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C., to the Solicitor 
Gen. (Aug. 15, 1935) (emphasis added), quoted in Grove, Article II Safeguards, supra note 4, 
at 272 & nn.101–05. 
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 Another scholar, John Harrison, takes a superficially more tenable 
approach. He acknowledges the relationship between the terms: “Judi-
cial power and jurisdiction are obviously closely related concepts, but, 
just as obviously, they are not the same concept.”119 The distinction he 
makes between them, however, is curious: “The judicial power is . . . less 
specific than a particular court’s jurisdiction, as the potential is less spe-
cific than the actual.”120 He concludes that inapt juxtaposition by equat-
ing the judicial power with the “potential” as opposed to “actual scope 
of federal jurisdiction.”121 Harrison is right that “judicial power” is less 
specific than “jurisdiction.” But generality is not tantamount to potenti-
ality. Nothing about its higher level of abstraction makes the judicial 
power “potential,” any more than the executive power is more potential 
than, say, the treaty power. Whether concerning treaties, the executive 
branch generally, or the judiciary, the constitutional power is actual; 
the potential is whether it will be used, and to what extent. 
 Harrison’s point about potentiality would be harmless if he meant 
that the entity with the power—the judiciary—could decide when to use 
it. Instead, though, he insists that the decision to unleash the judicial 
power is “left for Congress, as many important choices are.”122 To sup-
port that claim, in addition to relying on the conventional view of the 
Exceptions Clause, he compares Article III with Article I. The legislative 
power to “lay and collect Taxes” and so on does not imply a duty to do so. 
Harrison’s argument is that likewise, the power of the judiciary over a 
range of cases does not imply that it must have jurisdiction.123 The anal-
ogy works to a point, but the more logical conclusion to draw from it 
would be that the judiciary is under no duty to exercise its power.124 
 In the context of Article II, it would be unthinkable to interpret 
“the executive Power shall be vested” or “he shall have Power to grant 
Reprieves and Pardons” as having an implied qualifier of “only if Con-
gress decides that the President may use the power.”125 Yet the conven-
                                                                                                                      
119 Harrison, supra note 17, at 214. 
120 Id. at 215. 
121 Id. at 218. 
122 Id. at 213. 
123 Id. at 213–14. 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43 (stressing the Supreme Court’s lack of ob-
ligation to exercise its power in every case). 
125 See U.S. Const. art. II, §§ 1–2; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 
(1872) (holding that Congress may not impair the executive pardon power); Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329–30 (1816) (analogizing that because the 
phrase “shall be vested” creates inviolable powers in Articles I and II, it does in Article III 
as well); cf. Amar, supra note 38, at 224 (drawing a similar parallel between judicial power 
and executive power). 
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tional view of the Extension Clause reduces the Supreme Court, with 
respect to its appellate jurisdiction, to such a puppet. Few commenta-
tors argue that the provision of Article III’s Section 1 that “[t]he judi-
cial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court” 
allows Congress to interfere,126 and with good reason. The drafters 
knew how to convey such authority, as they did in the same clause with 
respect to the potential establishment of inferior courts.127 In Section 2, 
though, the conventional interpretation of “[t]he judicial Power” twists 
it into, effectively, “the legislative Power to authorize courts to exercise 
jurisdiction.” Whatever ambiguities inhere in the concept of judicial 
power, a natural reading cannot shift the power, without any reference 
to Congress, from the judiciary to the legislature. 
C. Words Collide in Philadelphia 
 The words that became the Extension Clause developed in fits and 
starts, but most of the editing concerned the substantive list of cases 
and controversies that would be heard and determined by the Supreme 
Court. The structure of the clause, in contrast, was relatively stable. As 
discussed in this Section, its subject at first was “jurisdiction” but even-
tually changed to “judicial Power,” for reasons unrelated to legislative 
control of the Court’s jurisdiction.128 The equally innocuous appear-
ance of the word “extend” is discussed in a later section.129 
1. The Early Focus on “Jurisdiction” 
 For most of the Federal Convention in Philadelphia during the 
summer of 1787, the nascent Extension Clause was phrased in terms of 
“jurisdiction.” The clause originated in the “Virginia Plan” introduced 
by Governor Edmund Randolph on May 29, at the outset of the Con-
vention.130 The plan chartered a bold course for a radically new na-
                                                                                                                      
126 But cf. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1178, 1187–88, 1199–1200, 1209–10 
(positing that if “shall” means “will,” the clause is merely “descriptive” rather than “manda-
tory” and thus allows Congress discretion). 
127 See infra notes 330–356 and accompanying text. 
128 See infra notes 130–163 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 358–386 and accompanying text. 
130 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 21–22 (Madison’s notes). Perhaps be-
cause he was “handsome” and “eloquent,” Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the 
Constitution 1787–1800, at 199 (1950), Randolph was the spokesman for the Virginia 
delegation; he had consulted with the other members about the plan. See Letter from 
James Madison to John Tyler, in 3 Records, supra note 29, at 524, 525. 
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tional government.131 Though historical sources differ about some of 
the plan’s details, such as whether it contemplated simply an undiffer-
entiated “National Judiciary” or organized the branch into “one or 
more supreme tribunals” and “inferior tribunals,” the language that 
became the head of the Extension Clause is clear: “jurisdiction . . . shall 
be to hear & determine [various types of cases].”132 
 The week that followed brought conflict over the anticipated pro-
liferation of federal courts.133 The delegates eventually agreed on the 
“Madisonian compromise,” which punted the decision of whether to 
establish inferior courts to the national legislature.134 Through it all, 
the basic structure and terminology of the budding Extension Clause 
survived, including the term “jurisdiction.” 
 Soon after, on June 13, following discussions about the substantive 
content of the clause, Randolph successfully introduced a resolution 
using a new verb but still with the same subject: “[T]he jurisdiction of 
the national Judiciary shall extend to [a variety of cases].”135 At the end 
of July, a five-man Committee of Detail began the task of turning the 
various resolutions agreed on by the Convention into a working draft of 
a constitution.136 In each of the two significant drafts that emerged 
from the committee, the developing Extension Clause did not yet men-
tion the “judicial power” but otherwise continued to resemble the 
                                                                                                                      
131 See 2 Records, supra note 29, at 555 (Sept. 10), 560 (Madison’s notes) (relating Ran-
dolph’s conviction of a need for “radical changes”); Richard Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: 
The Making of the American Constitution 88 (2009) (calling Randolph’s plan “an en-
tirely new conception of the fledgling American government” and “a revolutionary step”). 
132 Compare John Franklin Jameson, Studies in the History of the Federal Con-
vention of 1787, at 103–06 (1903) (compiling what John Franklin Jameson thought the 
original version would most likely have been and referring only to a “National Judiciary”), 
with 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 21–22 (Madison’s notes)(referring to “su-
preme” and “inferior” tribunals). In his widely cited Records, Max Farrand acknowledged 
the unavailability of the original Virginia Plan. 3 Records, supra note 29, at app. C, 593–94 
(respecting though disagreeing with the alternative perspective). 
133 See, e.g., 1 Records, supra note 29, at 115 ( June 5), 124–25 (Madison’s notes). 
134 See id. at 115 ( June 5), 118 ( journal), 127 (Yates’s notes); infra notes 330–357 and 
accompanying text. 
135 1 Records, supra note 29, at 223 ( June 13), 223–24 ( journal), 232 ( journal and 
Madison’s notes). 
136 2 id. at 116 ( July 26), 117 ( journal), 128 (Madison’s notes). The committee was 
formed on July 24 for the purpose of composing constitutional language reflecting the 
resolutions that had been passed by the full Convention. See id. at 97 ( July 24), 97 ( jour-
nal), 106 (Madison’s notes). 
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eventual final version: “The jurisdiction of the supreme [tribunal or 
Court] shall extend . . . .”137 
2. The Late Shift to “Judicial Power” 
 It was not until August 27 that the full Convention again focused 
on the judiciary.138 On that day, it made a fateful edit that would unwit-
tingly cloud future interpretation of the Extension Clause.139 
 The Committee of Detail had drafted a provision permitting the 
legislature to “assign any part of the [Supreme Court’s] jurisdiction . . . , 
in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to 
. . . Inferior Courts . . . .”140 That language would not last. After some 
adjustments to the substantive list of cases and controversies and the al-
location of original and appellate jurisdictional form, the Convention 
amended the subject of the Extension Clause from the “jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court” to the “Judicial Power,”141 thus embracing all Arti-
cle III courts. Soon after, on the same day, the provision about assigning 
jurisdiction to inferior courts was struck; in light of the newly broadened 
subject of the Extension Clause, the assignment clause was presumably 
deemed unnecessary.142 
                                                                                                                      
 
137 See 4 id. at 37 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from the original), 47 (“tribunal”); see 
also 2 id. at 137 (Randolph draft) (transcribed from a facsimile), 146; id. at 163 (Wilson 
draft), 172 (“Court”) (using slightly different capitalization). 
138 Id. at 422, (Aug. 27), 423–25 ( journal), 428–32 (Madison’s notes). 
139 See infra notes 140–163 and accompanying text. 
140 2 Records, supra note 29, at 176 (Aug. 6), 186–87 (Madison’s notes) (report of the 
Committee of Detail). 
141 Id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (“Judicial Power”), 431 (Madison’s notes) (“Ju-
dicial power”). The phrase did not have any particularly well-defined meaning. See Gary 
Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 Const. 
Comment. 191, 203 & n.51 (2001) (“‘The judicial Power’ simply was not a term that re-
ceived serious attention during the founding period.”). 
142 See 2 Records, supra note 29, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s 
notes). Most scholars have surmised that the reason for the deletion of the assignment 
clause was redundancy. E.g., Claus, One Court, supra note 47, at 85 (calling the clause “sur-
plusage”); David E. Engdahl, What’s in a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” 
Courts, 66 Ind. L.J. 457, 488 n.159 (1991) (opining that the assignment clause “ceased to 
be crucial” once the “Judicial Power” edit was made); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Su-
preme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 Calif. L. Rev. 555, 621 (1994) (call-
ing the clause “redundant”); Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 157, 164 & n.34 (1960) (calling the clause 
“superfluous” as a result of the change to “Judicial Power”); Velasco, supra note 14, at 733 
(calling the clause “unnecessary”). Whether the legislature retained the prerogative to 
restrict the jurisdiction of inferior courts it established—perhaps on the theory that the 
power to create includes the power to control—is beyond the scope of this Article. See 
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 The change to “Judicial Power” was effected without dissent and 
without recorded debate. One reason for the change may have been to 
pave the way for the deletion of the assignment clause. The Madisonian 
compromise had been a bruising battle,143 and the fewer the references 
to potential inferior courts, the more elegant and less controversial the 
judiciary article became.144 There was no parallel language about legis-
lative limitations on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, and nothing 
suggests that the combination of the jurisdictional provisions of the su-
preme and inferior courts silently incorporated such restrictions. 
 One signal that “Judicial Power” was meant to include jurisdiction 
is a motion made later in the day to amend the Appellate Jurisdiction 
Clause. The proposal would have followed the Original Jurisdiction 
Clause, which listed cases in which “[t]he supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction.”145 Yet the proposal (which did not pass) read, “In 
all the other cases before mentioned the judicial power shall be exercised 
in such manner as the Legislature shall direct.”146 The link between 
those sentences, evident by the reference to the “other” cases, shows 
that—at the very least in the mind of the delegate making the pro-
posal—original jurisdiction was a manner of exercising the judicial power. 
 Likewise, during the debate about Randolph’s resolution about 
the jurisdiction of the national judiciary, New York’s Robert Yates in his 
notes used one term for the other: “Randolph observed the difficulty in 
establishing the powers of the judiciary . . . .”147 The actual resolution 
in question used only the term “jurisdiction,” both originally and in the 
revised form proposed by Randolph.148 Yet Randolph—or at least 
Yates—apparently saw no problem with characterizing jurisdiction as a 
judicial power.149 To suggest that the later shift of terms conveyed a 
shift of control is to ignore this overlapping usage.150 
                                                                                                                      
 
Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1419 n.181 (discussing the deletion of the assignment clause); 
supra note 69 and accompanying text (sketching the “greater power” argument). 
143 See infra notes 330–356 and accompanying text (detailing the debates leading to the 
compromise). 
144 See infra text accompanying notes 368–371 (discussing a way to minimize such ref-
erences). 
145 2 Records, supra note 29, at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal) (emphasis added). 
146 Id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes) (emphasis added). 
147 1 id. at 223 ( June 13), 238 (Yates’s notes). 
148 Id. at 15 (May 29), 21–22 (Madison’s notes); id. at 209 ( June 12), 211 ( journal), 
220 (Madison’s notes). 
149 See id. at 223 ( June 13), 238 (Yates’s notes). 
150 See 3 Blackstone, supra note 29, at *32 (categorizing courts from those whose “ju-
risdiction . . . is . . . narrow” to those with the most “extensive . . . power”); 1 id. at *258 
(noting that by the crown’s delegation of “judicial power,” courts acquire “jurisdiction,” 
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 Perhaps the clearest indication that the change from jurisdiction to 
judicial power did not derogate jurisdiction came in a comment by 
James Madison during a debate about the admission of new states. One 
concern was the need to protect claims of the United States to western 
territories.151 To address that concern, Maryland’s Daniel Carroll moved 
to add language to the provision about the admission of new states: 
“Provided nevertheless that nothing in this Constitution shall be con-
strued to affect the claim of the U. S. to vacant lands ceded to them by 
the Treaty of peace.”152 Madison saw no need to insert such language, 
thinking it best not to address that issue at all.153 His basis for not worry-
ing about protecting claims of the United States was telling. The na-
tion’s interests would already be protected, in that the nation’s courts 
would be the ones adjudicating disputes about those lands. In his words, 
such claims of the United States would be “favored by the jurisdiction of 
the Judicial power of the U— S— over controversies to which they 
should be parties.”154 
 That jurisdictional category (U.S.-party controversies) had been 
added to the Extension Clause three days earlier,155 on the same day as 
(and just before) the switch from “jurisdiction” to “Judicial Power.”156 
To Madison, the extension of (at the time) “jurisdiction” to U.S.-party 
controversies was not transformed into something less when moments 
later it became an extension of “judicial power.” Instead, his precise 
phrasing— “the jurisdiction of the Judicial power” —suggests that juris-
                                                                                                                      
which the crown cannot then unilaterally abrogate); A New Law Dictionary (London, 
Giles Jacob & J. Morgan eds., 10th ed. 1782) (citing Blackstone for the bulk of an alpha-
betized entry, on an unnumbered page, for “judicial power”). Early statutes in Virginia 
provide examples of the blending of the two words. One provided that “the . . . General 
Court shall take Cognisance of, and [is] hereby declared to have Power and Jurisdiction to 
hear and determine, all Causes.” Act of General Assembly, 1753, ch. I, § V (1753), in The 
Acts of Assembly, Now in Force, in the Colony of Virginia 293 (1769). Another pro-
vided that “the Justices of every County Court . . . are hereby declared to have Power, Au-
thority, and Jurisdiction, to hear and determine all Causes.” Act of General Assembly, 1748, 
ch. IV, § V (1748), in The Acts of Assembly, Now in Force, in the Colony of Virginia, 
supra, at 169. 
151 2 Records, supra note 29, at 457 (Aug. 30), 465–66 (Madison’s notes). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 457 (Aug. 30), 465 (Madison’s notes). 
154 Id. If anything, Madison viewed the proposed language as leaning too much in fa-
vor of the union; he proposed, successfully, that if the unnecessary language were in-
cluded, it ought to be balanced by a parallel reference to claims of individual states. Id. 
155 Id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 423 ( journal) 430 (Madison’s notes) (indicating that the mo-
tion to insert passed). 
156 Id. at 422 (Aug. 27), 425 ( journal), 431 (Madison’s notes). 
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diction is a facet or dimension of the judicial power.157 Nothing in his 
comment implies that this “jurisdiction of the Judicial power” would be 
subject to congressional control. 
 Madison’s comment switched the focus of the state-admission de-
bate to jurisdiction. Carroll withdrew his motion, substituting a new 
one that added the following point: “but all such claims shall be exam-
ined into & decided upon, by the Supreme Court of the U. States.”158 
Pennsylvania’s Gouverneur Morris moved to substitute different lan-
guage at the front (instead of what was in Carroll’s original motion) 
and leave off the part about the Supreme Court.159 Maryland’s Luther 
Martin moved to amend Morris’s proposal by reinstating that part.160 
Morris protested that such language was “unnecessary, as all suits to 
which the U. S– are parties– are already to be decided by the Supreme 
Court.”161 Martin, though, wanted to “remove all doubts.”162 Martin’s 
amendment was rejected, and Morris’s motion was approved.163 Appar-
ently, it was too obvious that the Extension Clause would guarantee the 
Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over a case listed there to warrant repeat-
ing the point elsewhere. 
 Though the state-admission debate was not directly about Article 
III, its terms help confirm that the shift from “jurisdiction” to “Judicial 
Power” did not undermine the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction; it simply 
embraced inferior courts within the scope of the Extension Clause. The 
jurisdictional grant in the final version of Article III may not be as ex-
plicit as it first was in drafts, but the Court’s jurisdiction nonetheless 
remains an irrepressible dimension of its judicial power. 
III. The Forceful Futurity of “Shall” 
 Thomas Paine’s revolutionary exegesis notwithstanding,164 the in-
terpretation of directives turning on “shall” is a judicial bugaboo. As 
judges have practically stripped it of any inherent meaning, the word 
has become a Rorschach test. Is it a command— “thou shalt not kill”? A 
                                                                                                                      
157 Cf. 2 Records, supra note 29, at 434 (Aug. 28), 439 (Madison’s notes) (noting the 
statement of Gouverneur Morris that, on the subject of interference with private contracts, 
“[t]he Judicial power of the U—S—will be a protection in cases within their jurisdiction”). 
158 Id. at 457 (Aug. 30), 465–66 (Madison’s notes). 
159 Id. at 457 (Aug. 30), 466 (Madison’s notes). 
160 Id. 
161 Id. Presumably, Morris did not consider the possibility of inferior courts. 
162 Id. 
163 2 Records, supra note 29, at 457 (Aug. 30), 466 (Madison’s notes). 
164 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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definitive prediction— “we shall overcome”? Or something more tenta-
tive— “shall we dance?” 
 Modern legal writing guru Bryan Garner has gone so far as to iden-
tify eight distinct senses for “shall” in legal documents.165 Though most 
senses denote a duty,166 the word’s nature is on occasion, as Garner puts 
it, “directory” —stronger than precatory but weaker than mandatory.167 
Along similar lines, the classic grammarian Henry Fowler wrote that 
“shall” has both descriptive and prescriptive meanings and thus could 
function in both the indicative or imperative moods.168 Eighteenth-
century lexicographer Dr. Samuel Johnson threw up his hands: “The 
explanation of shall, which foreigners and provincials confound with 
will, is not easy; and the difficulty is increased by the poets, who some-
times give to shall an emphatical sense of will . . . .”169 Put simply, de-
pending on the context, “shall” can convey obligation, certainty, or futu-
rity.170 
 Advocates of the conventional view of congressional control of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction have seized on that osten-
sible indeterminacy to claim that the provision that the judicial power 
“shall” extend to the listed categories of cases and controversies poses 
no hurdle. For example, one traditionalist has insisted that the “shall” 
in the Extension Clause “has a [less] imperative ring” than that in the 
Original Jurisdiction Clause.171 As this Part explains, the word can be 
                                                                                                                      
 
165 Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 939–40 (2d ed. 1995) 
(decrying the word’s “promiscuity”). 
166 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1176–77 (9th ed. 2009) (describing the sense of “du-
ty” as “the mandatory sense that drafters typically intend and courts typically uphold”). 
167 Garner, supra note 165, at 278–79, 940; see also David Mellinkoff, Mellinkoff’s 
Dictionary of American Legal Usage 402–03 (1992) (noting the contextual differences 
in its meaning); Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1761, 1777 (2004) (noting that although the word “has imperative 
overtones,” it “often preserves some measure of discretion”). 
168 See generally H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler, The King’s English 142–61 (3d ed. 
1931) (comparing “shall” and “will”). 
169 2 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (London, J.F. & C. 
Rivington et al., 6th ed. 1785) (no pagination). 
170 See Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of Shall, 3 Scribes J. Legal Writing 61, 64 
(1992) (describing the word’s “legacy of confusion”). 
171 Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1597 (critiquing Akhil Amar’s partial theory of mandatory 
federal jurisdiction); see Amar, supra note 38, at 239–40 n.118 (pointing out this inconsis-
tency in traditionalists’ interpretations of “shall”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Struc-
ture of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1524–25 (1990). Steven Calabresi’s 
work has illustrated the stakes riding on the interpretation of “shall.” In a 1992 article, he 
did not take a position on the meaning of “shall” but observed that a non-mandatory read-
ing “devastates” theories of mandatory jurisdiction. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, at 
1209–10 & n.270. Fifteen years later, he acknowledged that “‘shall’ . . . normally means 
2012] The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence 1255 
somewhat protean, but its meaning is usually clear in context, and 
nothing about its usage in the Extension Clause suggests that the viabil-
ity of the judicial power depends on legislative prerogative. 
A. Prescription or Permission 
 One axis of common confusion has been whether “shall” can be 
interpreted as if it were “may.” The committee “restyling” the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 2006 cited that potential slipperiness as a 
justification for amending each “shall” in the old rules to “must,” “may,” 
or “should,” depending on the context.172 Likewise, some scholars have 
argued that the Extension Clause is ambiguous because “it does not say, 
one way or the other, whether ‘shall’ is mandatory.”173 Another has 
been less equivocal: “[T]he words ‘shall extend’ are more permissive 
                                                                                                                      
‘must’” and thus embraced a theory of mandatory jurisdiction, at least for the disputes 
described in the Extension Clause as “all Cases.” Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 47, at 
1013–14 & n.65 (relying on instances of “shall” in Article III’s Vesting Clause, Extension 
Clause, and Original and Appellate Jurisdiction Clauses). 
172 See Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee, at D-8 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Appendix_D.pdf (referring to “shall” as “inherently ambiguous”). 
One of the committee’s goals was blunt: 
Banish shall. The restyled civil rules . . . use must instead of shall. Shall is noto-
rious for its misuse and slipperiness in legal documents. No surprise, then, 
that the Committee changed shall to may in several instances, to should in sev-
eral other instances, and to the simple present tense when the rule involves 
no obligation or permission . . . . 
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., 
Guiding Principles for Restyling the Civil Rules, in Preliminary Draft of Proposed Style Revi-
sion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at x, xviii (2005), available at http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_pt1.pdf; see also 
Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 155, 164 (2006) (ruing 
the change wrought by the elimination of “shall” from Rule 65). 
The word “shall” was later restored to the summary judgment rule—after an awkward 
three-year reign of “should” —in an attempt to direct judges to grant such motions when 
appropriate while still reflecting the delicate dollop of discretion accorded by precedent. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (noting that “neither of the choices avail-
able under the Style Project conventions— ‘must’ or ‘should’ —is suitable”). In that con-
text, the protean nature of “shall” reflected the irreconcilability of the case law. See id. (cit-
ing conflicting language from two Supreme Court cases decided on the same day); Steven 
S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 Akron L. Rev. 1139, 1149–60 (2010) (chronicling the 
restoration of “shall” to Rule 56). 
173 E.g., Wells & Larson, supra note 28, at 96 (finding the Extension Clause to be un-
susceptible to textual interpretation). 
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than mandatory; they are better interpreted as ‘can include’ rather 
than as ‘must include.’”174 
 Justice Benjamin Cardozo differed, describing “shall” as “the lan-
guage of command.”175 Indeed, the Supreme Court has generally read 
that auxiliary word as making the main verb following it mandatory.176 
It has, however, recognized the confusion stemming from “shall” and 
has on occasion construed it to signal permission, as if it were “may.”177 
 But those two words are not interchangeable.178 The linguistic cir-
cumstances in which the odd “may”-for-“shall” interpretation arises are 
limited. For example, a statutory provision that a defendant “shall” be 
prosecuted has not prevented the government from choosing to prose-
cute instead under a different act;179 likewise, a corporate charter pro-
viding that process “shall” be served on the corporation in a certain 
manner has not barred the legislature from later enacting other means 
                                                                                                                      
174 Velasco, supra note 14, at 704; see id. at 705 n.167 (“Congress cannot be required to 
grant jurisdiction . . . because ‘shall’ is not a mandate to Congress.”). 
175 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935) (ordering the release of a prisoner on the 
ground that the district court had bypassed the statutory mandate that a probationer 
“shall” receive a court hearing before being imprisoned for violation of probation); see also 
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. 
L. 183, 209 (2003) (“[In the eighteenth century] as now, in legal discourse the term ‘shall’ 
was nearly always a mandatory command.”). 
176 E.g., Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947) (interpreting a rule providing 
that a case “shall” be dismissed if no substitution is made within two years of the death of a 
party as offering the court no discretion, despite the potential interaction of a rule allow-
ing the expansion of time periods based on “excusable neglect”); see also United States v. 
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (commenting on the statutory language “shall forfeit” 
that “Congress could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that forfeiture 
be mandatory”). 
177 E.g., Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 430–34 & n.9 (1995) (5–4 
decision) (holding that despite the statutory provision that “[u]pon certification by the 
Attorney General . . . any civil action or proceeding . . . shall be deemed an action against 
the United States . . . , and the United States shall be substituted as the party defendant,” 
certification was not conclusive of the propriety of substitution of the United States). Not-
ing that legal writers “sometimes use, or misuse, ‘shall’ to mean ‘should,’ ‘will,’ or even 
‘may,’” the Gutierrez de Martinez Court proceeded to interpret the statute in that fashion. Id. 
at 432–33 n.9. “May,” of course, has its own ambiguity, in that it can convey either permis-
sion or possibility. 
178 But cf. Nora Rotter Tillman & Seth Barrett Tillman, A Fragment on Shall and May, 50 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 453, 454 (2010) (cautioning against using “presentism” to overestimate 
the gap between those words in 1787). 
179 Richbourg Motor Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 528, 534 (1930) (“The usual provi-
sion[] of criminal statutes that the offender ‘shall’ be punished as the statute prescribes is 
not necessarily to be taken, as against the government, to direct prosecution under that 
rather than some other applicable statute.”). 
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of service.180 Of course, prosecution or service in the first place is not 
always required. For example, the old Rule 59(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure read, “A motion for a new trial shall be served not 
later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.”181 That rule did not 
compel that a motion be made, any more than the current rule’s 
“must” does. The understood background was and continues to be “if 
the motion is made at all.”182 
 Because no analogous linguistic framework underlies the Exten-
sion Clause,183 there is no reason to read “shall extend” as “may ex-
tend.”184 The claim that the Extension Clause is ambiguous for failing 
to specify whether the “shall” is mandatory rings hollow; a document 
need not spell out the interpretation of its own words to be under-
standable. Whatever ambiguity arises in other contexts about whether 
“shall” is merely permissive, its usage in the Extension Clause is clear. 
 A potentially distracting point is that if a power shall extend, then 
logically the power may be used.185 The Extension Clause’s “shall” 
makes the extension of the judicial power definitive but does not in 
and of itself compel the judiciary to exercise it.186 In defense of the tra-
ditional view, Daniel Meltzer seizes on that nuance in an attempt to 
dismiss the notion that the “shall” is mandatory: “One can easily read 
‘the judicial Power shall extend’ as referring only to matters over which 
                                                                                                                      
180 R.R. Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168, 170 (1877) (“As against the government, the word 
‘shall,’ when used in statutes, is to be construed as ‘may,’ unless a contrary intention is 
manifest.”). 
181 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, 28 U.S.C. app. 247 (2006 & Supp. I 2008) (amended 2010) 
(providing the former text of Rule 59). 
182 See Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 432 n.9 (noting that certain procedural rules 
use the word “shall” to “authorize, but not to require, judicial action”). 
183 Perhaps the closest is the canon of construction that “shall” generally means “may” 
when the actor is the government. Hecht, 95 U.S. at 170. The purpose of that canon, how-
ever, is to preserve governmental prerogative vis-à-vis the public. See id. It is not to reallo-
cate power from one branch of the government to another. 
184 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 331–32 (1816) (Story, J.) (re-
jecting that proposed reading); 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 
§§ 1588–1589, at 452–53 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (same). 
185 Some legislative and executive authority is granted by provisions that the relevant 
branch “shall have power” to act and some by provisions that it “may” act, with no apparent 
difference. Compare, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes . . . .”), and id. art. II, § 2 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Va-
cancies . . . .”), with id. art. II, § 1 (“Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Elec-
tors . . . .”), and id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene 
both Houses . . . .”). 
186 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43 (stressing the Supreme Court’s lack of ob-
ligation to exercise its power in every case). 
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the federal courts have capability (rather than an obligation) . . . .”187 
That reading is not unreasonable but is a non sequitur.188 It is true that 
federal courts have a capability rather than an obligation; the phrase is 
“judicial Power,” not “judicial Duty.”189 That point, though, is distinct 
from the question of whether the extension of that power is, as the tra-
ditionalists claim, subject to legislative approval.190 
 Of course, power may be used even if the power may extend; the 
difference is that a legitimate question then arises about who decides 
whether the power will in fact extend. If the Extension Clause’s “shall” 
were (or could be interpreted as) “may,” the judiciary might be able to 
determine when its own power would extend, perhaps collapsing that 
inquiry with that of when to wield it. One might reasonably argue, 
though, that in that counterfactual scenario, Congress would be the 
appropriate body to prescribe the extent of the judicial power, in a law 
“necessary and proper for carrying [that power] into Execution.”191 Be 
that as it may, in the actual Extension Clause, the “shall” means that 
                                                                                                                      
187 Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1596 (critiquing Akhil Amar’s partial theory of mandatory 
jurisdiction); accord id. at 1573 n.14. Likewise, another traditionalist scholar has conflated 
the two issues: “If ‘shall extend’ is mandatory, then the federal courts may be required to 
hear many cases. The constitutional text could then be paraphrased as follows: ‘The judi-
cial power must be exercised in the following cases . . . .’” Velasco, supra note 14, at 702 
(arguing that the phrase is not mandatory). That reading equates authority with obliga-
tion. Instead, the import of a mandatory “shall” would be simply that the judicial power 
unquestionably extends to the listed disputes; whether judges would have a duty to exer-
cise that power in a given case or controversy is a separate question. 
188 Along similar lines, John Harrison paraphrases the head of the Extension Clause as 
follows: “The judicial power may be used to decide . . . .” Harrison, supra note 17, at 212. 
Because the extension of power permits it to be used, that “may” in and of itself is not as 
misleading as it looks. Cf. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power over Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 847, 862 (criti-
cizing Harrison for flipping “shall” to “may”). But more to the point, both Harrison and 
Meltzer, without justification, find that capability to be contingent on legislative approval. 
See Harrison, supra note 17, at 214 (referring to Congress’s “power to alter” the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction); Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1569–73 (defending the view that “Con-
gress has plenary authority”). 
189 See Amar, supra note 38, at 233 n.96 (calling it “plausible” that the judicial power 
may be waivable); infra text accompanying notes 219–231 (describing the debate at the 
Convention about whether the new government “shall” discharge states’ debts or merely 
“shall have power” to do so). 
190 See Amar, supra note 38, at 233 n.96 (adding that “[i]f the judicial power may be 
waived, . . . it can only be waived by Article III judges, . . . not . . . by Congress”). Though 
intended to blunt the force of “shall,” Meltzer’s comment plays into the hand of theories 
of mandatory jurisdiction in suggesting that federal courts “have” (rather than “may, if 
Congress assents, have”) capability. See Meltzer, supra note 14, at 1596. 
191 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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nobody needs to make that decision. The delegates made it in Phila-
delphia. 
B. Prescription and Prediction 
 The other common uncertainty about “shall” is whether it denotes 
duty or futurity.192 A modern drafting guide for the federal government 
advises that because that word “imposes an obligation . . . , but may be 
confused with prediction of future action,” regulations should use 
“must” for obligations and “will” for predictions.193 Such confusion is 
manifest in a justification advanced in support of the orthodox view of 
the Extension Clause, namely, that its “shall” is merely predictive.194 For 
example, in his concurring opinion in the landmark 1816 case of Mar-
tin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Justice William Johnson insisted that in that clause 
it was “plain and obvious” that the word was used “in the future sense, 
. . . [with] nothing imperative in it.”195 
                                                                                                                      
 
192 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 760–61 (1999) (expli-
cating a passage by Justice Joseph Story about whether “shall” in the Article III Vesting 
Clause is “a future-tense verb or an imperative verb”); Tillman & Tillman, supra note 178, 
at 454–55 (discussing the eighteenth-century usage of “shall” in its “mandatory” sense and 
in its sense “indicating futurity”). 
193 Drafting Legal Documents: Principles of Clear Writing, Office of the Fed. Register, 
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/write/ 
legal-docs/clear-writing.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (advising writers of documents for 
publication in the Federal Register). 
194 E.g., Martin, 14 U.S. at 374 ( Johnson, J., concurring); Redish, supra note 18, at 37–
38 (casting doubt on whether “shall” implies a mandate as opposed to the future tense). 
195 Martin, 14 U.S. at 374–75 ( Johnson, J., concurring). The Martin case turned spe-
cifically on whether Congress could authorize the Supreme Court to exercise jurisdiction 
over cases originating in state courts, not whether Congress could withhold it, but the case 
served generally as the platform for a wide-ranging analysis of Article III, with “shall” play-
ing a prominent role. The Virginia Court of Appeals had defied a Supreme Court decision 
reversing its judgment; the Virginia court’s rationale was that Congress’s grant of appellate 
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in such cases exceeded Article III’s limits on the federal 
judicial power. Id. at 305–06 (Story, J.). Arguing that the Supreme Court had properly 
exercised jurisdiction, counsel for the petitioner focused on the Extension Clause: “The 
word shall, is a sign of the future tense, and implies an imperative mandate . . . .” Id. at 314. 
Seeking to minimize the federal judicial power, the respondent’s counsel disagreed 
with that assessment: “Shall is merely a sign of the future tense, and not imperative . . . . 
‘Extend,’ or ‘shall extend,’ merely imports that [the judicial power] may extend.” Id. at 
316–17 (arguing that if “shall” were imperative, laws giving federal and state courts con-
current jurisdiction would be unconstitutional). Allowing the Supreme Court to review 
state court decisions, he contended, would be “inconsistent with the whole genius, spirit, 
and tenor of the constitution.” Id. at 316 (arguing that the Constitution operated on indi-
vidual persons rather than on “state authorities”). 
In his opinion for the Court upholding its jurisdiction, Justice Story expatiated on not 
only the breadth but also the definitiveness of Article III. As to the Extension Clause, he 
stressed that “the words are used in an imperative sense,” resulting in a legislative duty to 
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 To be sure, the “shall” in the Extension Clause is not a direct man-
date; if it orders any constitutional entity to act, that entity, Congress, is 
only implied. Still, one might say that as part of the legislature’s enact-
ment of housekeeping laws “necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution” the judicial power,196 it “shall” (i.e., must) extend that pow-
er to the listed categories of disputes. But even if one reads the “shall” 
merely as intimating the future, such that the Extension Clause is not 
an order at all but simply a pronouncement of what is to be, that pro-
nouncement is nonetheless definitive: the judicial power “shall” (i.e., 
will197) extend. That extension could occur via a perfunctory imple-
                                                                                                                      
 
execute the constitutional mandate. Id. at 328, 331. In his view, that mandate left no room 
for Congress to withhold any jurisdiction from the federal courts collectively, at least in the 
categories of disputes headed by “all Cases” as opposed to “Controversies.” Id. at 331, 333–
36; see 3 Story, supra note 184, §§ 1588–1590, at 452–54 (reiterating the same view). He 
even stitched together an argument, skirting a constitutional “may,” that “congress are 
bound to create some inferior courts.” Martin, 14 U.S. at 330–31. 
Justice Johnson concurred in the judgment but disagreed with Justice Story’s vision of 
mandatory jurisdiction, referring instead to Congress as the body with discretionary “pow-
er to assume jurisdiction to the constitutional extent.” Id. at 375–76 ( Johnson, J., concur-
ring) (rejecting any distinction between “all Cases” and “Controversies”). That view of 
judicial subservience apparently stemmed from his disagreement with Justice Story’s take 
on the Extension Clause: 
[T]he plain and obvious sense and meaning of the word shall, in this sen-
tence, is in the future sense, and has nothing imperative in it. The language 
of the framers of the constitution is, “We are about forming a general gov-
ernment—when that government is formed, its powers shall extend,” &c. I 
therefore see nothing imperative in this clause, and certainly it would have 
been very unnecessary to use the word in that sense; for, as there was no con-
trolling power constituted, it would only, if used in an imperative sense, have 
imposed a moral obligation to act. 
Id. at 374–75. 
As provocative as Justice Story’s opinion was in suggesting that inferior courts must be 
created and in distinguishing between “all Cases” and “Controversies,” history has instead 
favored Justice Johnson’s vision of broad legislative discretion with respect to the entire 
menu of federal jurisdiction. But see Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 243 n.228, 246–47 
(1971) (opining that by deleting the phrase “when necessary” from a draft of the Constitu-
tion, the Committee of Style “robbed Congress of discretion whether or not to create infe-
rior courts”); Amar, supra note 38, at 206 (resuscitating Justice Story’s two-tier interpreta-
tion). The putatively non-imperative “shall,” however, does not justify that vision any more 
than do other arguments advanced by proponents of the conventional view. 
196 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
197 Such a reading is a stretch because “shall” signals emphatic futurity, implying defi-
niteness or inevitability—much more so than “will.” See Margaret Sinclair, “It Shall Be So”: 
Grammatical Usage as Political Intent in Coriolanus, J. Aesthetic Educ., Winter 2002, at 32, 
32 (“Instead of referring to mood or attitude, ‘shall’ generally refers to futurity. Without 
reference to time, ‘shall’ in the third person signifies determination or purpose.”). The 
implications of “shall” and “will” are reversed, however, when the subject of a sentence is 
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menting statute or simply as a constitutional rule that is self-executing 
upon ratification.198 Whether the clause is an implicit injunction or a 
mere declaration of the judiciary’s autonomy, it offers Congress no 
leeway to violate its terms.199 In the language of litigation, ignoring a 
declaratory judgment may be less contemptuous than defying a direct 
court order, but it is no more legal. 
 In other words, the “duty or futurity” dichotomy is a false one be-
cause statements about the future are not inherently permissive. The 
Extension Clause’s “shall” is simultaneously prospective and prescrip-
tive.200 It anticipates what will be done, not as a neutral prediction, but 
by way of ensuring that result, without room for debate. Congress could 
no more block the extension of judicial power than it could the estab-
lishment of a Supreme Court, in which that power “shall be vested.”201 
                                                                                                                      
 
“I.” Id. at 36 n.4 (“To denote inevitability, writers use ‘will’ with the first person and ‘shall’ 
with the third persons.”) (citing A.E. Abbott, A Shakespearian Grammar 223 (London, 
Macmillan & Co. 1897)). The constitutional drafters’ sensitivity to that distinction is evi-
dent in the principal instance of the word “will”: The presidential oath or affirmation in-
cludes the phrase, “I will faithfully execute the Office . . . and will to the best of my Ability, 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution . . . .” See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (em-
phasis added); Tillman & Tillman, supra note 178, at 455–56 (comparing “shall” and “will” 
in a discussion of the possible meanings of “shall” in the Constitution). 
198 Constitutional language in the passive voice, such as the provision that the judicial 
power “shall be vested,” more readily implies the intervention of an implementing statute 
than does the active “shall extend.” But regardless of whether the Extension Clause is self-
executing, Congress may not contradict it. 
199 In the slightly different context of Article III’s Vesting Clause, Steven Calabresi and 
Kevin Rhodes have characterized theories of mandatory jurisdiction as dependent on 
reading “shall” as “must” rather than “will.” Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1178, 
1187–88, 1199–1200, 1209–10 (arguing that the extent of presidential power turns on the 
same issue in the Vesting Clause of Article II). If “shall” means “will,” they contend, then 
the clause “suggests . . . but does not command.” Id. at 1188 (declining to take sides in the 
interpretive debate). But “will” does not mean “may.” “[D]escriptive” though the word 
“will” may be, id., it leaves no room to stray from the description. 
200 Despite his forceful insistence in Martin that the Extension Clause’s “shall” was used 
in the “future sense” with “nothing imperative” in it, see supra note 195 and accompanying 
text, even Justice Johnson seemed to recognize that his grammatical distinction amounted to 
little. As a practical matter, he wrote, “wherever power is given it will be used,” and thus “the 
same result arises from using [‘shall’] in a future sense.” Martin, 14 U.S. at 375 ( Johnson, J., 
concurring). My disagreement with him is thus ultimately less about the meaning of “shall” 
than about his assumption that the power in question was given not to the judiciary but to 
Congress. See id. at 375–76. Because Martin concerned the constitutionality of a grant of ju-
risdiction rather than a restriction, Justice Johnson, despite his apparent cynicism, may not 
have had occasion to contemplate a ramification of that assumption, namely, that in other 
contexts, Congress might seek to insulate itself from judicial review by—contrary to his pre-
diction—selectively abnegating its supposed power to extend jurisdiction. 
201 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1179 n.125 (raising the possibility that 
“shall” in the Vesting Clause is “a present tense ‘performative’ that acquires force from its 
self-proclaimed status in a constituting document”); cf. Martin, 14 U.S. at 328–30 (Story, J.) 
1262 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1225 
 The dual role for “shall” is hardly limited to the Extension Clause. 
That modal verb set the temporal motif of the Constitution. The doc-
ument was forward-looking, in that it would not govern anyone before 
ratification by nine states. As a result, with two exceptions, every sen-
tence in the (unamended) Constitution contained a “shall.”202 In con-
trast, the immediately effective Declaration of Independence used but a 
single “shall”; the dominant tense was the present perfect, serving to list 
the indignities the king had perpetrated.203 The original Constitution, 
in all, used “shall” 191 times.204 
 For example, writing that all legislative powers “are” vested in Con-
gress would not do, as that description would not be the case until ratifi-
cation. Thus that opening clause, like those that followed it, was phrased 
prospectively: “shall be vested.”205 One exception was the preamble, in 
which “We the People” did something then and there, namely, “ordain 
and establish this Constitution.”206 The other was the provision that 
each house of Congress “may” determine rules of proceedings, punish 
                                                                                                                      
(calling all of Article III “mandatory upon the legislature,” which has a “duty to vest the 
whole judicial power”); Clinton, supra note 38, at 782 (arguing that “shall” was used “in its 
mandatory sense rather than as future tense”). 
In a case interpreting a provision in the Kansas Constitution that “dues from corpora-
tions shall be secured by individual liability of the stockholders,” the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized the definitiveness of “shall” even when the word is not tethered to a specific 
actor: “The words, ‘shall be secured,’ are not merely directory to the legislature to make 
provision for such liability, but of themselves declare it. To this extent the constitution is 
self-executing.” Whitman v. Oxford Nat’l Bank, 176 U.S. 559, 560, 562 (1900). But cf. 
Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 501 (1841) (interpreting the Mississippi consti-
tutional provision that certain sales of slaves “shall be prohibited” not as a self-executing 
prohibition per se but rather as a “command” that would be “directory to the legislature”). 
202 See generally U.S. Const. Every sentence of the Bill of Rights, other than the Tenth 
Amendment, also uses a “shall.” The Tenth Amendment states simply that powers not del-
egated to the United States and not prohibited by the Constitution “are” reserved to the 
states or the people. U.S. Const. amend. X. That distinction presumably arose because the 
amendment clarified the existing constitutional order rather than establishing a new right. 
203 See generally The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776). 
204 In a compilation of each occurrence of every word (other than articles, preposi-
tions, and the like) in the text of the Constitution, the entry for “shall” dwarfs all others. 
See Charles W. Stearns, Concordance to the Constitution, in Thurston Greene, The Lan-
guage of the Constitution 969, 1016–20 (Stuart B. Flexner ed., 1991). That usage re-
flected the drafting style of the time. The other famous national document of the same 
year, the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was constitutional in nature and used many 
phrases echoed in the later Bill of Rights, likewise contained a “shall” in practically every 
sentence. See generally Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). Although the 
future tense has the logical justification described here, legal drafting literature since the 
middle of the nineteenth century has advocated the use of the present tense in legislation. 
Garner, supra note 165, at 939 (tracing that historical development). 
205 U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. 
206 Id. pmbl. 
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its members, and even expel them.207 Pivoting from the prescriptive de-
terminacy of “shall,” the word “may” conveyed that the chambers would 
have powers but no duties in those areas. That use of “may” shows (as do 
plenty of compound sentences mixing “shall” and “may”) that the Con-
stitution’s drafters knew how to grant discretion when appropriate.208 
 In short, “shall” was evidently chosen for the Extension Clause, the 
Legislative Vesting Clause, and others as an alternative not only to 
“does,” but also to “may.” Not all clauses using “shall” require a specific 
action; after ratification, nobody was charged with implementing the 
abstract vesting of the legislative power.209 But those self-executing 
clauses are still mandatory in that, other than through the amendment 
procedure, no constitutional actor has discretion to effect a different 
result.210 Regardless of whether the more grammatically faithful read-
ing of the Extension Clause is that the judicial power “must” or “will” 
extend to the listed categories of disputes, the legislature lacks the 
power to derail it. 
C. Conventional Usage 
 Towards the end of the Federal Convention, when the Extension 
Clause underwent a slew of minor edits, including the August 27 
change from “jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” to “Judicial Power,”211 
its “shall” went untouched. That was not for lack of appreciation of the 
                                                                                                                      
207 Id. art. I, § 5. 
208 See Amar, supra note 171, at 1507–08 (arguing that the selective use of “may” in the 
Constitution helps show the mandatory nature of “shall”); Barnett, supra note 175, at 209 
(reasoning that because the constitutional drafters were careful to distinguish it from “may,” 
“shall” made provisions mandatory); Clinton, supra note 38, at 782 & n.147 (cataloguing and 
contrasting the usage of “shall” and “may” throughout the Constitution); cf. Anderson, 329 
U.S. at 485 (“[W]hen the same Rule uses both ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ the normal inference is that 
each is used in its usual sense—the one act being permissive, the other mandatory.”). 
209 In contrast, some prescriptive clauses issue commands to specific bodies, such as 
the provision that election procedures “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof.” See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4 (emphasis added). 
210 See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of discretion af-
forded by “shall”); cf. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) 
(holding that the rule providing that early notice of appeal “shall have no effect” was 
mandatory); Elmer A. Driedger, The Composition of Legislation 13 (2d ed. rev. 1976) 
(noting that “shall” can create a self-executing “rule of law” or a targeted “obligation” and 
recommending limiting its usage to the latter to avoid ambiguity). But cf. Velasco, supra 
note 14, at 703–04, 705 n.167 (interpreting “shall” as “self-executing” but nonetheless de-
fending the traditional view of congressional control on the ground that “shall extend” is 
“more permissive than mandatory” and is “better interpreted as ‘can include’ rather than 
as ‘must include’”). 
211 See supra notes 138–163 and accompanying text. 
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word’s importance. When discussing other clauses around that time, 
the delegates showed sensitivity to how “shall” would be interpreted. 
They understood its potency, and they wielded it purposefully.212 
 For example, a late draft of the Constitution provided that full 
faith and credit “ought to” be given in each state to official acts of other 
states and that the national legislature “shall” prescribe laws governing 
the details.213 During the discussion about the clause, a motion passed 
to edit the “shall” to “may,” and the “ought to” to “shall.”214 
 The language about the President’s State of the Union address un-
derwent a similar transformation. The Committee of Detail suggested 
the following: “He shall, from time to time, give information to the Leg-
islature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their consid-
eration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient 
. . . .”215 When the full Convention took up that point on August 24, 
Pennsylvania’s Gouverneur Morris successfully moved to strike “he may” 
in favor of “and,” thus linking “recommend” back to “shall.”216 James 
Madison, accentuating the crucial word himself, described the motion’s 
effect as “mak[ing] it the duty of the President to recommend, & thence 
prevent umbrage or cavil at his doing it.”217 
 During the debate about how to flesh out a resolution “[t]o secure 
the payment of the public debt,”218 the forcefulness of “shall” took cen-
ter stage. On August 18, Roger Sherman of Connecticut argued that 
the Constitution ought to authorize, but not require, Congress to as-
sume state debts; his colleague Oliver Ellsworth disagreed.219 Three 
days later, reporting from a committee that had considered the issue, 
                                                                                                                      
212 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1200 (2003) (noting the usefulness of drafting 
history in determining the “contextual definitions” of words such as “shall”). 
213 2 Records, supra note 29, at 483 (Sept. 1), 483–84 (journal), 485 (Madison’s notes). 
214 Id. at 486 (Sept. 3), 486 ( journal), 489 (Madison’s notes). Two years later, when 
drafting the Bill of Rights, James Madison made a similar decision about what became the 
Eighth Amendment. Tweaking language from England’s 1689 Bill of Rights and Virginia’s 
1776 Declaration of Rights, each of which provided that excessive bail “ought” not to be 
required, he substituted the stronger “shall.” Sandra Day O’Connor, The Majesty of 
the Law 60 (Craig Joyce ed., 2003) (noting that throughout the Bill of Rights, Madison 
“transform[ed] suggestions into bold declarations”); Bernard Schwartz, The Great 
Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights 170 (1992) (tracing 
the development of the Eighth Amendment). 
215 2 Records, supra note 29, at 176 (Aug. 6), 185 (Madison’s notes) (report of the 
Committee of Detail). 
216 Id. at 396 (Aug. 24), 398 ( journal), 405 (Madison’s notes). 
217 Id. (emphasis in original). 
218 Id. at 321 (Aug. 18), 326 (Madison’s notes). 
219 Id. at 321 (Aug. 18), 327 (Madison’s notes). 
2012] The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence 1265 
New Jersey’s William Livingston proposed language tracking Sherman’s 
view: “The Legislature of the U. S. shall have power to fulfil the engage-
ments . . . and to discharge as well the debts of the U– S.”220 This time, 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts spoke in opposition, arguing that the 
mere power without an obligation to use it would “destroy[] the secu-
rity” of public creditors.221 
 When the debate resumed the next day, after a comment by Gerry 
about the need to avoid a pretext under which the new government 
might try to avoid the public debt of the old one, Gouverneur Morris 
took Gerry and Ellsworth’s side and successfully moved to amend the 
proposal to “The Legislature shall discharge the debts & fulfil the en-
gagements [of the United States].”222 In his notes, Madison highlighted 
the “shall,”223 as he did again the following day when other language 
was added to the sentence.224 
 Two days later, after a successful motion to reconsider,225 Virginia’s 
George Mason—known to distrust heavy-handed governments226— re-
sumed the opposition. According to Madison’s notes, “Mason objected 
to the term, ‘shall’ . . . as too strong. It may be impossible to comply with 
it.”227 Mason continued at length, drawing distinctions among public 
creditors and arguing that though some were less deserving of being 
paid, the “shall” would seem to require payment to all; he also feared 
that “the word ‘shall,’ might extend to all the old continental paper.”228 
Morris took the other side, opining that he “preferr’d the term ‘shall’ as 
the most explicit.”229 He also noted the political benefit of such an un-
ambiguous provision, which would “create many friends to the plan.”230 
Though the sentence was reconfigured and eventually moved from Ar-
ticle I to Article VI, the unqualified “shall” remained.231 
                                                                                                                      
220 Id. at 352 (Aug. 21), 355 ( journal and Madison’s notes) (emphasis added). 
221 2 Records, supra note 29, at 352 (Aug. 21), 356 (Madison’s notes). 
222 Id. at 366 (Aug. 22), 368 ( journal), 377 (Madison’s notes). 
223 Id. at 366 (Aug. 22), 368 ( journal) (not italicizing “shall”), 377 (Madison’s notes) 
(emphasis in original). 
224 Id. at 380 (Aug. 23), 382 ( journal) (not italicizing “shall”), 392 (Madison’s notes) 
(emphasis in original). 
225 Id. at 396(Aug. 24), 396 ( journal), 400 (Madison’s notes). 
226 Brant, supra note 130, at 23. 
227 2 Records, supra note 29, at 408 (Aug. 25), 412 (Madison’s notes). 
228 Id. at 408 (Aug. 25), 412–13 (Madison’s notes). 
229 Id. at 408 (Aug. 25), 414 (Madison’s notes). 
230 Id. 
231 Id.; see U.S. Const. art. VI. 
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 It was two days later that the delegates amended various aspects of 
the Extension Clause but left the “shall” intact.232 In light of the sur-
rounding debates and edits, it is difficult to argue that they failed to 
appreciate its significance as an unequivocal term of intractability.233 It 
is instead scholars supporting the traditional view who do not grant 
“shall” its due. 
 For example, John Harrison has drawn a surprising conclusion 
from the lexicon of the Constitution. Based in part on the lack of the 
word “must” anywhere in the text, he insists that one cannot impute a 
similar meaning to the Extension Clause’s “shall.”234 He does not ex-
plore the broader consequences of that argument, namely, that if no 
instances of “shall” are tinged with the imperative hue of “must,” then 
the whole document becomes precatory, more resolution than consti-
tution. 
 Harrison relies on the basic constitutional principle of limited fed-
eral powers. Positing that the Extension Clause must set a ceiling for 
the judicial power, he argues that reading “shall extend” as a floor 
would shatter that ceiling.235 What he does not contemplate is the pos-
sibility of a construction merging the two.236 In fact, there is nothing 
unique to the Extension Clause in having “shall” install a floor and a 
ceiling simultaneously. Throughout the Constitution, “shall” establishes 
fixed norms, including those about the reach of authority of the gov-
ernmental branches, such as in the provisions directing when “[t]he 
Congress shall have Power”237 or “[t]he President shall have Power.”238 
                                                                                                                      
 
232 2 Records, supra note 29, at 422 (Aug. 27), 423–25 (journal), 428–32 (Madison’s 
notes). 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43 (focusing on the difference between ca-
pability and obligation). 
234 Harrison, supra note 17, at 217 (denigrating Robert Clinton’s theory of mandatory 
jurisdiction). 
235 Id. 
236 Cf. id. at 218–19 (citing Robert Clinton’s claim to that effect but dismissing it); 
Pushaw, supra note 188, at 862 (noting the possibility that the same language created both 
a floor and a ceiling). 
237 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
238 See id. art. II, § 2. The Extension Clause might cause less confusion if its wording 
about power more exactly mirrored that in other articles of the Constitution. One scholar 
defending the traditional view of congressional control of federal jurisdiction has seized on 
that superficial distinction, arguing that because Article III does not use the “shall have Pow-
er” formulation, the judiciary is not in the same posture as the legislative and executive 
branches. See Velasco, supra note 14, at 702 n.150 (rejecting a potential paraphrase of the 
Extension Clause as “The federal courts must be permitted to exercise the judicial Power 
over the following cases . . .”). That argument is odd in light of his willingness to bridge lin-
guistic disparities to make apt cross-branch analogies in only slightly different contexts. See, 
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The branches need not always use the full extent of their powers, but 
the powers are nonetheless inviolable.239 
 It seems true (especially after the Tenth Amendment)240 that, as 
almost everyone agrees,241 the judicial power extends no further than 
the listed cases and controversies, but it is equally clear that it does ex-
tend that far. If the delegates had wanted the legislature to calibrate the 
extent of judicial power, they could have found a model one constitu-
tional paragraph earlier or later. Section 1 of Article III sets a minimum 
                                                                                                                      
e.g., id. at 703 (“[T]he enumeration of cases in Article III [is] analogous to the enumeration 
of powers in Articles I and II.”). In any event, the Extension Clause’s lack of complete paral-
lelism with grants of power to other branches is simply the unremarkable result of the grad-
ual development of a clause that began as one about the “jurisdiction of the supreme tribu-
nal” rather than about the power of the judiciary per se. By the time the word “power” was 
inserted, the phrase “shall extend” was already entrenched. As detailed above and below, 
none of that editing had anything to do with conditioning the judiciary’s power on legislative 
approval. See supra notes 138–163 and accompanying text (detailing the history resulting in 
“judicial Power” as the subject of the clause); infra notes 357–386 and accompanying text 
(detailing the history resulting in “extend” as the verb of the clause). 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43, 122–124, 189 (stressing the Supreme 
Court’s lack of obligation to exercise its power in every case); infra text accompanying 
notes 316–319 (discussing the distinction between the extension of power and the duty to 
use power). 
240 Absent the amendment, the argument rests mainly on the slippery doctrine of ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius. 
241 See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809) (holding that a stat-
ute “cannot extend . . . [federal] jurisdiction beyond the limits of the constitution”). One 
who did not agree was constitutional historian William Winslow Crosskey, who pointed to 
the Extension Clause’s lack of an explicit ceiling on the federal judicial power. 1 Cross-
key, supra note 51, at 619–20. Moreover, Crosskey argued, because all civil litigation be-
tween parties within a government’s jurisdiction naturally lies within the judicial power of 
that government, Congress could, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, extend juris-
diction to disputes beyond the listed cases and controversies. Id. 
Crosskey’s view is consistent with dicta from the Supreme Court to the effect that a na-
tion’s judicial power embraces “all controversies of a justiciable nature arising within the 
territorial limits of the Nation, no matter who may be the parties thereto.” See Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907). In that case, the Court did not read the specific catego-
ries of the Extension Clause as an implicit limitation. Id. at 82. Because the dispute was one 
between states, id. at 80, however, the propriety of jurisdiction did not depend on the 
Court’s expansive interpretation of the clause. In a later case, Justice Robert Jackson wrote 
for the Court in support of a similar interpretation. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Trans-
fer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590, 600 (1949) (rejecting the notion that “no jurisdiction other 
than specified in Art. III can be imposed on courts that exercise the judicial power of the 
United States”). But only two justices joined his opinion; a majority read the Extension 
Clause more strictly. See id. at 607 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“[T]he words of Article III 
. . . must mark the limits of the power Congress may confer on the district courts . . . .”); id. 
at 628–36 (Vinson, J., dissenting) (relying on drafting and ratification history to argue that 
the Extension Clause was intended as a ceiling); id. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(“The Framers guarded against the self-will of the courts as well as against the will of Con-
gress by marking with exactitude the outer limits of federal judicial power.”). 
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of a “supreme” court but allows “inferior” courts as well, “as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”242 The second para-
graph of Section 2 fixes a floor of cases in which the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction is original, but those cases can be multiplied via “such Ex-
ceptions” to the appellate form of the rest of the Court’s jurisdiction “as 
the Congress shall make.”243 In contrast, Section 2’s first paragraph— 
the Extension Clause—says nothing about Congress.244 When tradi-
tionalists interpret “[t]he judicial Power shall extend” as “Congress may 
extend the judicial power,” they distort the clause beyond recognition. 
IV. The Present (Not Potential) Potency of “Extend” 
 An early instance of the word “extend” cited in the Oxford English 
Dictionary described Parliament as being “of great strengthe in matters 
whereunto it extendethe.”245 Under the conventional view in the Unit-
ed States, the same cannot be said of the federal judiciary, at least with-
out a qualifier about the putative legislative power to weaken the judi-
cial branch by withdrawing its jurisdiction in matters within its 
constitutionally “extend[ed]” bailiwick. 
 One of the arguments made in support of the conventional view of 
the Extension Clause is that its verb, “extend,” signals only the outer 
reaches of where something may potentially go, if unleashed.246 Ac-
cording to that claim, the judicial power does not, say, “apply” or “at-
tach” unequivocally to the listed cases and controversies; all it does is 
“extend” to that ceiling, and thus the power is merely dormant until 
                                                                                                                      
242 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
243 See id. art. III, § 2. This interpretation of the Exceptions Clause, which is disputed 
by traditionalists, is elaborated in Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1383–86. See also supra note 
45 and accompanying text (summarizing the conventional interpretation of the Excep-
tions Clause). 
244 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Two other paragraphs in Article III also refer to congres-
sional powers. See id. (laying the venue for certain criminal trials “as the Congress may by 
Law have directed”); id. art. III, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to declare the Pun-
ishment of Treason . . . .”). Only the Extension Clause and the paragraph about treason do 
not. See id. art. III, §§ 2–3. 
245 5 Oxford English Dictionary 594–95 (2d ed. 1989) (citing 1 John Strype, An-
nals of the Reformation app. x. 28 (1559)). 
246 E.g., Harrison, supra note 17, at 212 (defending the traditional view based on a par-
aphrasing of the Extension Clause as “The judicial power may be used to decide . . .” or 
“The judicial power shall be capable of deciding . . .”); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 
708 (insisting that “‘shall extend to’ meant that and not ‘shall be’”); id. at 721–23, 753 
(arguing that editing of the clause about cases and controversies from “shall be” to “shall 
extend” changed the clause from a jurisdictional floor to a ceiling); Velasco, supra note 14, 
at 703–04 (citing the dictionary definition of “extend” to support the claim that Congress’s 
right to control jurisdiction stems from a “natural reading of the text of the Constitution”). 
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Congress animates it. As this Part explains, however, both the plain 
meaning and the drafting history of the clause show that the extension 
of the judicial power is a straightforward, unconditional demarcation of 
the scope of the power that Article III vests in the judiciary. 
A. More Than a Ceiling 
 A paraphrase of the start of the Extension Clause by one defender 
of the conventional view, John Harrison, exemplifies the interpretation 
of the clause as merely setting a ceiling of potential jurisdiction: “The 
judicial power shall be capable of deciding . . . .”247 Awkward as that may 
be, it makes sense if one reads “[t]he judicial power” as “the judiciary.” 
According to Harrison, though, a different branch is empowered to 
turn the capability into reality. As he notes, the Constitution did not 
need to decide when the judicial power would actually be exercised. 
Instead, he insists, “the decision can be left for Congress, as many im-
portant choices are.”248 
 Many indeed are, and this one could have been, as Edmund Ran-
dolph’s draft for the Committee of Detail suggested for certain cases.249 
But nothing about the actual Extension Clause suggests that it was. In-
terpreting a provision as delegating decisions to a body that it does not 
mention is an odd move for a scholar who (rightly) admonishes, in cri-
tiquing another’s take on the same provision, that “the Constitution is 
not drafted in . . . [an] indirect and allusive manner . . . .”250 In the ab-
sence of instructions to the contrary, whatever choices may exist about 
whether to exercise the judicial power251 would seem to lie with the 
branch invested with that power—the judiciary.252 
                                                                                                                      
247 Harrison, supra note 17, at 212 (emphasis added) (offering “The judicial power 
may be used to decide . . .” as an alternative). 
248 Id. at 213 (implying that the Exceptions Clause is the source of that legislative power). 
249 See infra notes 387–399 and accompanying text (chronicling the drafting and dele-
tion of a provision qualifying a jurisdictional grant with the phrase “as the national legisla-
ture may assign”). 
250 See Harrison, supra note 17, at 217. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43 (stressing the Supreme Court’s lack of ob-
ligation to exercise its power in every case). 
252 See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in “one supreme Court, and 
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”); Am-
ar, supra note 38, at 267 (“As a matter of separation of powers, there is a tremendous dif-
ference between a court’s decision to decline to hear a case that it is empowered to enter-
tain, and a congressional attempt to deny the court the power to hear that very same case.”). 
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 To be sure, a clause in Article I charges Congress generally with 
the practical task of putting the Constitution into effect.253 But in the 
language of that clause, it is neither “necessary” nor “proper” to recali-
brate the extent of a power that has already been extended. As shown 
by the analysis below of the simple word “extend” —the word Harrison 
contorted in his paraphrase—the cases and controversies listed in the 
Extension Clause are not only the ceiling of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction, but also its floor. 
1. Lexicographical Legerdemain 
 In the early nineteenth century, John Adams scoffed at the notion 
of fidelity to the King’s English, urging Americans to develop their own 
lexicography: “As an independent Nation . . . [w]e are no more bound 
by [Dr. Samuel] Johnson[’]s Dictionary than by the common or Statute 
or Cannon Law of England.”254 Noah Webster had animated that brand 
of post-revolutionary zeal, arguing in 1789 that differentiating Ameri-
can English would have “vast political consequence” by facilitating in-
dependence of thought.255 The “honor” —he had recently dropped the 
                                                                                                                      
253 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (empowering Congress to “make all Laws which shall 
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the . . . Powers vested by th[e] Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States”). Some have cited the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as authority for congressional power over the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Eugene Gressman & Eric K. Gressman, Necessary and Proper Roots of Exceptions to 
Federal Jurisdiction, 51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 495, 500 (1983) (calling the clause “the one pro-
vision in the Constitution by which Congress can enact laws . . . withdrawing . . . [the Su-
preme Court’s] jurisdiction”). But cf. Harrison, supra note 17, at 211–12, 248 (minimizing 
the role of the clause). 
254 Letter from John Adams to Benjamin Rush (Feb. 10, 1812), microformed on 2 The 
Adams Papers, reel 118, no. 239 (Mass. Historical Soc’y microform ed. 1955). Asserting his 
own equal “right to make a Word,” he dismissed Dr. Johnson as a “Pedant Bigot and Cyn-
ic.” Letter from John Adams to Catherine E. Rush (Feb. 23, 1815), microformed on 2 The 
Adams Papers, supra, at reel 122, no. 55 (playfully coining the word “Dongle” to describe a 
joyful sound). Adams had specific ideas about how to overthrow Dr. Johnson’s regime: “We 
ought to have an American Dictionary: after which I should be willing to lay a Tax of an 
Eagle a Volume upon all English Dictionaries that should ever be imported.” Letter from 
John Adams to Benjamin Rush, supra. Thomas Jefferson shared in the lexicological mili-
tance. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Aug. 15, 1820), in 2 The Adams-
Jefferson Letters 565, 567 (Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959) (admiring the French model of 
following a political revolution with a linguistic one and surmising that America could 
serve as an “example of a colonial dialect improving on it[s] primitive”). 
255 Noah Webster, Dissertations on the English Language app. at 397–98 (Bos-
ton, Isaiah Thomas & Co., 1789) (stressing that “a national language is a band of national 
union”). 
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“u”256—of “an independent nation,” he argued, “require[d] . . . a sys-
tem of our own, in language as well as government.”257 In 1828, Web-
ster published what is regarded as the first comprehensive American 
dictionary.258 That was a generation or two after the Constitution, 
though, and so in the early twenty-first century, despite critics’ admoni-
tion that old dictionaries from England were prescriptive rather than 
descriptive,259 scholars (as well as Supreme Court justices260) often still 
seem bound by them—particularly Dr. Johnson’s—when explicating 
eighteenth-century American text.261 
                                                                                                                      
256 Just six years earlier, Webster had praised Dr. Johnson’s spelling of “-our words.” In 
the interim, he “launched upon his grandiose plan to establish an independent ‘Federal’ 
language in the new Republic.” H.L. Mencken, The American Language: An Inquiry 
into the Development of English in the United States 381 (4th ed. 1936). 
257 Webster, supra note 255, at 20. 
258 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (New York, 
S. Converse, 1828). In 1798, a more obscure American dictionary had been published by 
someone named, interestingly enough, Samuel Johnson, Jr. Johnson’s Dictionary, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 15, 1898, at 15, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9 
D0DEEDB1030E333A25756C1A9669D94699ED7CF. 
259 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The Unit-
ed States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 Marq. L. Rev. 77, 
118 (2010) (cautioning that eighteenth-century English dictionaries “listed what words 
should mean (rather than how words were actually used)”); cf. Lawrence Solan, When Judg-
es Use the Dictionary, 68 Am. Speech 50, 55 (1993) (noting that the problem stemming from 
definitions’ illusory sheen of precision is “especially pronounced” when “old dictionaries” 
are used to interpret old statutes or constitutional provisions). 
260 See Kirchmeier & Thumma, supra note 259, at 113–19 (noting the recent prevalence 
of citations to eighteenth-century dictionaries in constitutional cases); Phillip A. Rubin, 
Note, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in Accordance with Textualist Principles, 
60 Duke L.J. 167, 169 (2010) (“[S]everal significant new cases suggest that dictionaries 
now play a crucial role in the interpretation of the Constitution . . . .”); cf. Note, Looking It 
Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1438 (1994) (tracking 
the Supreme Court’s historical dictionary usage and noting that the trend of frequent 
citations to dictionaries began in the 1980s). 
261 See, e.g., John Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and For-
eign Affairs After 9/11, at 145 (2005) (citing Dr. Johnson’s original edition in support 
of his interpretation of the Declare War Clause); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of 
the Commerce Clause, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 101, 113–14 (2001) (relying on Dr. Johnson’s 1785 
entry for “commerce,” as well as on other dictionaries of that era, to support his interpre-
tation of the Commerce Clause); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 212, at 1200–02 (noting 
the interpretive force of eighteenth-century dictionaries, though acknowledging the supe-
rior usefulness of drafting history). One scholar has criticized reliance on Dr. Johnson’s 
dictionary in constitutional interpretation on the ground that the good doctor was “on the 
wrong continent.” Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 
Neb. L. Rev. 754, 797 (2001); see also Stuart Streichler, Mad About Yoo, or Why Worry About 
the Next Unconstitutional War, 24 J.L. & Pol. 93, 96 (2008) (criticizing John Yoo’s dictionary-
based interpretation as oversimplistic). 
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 Scholarship about the word “extend” is no exception. There is lit-
tle historical intrigue, however, because its meaning has been static for 
hundreds of years.262 The definition in Dr. Johnson’s original edition 
from 1755 would be serviceable in the United States today: 
1. To stretch out towards any part. 2. To spread abroad; to dif-
fuse; to expand. 3. To widen to a large comprehension. 4. To 
stretch into assignable dimensions; to make local; to magnify 
so as to fill some assignable space. 5. To enlarge; to continue. 
6. To [i]ncrease in force or duration. 7. To enlarge the com-
prehension of any position. 8. To impart; to communicate. 9. 
To seize by a course of law.263 
As modern scholars relying on the 1773 edition in analyzing the Exten-
sion Clause have explained, “[t]he verb ‘to extend’ . . . derives from the 
Latin ‘extendere,’ meaning ‘to stretch [tendere] out [ex]’ an already ex-
isting thing or, in this case, a power.”264 
 James Liebman and William Ryan cite the first sense of Dr. John-
son’s 1755 definition as well as the above reference to his 1773 edition 
to support their claim that when the delegates to the Federal Conven-
tion edited the verb phrase about the “jurisdiction” of federal courts 
from “shall be to hear and determine” to “shall extend to,”265 they 
transformed the Extension Clause from a jurisdictional floor to a ceil-
ing, “leaving the floor-setting duty to the legislature.”266 But those 
                                                                                                                      
262 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
549, 552 (2009) (citing the constitutional phrase “domestic violence” as an illustration of the 
interpretive importance of checking whether “dictionary definitions of words changed over 
time”); Adam Liptak, Justices Turning More Frequently to Dictionary, and Not Just for Big Words, 
N.Y. Times, June 14, 2011, at A11 (noting that the resort to old dictionaries for constitutional 
interpretation “makes sense given that usage may have shifted over time”). 
263 1 Johnson, supra note 169 (London, W. Strahan 1755) (no pagination) (examples 
within each sense omitted); accord id. (London, W. Strahan et al., 5th ed. corrected 1773); 
id. (London, W. Strahan et al., 4th ed. corrected 1770); id. (Dublin, W.G. Jones, 3d ed. 
1768). Other editions added “To amplify: opposed to contract.” Id. (London, J.F. & C. Riv-
ington et al., 6th ed. 1785); id. at 696 (Dublin, Thomas Ewing, 4th ed. rev. 1775). 
264 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 
104 Yale L.J. 541, 573 (1994) (bracketed words in original) (quoting 1 Johnson, supra 
note 169, at 696 (Librairie du Liban ed. 1978) (4th ed. 1773)). Johnson’s dictionary notes 
that “extend” derives from the Latin “extendo,” and it lists “[t]o stretch out towards any 
part” as one of the senses; it does not break down the Latin verb into its parts. 1 Johnson, 
supra note 169, at 696 (Librairie du Liban ed. 1978 (4th ed. 1773)). 
265 1 Records, supra note 29, at 223 ( June 13), 223–24 (journal), 231 (journal) (compi-
lation of resolutions), 232 (Madison’s notes); see infra notes 357–386 and accompanying text 
(discussing the edit in detail). 
266 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 722 & n.129. 
2012] The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence 1273 
sources offer no revelations that advance Liebman and Ryan’s argu-
ment. None of Dr. Johnson’s prescriptions suggests that when a power 
extends—or stretches, spreads, diffuses, expands, widens, magnifies, 
enlarges, continues, or increases—it is paradoxically reduced to a state 
of latency and subservience. 
 The dictionary citations by Liebman and Ryan are embedded in 
references to articles by Steven Calabresi (one solo, one with a co-
author).267 In other words, rather than invoking Dr. Johnson directly, 
Liebman and Ryan quote Calabresi’s quotations of his entries, which 
makes one wonder whether Calabresi’s take on “extend” might bolster 
their position. It turns out, however, that Calabresi (and his co-author) 
consulted Dr. Johnson not to comment on congressional control of ju-
risdiction, but rather to support the taxonomical contention that the 
Vesting Clause, rather than the Extension Clause, is the formal source 
of federal judicial power.268 The verb “extend,” in Calabresi’s view, 
“merely ‘stretches’ forth the judicial power so that it will ‘reach’ or ‘in-
clude’ the nine categories of cases or controversies.”269 
                                                                                                                      
 
267 In a parenthetical explanation of a citation to Calabresi’s solo article, Liebman and 
Ryan quote—as did Calabresi—the first sense of the entry for “extend” in Dr. Johnson’s 
1755 edition. Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 722 n.129 (quoting Steven G. Calabresi, 
The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1377, 1380–81 & n.14 (1994) (quoting 
1 Johnson, supra note 169 (London, W. Strahan 1755)). In a parenthetical explanation of 
a citation to the co-written article, they quote the authors’ description of the entry for 
“extend” in Dr. Johnson’s 1773 edition. Id. (quoting Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 264, 
at 573 (quoting 1 Johnson, supra note 169, at 696 (Librairie du Liban ed. 1978) (4th ed. 
1773))). 
268 Calabresi, supra note 267, at 1381 n.14 (analyzing Article III’s Vesting Clause for the 
purpose of drawing a parallel with its Article II counterpart); Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 264, at 573 (“The etymology and plain dictionary meaning . . . make clear that it is 
the verb ‘vest’ in the Article III Vesting Clause that empowers the federal judiciary to act 
whereas the verb ‘extend’ can carry no empowering meaning or connotation.”). 
269 Calabresi, supra note 267, at 1381 & n.13 (quoting Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 
30, at 1210 n.270); see also Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 264, at 573 (arguing that rather 
than serving as an independent power source, the Extension Clause applies power con-
ferred by the Vesting Clause). Calabresi’s conclusion seems sensible as far as it goes. The 
Vesting Clause is the grant of power per se, and the Extension Clause defines the “reach” 
of that power, or what that power “include[s].” Calabresi’s quotation of “reach” and “in-
clude” is from his own earlier article, in which he differentiated between those two words 
as potential senses of “extend.” Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1210 n.270, quoted in 
Calabresi, supra note 267, at 1381 & n.13. Positing a reading of “shall” as “will,” he argued 
in that earlier article that whereas the interpretive formulation “[t]he judicial Power will 
include all cases” could support theories of mandatory jurisdiction, “[t]he judicial Power 
will reach all cases” could not. Id. (cryptically commenting that if, conversely, “shall” is read 
as “must,” then theories of mandatory jurisdiction are viable regardless of how “extend” is 
interpreted). That distinction between “reach or “include,” which he did not explain, is 
unconvincing. Regardless of whether the judicial power shall “extend to” or “reach” or 
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 As to Liebman and Ryan’s issue—whether the Extension Clause 
reserves power for Congress—Calabresi was, in those articles, expressly 
agnostic: “I t[ake] no position on this question . . . .”270 In a later article 
(with a different co-author), though, he did take a position. Noting the 
inexorable command of the phrase “shall extend,” he embraced, at 
least for the categories described in the Extension Clause as “Cases,” a 
theory of inviolable federal jurisdiction.271 
 In sum, Liebman and Ryan’s citations to Dr. Johnson may add a 
whiff of lexicographical propriety to their argument, but nothing about 
his dictionaries supports their thesis. John Adams’s exhortations not-
withstanding, the upheaval wrought by the American Revolution— de-
spite the auspicious editing of the final word of the Declaration of In-
dependence from the Johnson-approved “honour” to the “u”-free 
spelling that Webster would later endorse272—did not extend to every 
jot of the English language. The straightforward meaning of “extend” 
centuries ago in Great Britain has endured through the ages, on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
 In a parenthetical, Liebman and Ryan acknowledge as much: “It . . . 
makes sense to give ‘extend to’ its eighteenth-century (and current) 
meaning of flexibly ‘reaching’ as far as, but not mandatorily including, 
the entire constitutionally permissible jurisdiction.”273 But their focus on 
synonyms is a distraction. Their pivotal interpretive move is not choos-
ing “reach” as a substitute for “extend”; it is the insinuation that a power 
extending to or reaching certain objects does not “mandatorily in-
clud[e]” them. To be sure, possessing power does not mandate its use, 
                                                                                                                      
“include” the various cases and controversies, no words in the Extension Clause insinuate 
that the power is not self-executing or belongs to a body other than the judiciary. 
270 Calabresi, supra note 267, at 1388 & n.37; see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 30, 
at 1209 (stressing the separateness of the question of which section of Article III is the 
source of judicial power from that of the legislative ability to restrict that power). 
271 Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 47, at 1013–14 & n.65 (reserving judgment on the 
categories described as “Controversies”). 
272 See Julian P. Boyd, The Declaration of Independence: The Evolution of the 
Text 71, 77 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., rev. ed. 1999) (showing the edit). Compare The Decla-
ration of Independence (U.S. 1776) (“Honor”), and 1 Webster, supra note 258 (no pag-
ination) (“honor”), with Thomas Jefferson, American Treasures of the Library of 
Congress, Original Rough Draught of the Declaration of Independence ( June 
1776), available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/treasures/images/decp4.jpg (“honour”), 1 
Johnson, supra note 169 (London, W. Strahan 1755) (no pagination) (“honour”), and id. 
(London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al., 6th ed. 1785) (no pagination) (“honour”). See generally 
Mencken, supra note 256, at 228–31 (2d ed. 1921) (noting the edit to the Declaration and 
documenting Webster’s bold break from Johnson’s entrenched “u,” among other bursts of 
iconoclasm). 
273 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 723. 
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but Liebman and Ryan assume that the “judicial” power is held by Con-
gress, arguing that the edit resulting in the verb “extend” replaced what 
had earlier been envisioned as mandatory jurisdiction “with a legislative 
power to authorize [judicial] review when appropriate.”274 That assump-
tion is groundless. Providing that the judicial power extends to or 
reaches certain cases and controversies is not tantamount to granting 
legislative control over whether the judiciary may exercise the power. 
 Nicholas Rosenkranz is another scholar who has acknowledged the 
stability of the meaning of “extend.” He too, however, citing three 
eighteenth-century dictionaries, has adopted an inexplicably dynamic 
reading of the word: “The verb ‘to extend’ suggests today just what it 
signified in 1789: stretching, enlarging . . . . Thus, the scope of the judi-
cial power— . . . unlike the scope of the legislative power—is not en-
tirely fixed by the Constitution but may be stretched or enlarged by acts 
of Congress.”275 This puzzling conclusion, which Rosenkranz uses in 
service of a broader argument about the contrasting finiteness of Con-
gress’s own power,276 imputes transformative ability to the definition of 
“extend.” No pile of dictionaries, though, can change “The judicial 
Power shall extend [or stretch or enlarge] . . .” into “Congress may ex-
tend [or stretch or enlarge] the judicial Power . . . .” 
 The vision of congressional control articulated by Rosenkranz dif-
fers in kind from the conventional one. As Congress enacts new stat-
utes, he reasons, courts will be called on to interpret them, and thus in 
a certain quantitative sense, the scope of the judicial power to decide 
cases will grow.277 That point is true enough, as far as it goes; because 
some of the constitutionally assigned cases for federal courts to decide 
are those “arising under” federal laws, it is inevitable that Congress’s 
                                                                                                                      
274 Id. 
275 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867, 
1896 (2005) (contrasting judicial power with legislative power to critique the common 
understanding of the scope of Congress’s authority to enact bills implementing treaties) 
(citing N. Bailey, An Universal Etymological English Dictionary (Edward Harwood 
ed., London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al., 25th ed. 1790); Johnson, supra note 169 (London, 
W. Strahan et al., 4th ed. 1773); Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the 
English Language ( John Andrews ed., Philadelphia, W. Youngs, Mills & Son, 6th ed. 
1796)). 
276 Rosenkranz makes his point about the Extension Clause not to advance an argument 
about Article III in particular but rather to support his thesis that Congress lacks authority to 
enact statutes implementing treaties whose subject matter falls outside the boundaries of the 
powers listed in Article I. See Rosenkranz, supra note 275, at 1868–69 (disagreeing with the 
result in the seminal case of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)). 
277 Rosenkranz, supra note 275, at 1896 (“A new federal statute can give the judiciary 
something new to do, thus expanding its power.”). 
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pace of substantive (as opposed to jurisdictional) lawmaking, particu-
larly when the laws include private rights of action, can stimulate 
courts’ wielding of their authority. 
 The word “extend,” however, contrary to Rosenkranz’s assertion, 
has nothing to do with that unremarkable truth.278 Even if Article III 
provided that federal jurisdiction “shall be to hear and determine” the 
various cases and controversies, as an early draft did,279 Congress’s sub-
stantive output would still affect the number of cases available for fed-
eral courts to decide, despite the lack of elasticity in the verbs “be,” 
“hear,” and “determine.” Indeed, the same would be true if Article III 
echoed the straightforward language of Article I by providing that 
“[t]he [judiciary] shall have Power To” adjudicate the cases and con-
troversies.280 
                                                                                                                      
278 See id. (attributing the elasticity of judicial power to long-standing definitions of “ex-
tend”). As a result, a foundation of Rosenkranz’s overarching point about congressional 
power is shaky. Because of Article III’s use of the word “extend,” he maintains, the judiciary’s 
power is not limited, whereas Article I’s purportedly contrasting reference to the legislative 
powers “herein granted” shows that Congress’s is. Id. at 1896–97. Those three modest words 
cannot bear the weight of that analysis, however. See supra note 106 (discussing the impact of 
a minor difference in the wording of the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II). In the same 
marginal quantitative way that an enactment of a new substantive federal statute can expand 
the scope of the judiciary’s power, so does, for example, an increase in the number of “for-
eign Nations” indirectly expand the legislative power (to regulate commerce with them), 
despite Article I’s lack of an “[E]xten[sion]” Clause per se. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In 
fact, the verb “extend” could readily coexist, in a sentence about power, with the descriptive 
phrase “herein granted.” A hypothetical provision that “[t]he judicial Power herein granted 
shall extend to . . .” would hardly be oxymoronic, nor would the added words change the 
meaning of the actual Extension Clause. But cf. Rosenkranz, supra note 275, at 1897 (“[I]t 
would not have made sense to limit the federal courts to the powers ‘herein granted,’ be-
cause the scope of the judicial power may be expanded . . . .”). 
Rosenkranz’s contention that Congress lacks the authority to enact certain treaty-
implementing statutes may have merit. See id. at 1868–69 (arguing that treaty obligations 
do not override constitutional limitations). But the legislative branch is not alone in hav-
ing finite subject matter jurisdiction, as it were. See id. at 1878 (referring to the limited 
“subject matter” of congressional power). An Article III parallel would be that despite the 
putative malleability of the “extend”-able judicial power, federal courts could not be au-
thorized to adjudicate, say, all cases (regardless of the identity of the parties or the nature 
of the dispute) in which the amount in controversy exceeds $1 million. 
In sum, the legislature and the judiciary are more alike than Rosenkranz admits. Con-
gress can make as many laws as it likes (subject to presidential approval), and federal 
courts can decide as many cases as arise under those laws, but each branch has qualitative 
limits: Congress can make only certain kinds of laws, and the courts can decide only cer-
tain kinds of cases and controversies. The presence or absence of the word “extend” in the 
corresponding constitutional provisions is, on that score, immaterial. 
279 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 22 (Madison’s notes); see infra notes 357–
386 and accompanying text (discussing the edit in detail). 
280 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
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 As for the conventional qualitative claim that cases and controver-
sies falling within the nine listed categories are at the jurisdictional 
mercy of Congress—a claim not addressed one way or another by 
Rosenkranz—arguments based on the word “extend” are likewise un-
availing. Substituting “stretch” or “enlarge,” as Rosenkranz does, is un-
objectionable in and of itself, but whatever dictionary synonym one 
might plug into the Extension Clause, the legislature does not end up 
holding a direct on-off switch for the judicial power. 
 Another scholar to stretch the meaning of “extend” beyond its 
bounds is Julian Velasco. He has enlisted dictionaries from 1851 and 
1993 in support of the orthodox view of congressional power over the 
jurisdiction of federal courts: “The word ‘extend’ is not unambiguous 
. . . . [T]he proper definition of the word ‘extend’ is a non-mandatory 
one, meaning ‘to reach.’ Thus, the relevant constitutional text is best 
paraphrased as follows: ‘The judicial power hereby reaches the following 
cases . . . .’”281 As in Rosenkranz’s interpretation, and Liebman and 
Ryan’s, the synonyms are but a smokescreen. Whether one defines “ex-
tend” as “stretch” or “enlarge” or “reach” is of no moment.282 Velasco’s 
sleight-of-hand, similar to that by Liebman and Ryan, is his characteri-
zation of the definition as “non-mandatory.” On its own, “extend” is 
inherently neither mandatory nor permissive. The mandatory, or at 
least inevitable, nature of the Extension Clause springs instead from the 
word “shall.”283 
 Still, Velasco’s paraphrase at the end of the above passage is fair; 
the judicial power does indeed “reach[]” the listed cases and controver-
sies. In elaborating further on the clause’s meaning, however, Velasco 
conjures up illusory flexibility, apparently from the supposed supple-
ness of “extend”: “Despite the self-executing ‘shall,’ the words ‘shall ex-
tend’ are more permissive than mandatory; they are better interpreted 
as ‘can include’ rather than as ‘must include.’”284 This conception of 
the judicial power as a reservoir that may or may not be tapped is all 
too common. Even Steven Calabresi, when endorsing a (partial) theory 
of mandatory federal jurisdiction based on his reading of “shall” as 
                                                                                                                      
281 Velasco, supra note 14, at 703–04 (citing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dic-
tionary 1075 (10th ed. 1993); Webster, supra note 258, at 427 (Springfield, Mass., G. & 
C. Merriam 1851)). 
282 See supra note 269 (critiquing the distinction made by Calabresi and Rhodes be-
tween “reach” and “include” as potential senses of “extend”). 
283 See supra notes 164–244 and accompanying text. 
284 Velasco, supra note 14, at 704; see also id. at 716 (referring to “shall extend” as “de-
scriptive”). 
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“must,” managed to characterize “shall extend” as indicating “the max-
imum potential extent of federal judicial power.”285 
 From that problematic premise, Velasco, making the same logical 
leap as Liebman and Ryan, concludes that the body with the power to 
tap this reservoir is Congress.286 That interpretation, he maintains, 
stems from a “natural reading of the text of the Constitution.”287 With 
or without dictionaries, though, there is nothing “natural” about read-
ing the Extension Clause—or, if one would prefer, the Stretching, 
Enlarging, or Reaching Clause—as turning the judicial power into a leg-
islative one. 
. A
rb “extend” did not apply to subjects that were inher-
ntly
t for the trial of 
us
liminary step clearing the way for some other body to decide later 
                                                                                                                     
2 n Unwarrantable Connotation 
 When the prodigal protagonist of William Shakespeare’s Timon of 
Athens boasted, “To Lacedaemon did my land extend,” he was not 
speaking of a contingent interest.288 Later examples of its usage con-
firm that the ve
e  inchoate. 
 In fact, the extension of jurisdiction (if not “judicial power” per se) 
was a familiar linguistic construct to Americans in the constitutional 
era. The Declaration of Independence had used it in one of its defiant 
remonstrations: “We have warned [our British brethren] from time to 
time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdic-
tion over us.”289 That grievance echoed a similar point from the Decla-
ration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress two years earlier: 
“Whereas, . . . the British parliament . . . hath imposed rates and duties 
payable in these colonies . . . and extended the jurisdiction of courts of 
Admiralty not only for collecting the said duties, bu
ca es merely arising within the body of a county.”290 
 In those revolutionary contexts, “extend” carried no evident con-
notation of potentiality. If extending jurisdiction had simply been a pre-
 
285 Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 47, at 1014 (emphasis added). 
286 See Velasco, supra note 14, at 704 & n.162 (assuming that it is up to Congress to de-
cide the extent to which judicial power should be wielded). 
287 Id. at 704. 
288 See William Shakespeare, Timon of Athens, act 2, sc. 2, l. 145 (Karl Klein ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) (1607). His previous line was “Let all my land be sold.” Id. act 
2, sc. 2, l. 139. 
289 The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). 
290 Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14, 1774) (em-
phasis added), reprinted in Documents of American History 82, 82 (Henry Steele Com-
mager & Milton Cantor eds., 1988). 
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whether the extended jurisdiction could in fact be exercised, the colo-
nial complaints would have lacked some of their bite. 
 Nor does anything in the Constitution suggest such a connotation. 
Of course, the document lacks a glossary as such,291 but the way a word 
is used in one provision can help explain its meaning in another.292 In 
its only other appearance in the unamended Constitution, the word “ex-
tend” is used in the negative, with language indicating a range. Section 3 
of Article I provides that in cases of impeachment, judgment “shall not 
extend further than to” removal from one’s current office and disquali-
fication from other offices.293 Echoing a similarly phrased provision 
from the Articles of Confederation, that sentence structure puts up a 
ceiling: no judgment may be more onerous than removal and disqualifi-
cation, but nothing dictates such a double sanction in any given case.294 
 The clause about impeachment sanctions is not as far removed 
from the Extension Clause as one might think. The “shall not extend 
further than to” phrasing originated in James Wilson’s draft, for the 
Committee of Detail, of what became Article III;295 it was not until the 
end of the Convention that the Committee of Style moved it, intact, to 
Article I.296 Had Wilson and his fellow committee members wanted to 
engineer a ceiling in the Extension Clause similar to that in the clause 
about impeachment sanctions, they could have easily used the same 
comparative construction: “The judicial Power shall not extend further 
than to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution 
. . . .” Or the same essential idea could have been phrased in the posi-
tive, with “shall extend up to . . . .” 
                                                                                                                      
291 Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges 140 (1993) (critiquing the “theo-
retically incoherent body of law” that results when the Supreme Court interprets individual 
constitutional words across different cases). 
292 See Amar, supra note 192, at 748 (outlining this interpretive method); Calabresi & 
Rhodes, supra note 30, at 1216 (advocating a holistic interpretation under which parallel 
provisions in Articles II and III would be read in the same way). 
293 U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. 
294 The only appearance of “extend” in the Articles of Confederation was also in the 
negative, with language indicating a range: “[R]estrictions [on trade and commerce by 
out-of-state citizens] shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported 
into any State, to any other State, of which the owner is an inhabitant . . . .” Articles of 
Confederation of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. The range described in the constitutional clause 
(“not . . . further than”) included the ceiling, whereas the range in the Articles of Confed-
eration (“not . . . so far as”) did not, but each provision left leeway to determine the ap-
propriate sanction or restriction. 
295 2 Records, supra note 29, at 163 (Wilson draft for the Committee of Detail); see id. 
at 173 (showing emendation by John Rutledge). 
296 Id. at 582 (Sept. 12), 590, 592 (report of the Committee of Style). 
1280 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1225 
 Under either of those formulations, one could have more sensibly 
(if not indisputably297) inferred an eventual need for precise demarca-
tion within the constitutional range, though the identity of the appro-
priate power broker to pinpoint a new boundary would have been far 
from clear.298 Yet Wilson, his committee, and eventually the whole Con-
vention stayed with “shall extend to” for the Extension Clause.299 By 
eschewing any language indicating a range, such as “not . . . further 
than” or “up to,” the delegates, instead of installing a ceiling, simply 
sealed in a fixed ambit of power for the judiciary.300 
 The Constitution was not the only momentous American docu-
ment of 1787. One month to the day after delegates in Philadelphia 
introduced “extend” into the draft of what would become the Exten-
sion Clause,301 the Continental Congress in New York enacted the 
Northwest Ordinance, which included a precursor to the Bill of 
Rights.302 The prefatory language to the six enumerated rights de-
scribed one of their purposes as “for extending the fundamental princi-
ples of civil and religious liberty” to the newly organized territory so 
that those principles would permeate its legal infrastructure.303 If “ex-
tending” principles was to give them force that was merely potential, 
subject to later unilateral policy judgments, the principles hardly could 
have been characterized as “fundamental.” In fact, the ordinance 
                                                                                                                      
297 To be sure, both “shall not extend further than to” and “shall extend up to” can be 
read as communicating fixed points rather than ranges, but those locutions, with their 
evocations of distance and height, convey a stronger suggestion of openness and room for 
movement than does the unadorned “shall extend to.” 
298 Though the clause about judgment in cases of impeachment does not itself answer 
the question of who decides the sanction in a given case, the paragraph before it essen-
tially does, by giving the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments.” See U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 3. In contrast, nothing in or near the Extension Clause specifies who is to superin-
tend the putatively potential range of the judicial power. As to certain parts of the Exten-
sion Clause, Article III empowers Congress to make exceptions to the appellate form of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, as well as to regulate it, but neither of those prerogatives 
permits substantive restriction of the judicial power. See generally Glashausser, supra note 4 
(arguing that the Exceptions Clause allows Congress to shift the Supreme Court’s jurisdic-
tion from appellate to original). 
299 See infra notes 326–399 and accompanying text. 
300 Several years later, the Eleventh Amendment negated some of what the Extension 
Clause had conferred: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to [certain suits].” See U.S. Const. amend. XI. Because no phrase such as “further 
than” was used, the amendment set no ceiling; it simply razed part of the Extension Clause’s 
existing structure. 
301 1 Records, supra note 29, at 223 ( June 13), 223–24 ( journal), 231 ( journal) 
(compilation of resolutions), 232 (Madison’s notes). 
302 See generally Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789). 
303 Id. § 13 (emphasis added). 
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stressed that, unless the existing states and people in the new territory 
both consented, the rights declared in furtherance of those principles 
would “forever remain unalterable.”304 The judicial power “ex-
tend[ed]” by the Constitution is no less permanent. 
                                                                                                                     
 In modern legal writing, the word “extend” is likewise used in 
connection with unconditional norms. For example, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure provide that an expert’s “duty to supplement ex-
tends both to information included in the [expert’s] report and to in-
formation given during the expert’s deposition.”305 Courts have not 
interpreted that duty as being dependent on any sort of triggering 
mechanism. Instead, it is simply the discovery of previously unknown 
information that gives rise to the duty.306 
 Congress routinely uses the phrase “shall extend” in self-executing 
laws. One of many mundane examples is a passage in Title 18 of the 
U.S. Code stating that “[t]he provisions of chapter 46 of this title relat-
ing to civil forfeitures . . . shall extend to any seizure or civil forfeiture 
under this section.”307 Congress has even used the phrase in a jurisdic-
tional context: “The supervision and jurisdiction of the United States 
Capitol Police shall extend over [various areas in and around the Capi-
tol].”308 Nothing in that statute suggests that discretionary implementa-
tion is necessary for the jurisdiction of the police to take effect, and no 
attempt has been made to restrict it. Yet when it comes to the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, Congress (with the Court’s complicity) has 
blithely assumed a legislative prerogative to control the actual extent of 
the judiciary’s power. 
3. An Imperfect Analogy 
 The jurisdiction of hypothetical police officers serves as the vehicle 
for an analogy by James Liebman and William Ryan that helps illumi-
nate the meaning of “extend” in Article III. According to Liebman and 
Ryan, because the Constitution entrusts much of the enforcement of 
federal rights to state courts, the role of the federal judiciary is to “spot-
 
304 Id. § 14. 
305 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). 
306 See, e.g., Lewis v. FMC Corp., 786 F. Supp. 2d 690, 705 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The duty 
to supplement arises when the expert subsequently learns of information that was previ-
ously unknown or unavailable . . . .”); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., No. 
MDL-721, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17332, at *138–39 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (“Supplemental 
answers/reports must be filed as soon after the new evidence/opinion arises as possible.”). 
307 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(b)(2) (West 2012). 
308 Act of May 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-302, § 313, 104 Stat. 213, 245. 
1282 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1225 
check” the decisions of state judges, to the extent deemed appropriate 
by Congress.309 Thus defending the orthodox model of legislative con-
trol of the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, Liebman and Ryan 
argue that “[t]he Framers self-consciously swapped quantitative ( juris-
dictional) for qualitative ( judicial power) protections of the federal 
courts.”310 In their view, the “judicial Power” refers to the “authority 
and obligation, in all matters over which jurisdiction is conferred, in-
dependently, finally, and effectually to decide the whole case and noth-
ing but the case on the basis, and so as to maintain the supremacy, of 
the whole federal law.”311 To “extend” that power to certain cases and 
controversies, they contend, is not to confer jurisdiction but simply to 
provide that when rendering decisions in such disputes, judges must 
abide by those qualitative prescriptions.312 
. 
 In an attempt to show that the Extension Clause permits legislative 
discretion about the quantitative extent to which judges may have the 
opportunity to wield the judicial power, Liebman and Ryan offer this 
analogy: “[C]onsider a police chief’s statement to line officers: ‘From 
now on, your exercise of the qualities of courtesy, professionalism, and 
respect shall extend to all off-duty athletic events, parties, professional 
conferences, and other social affairs.’”313 The analogy matches the ba-
sic structure of the Extension Clause, as shown in the table below, and 
is a commendable effort to parse the clause by preserving its linguistic 
essence while removing its loaded legal context. It does not, however, 
reveal what the scholars intend
[Y]our exercise of the qualities 
of courtesy, professionalism, 
and respect 
shall extend to 
all off-duty athletic events, 
parties, professional conferences, 
and other social affairs. 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases [and Controversies of various sorts]. 
 
                                                                                                                      
309 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 703. 
310 Id. at 702–03, 768–69, 775. 
311 Id. at 771 (emphasis removed from original). More specifically, Liebman and Ryan 
describe a federal judicial power embracing five “qualitative attributes” that combine to 
both constrain and protect the adjudicative process: (1) independence, through life ten-
ure and salary protection; (2) “insulation from self-consciously political decisionmaking” 
by separation of the judiciary from the other branches of government; (3) dissociation 
from state courts; (4) “the capacity to decide the whole case,” including both law and fact; 
and (5) “the obligation to decide cases on the basis of all pertinent federal law,” as a way of 
ensuring the supremacy of federal law. Id. at 769–70. 
312 Id. at 753 (arguing that extending judicial power to certain cases serves not to 
guarantee that all such cases will be heard but “only to require that [federal courts] deploy 
the included judicial qualities when they do decide them”). 
313 Id. (brackets around “exercise of the qualities of” omitted). 
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 Liebman and Ryan draw two conclusions from the analogy. One is 
unobjectionable on its face, though it does not support their thesis, 
whereas the other blurs a crucial distinction between responsibility and 
permission: 
[T]his statement’s . . . qualitative subject matter makes clear 
that it does not require officers to attend all, or any, athletic 
events, parties, or professional conferences, but only to be-
have themselves when they do. Likewise, to say that “federal 
courts’ power to reach independent, comprehensive, final, 
and effectual decisions shall extend to all cases arising under 
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the nation” is [1] not to 
require those courts to decide all such cases but [2] only to 
require that they deploy the included judicial qualities when 
they do decide them.314 
 The scholars’ first conclusion, that federal courts need not decide 
every case and controversy of the sorts listed, makes sense; the extension 
of a power to certain situations makes it available but does not compel 
its use.315 The implication, however, that the Extension Clause thus does 
not grant federal courts “quantitative (jurisdictional)” protection is 
groundless. Interpreting the Extension Clause as a non-contingent ju-
risdictional grant would not “require [federal] courts to decide all such 
cases.”316 It would simply give courts the authority to do so. 
 More crucially, a similar conflation of duty and power corrupts the 
second conclusion—that what the Extension Clause does is impose a 
“qualitative” restriction on courts whenever they happen to adjudicate 
the listed cases and controversies. Liebman and Ryan write as though 
they were comparing two obligations, correlating the officers’ “re-
quire[ment] . . . to behave themselves” with the putative “require[ment] 
that [courts] deploy the included judicial qualities.”317 The statement of 
the police chief indeed imposes a standard of conduct that must, in cer-
tain situations, be followed: a duty of decorum. In contrast, the constitu-
tional clause by its terms sketches the scope of a “Power.” As the two 
scholars note, the duty attaches whenever officers attend the listed 
events. The more logical implication of the parallel would therefore be 
                                                                                                                      
314 Id. 
315 See supra text accompanying notes 40–43 (stressing the Supreme Court’s lack of ob-
ligation to exercise its power in every case). 
316 See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 753 (emphasis added). 
317 Id.; see supra text accompanying note 314. 
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that whenever federal courts attend to the listed cases and controversies, 
their judicial power attaches. 
 Notably, neither attachment hinges on the approval of an outside 
entity. The police directive does not make the duty of decorum depend 
on implementation by the department; the directive itself creates the 
duty. Likewise, nothing in the Extension Clause conditions the judicial 
power on statutory authorization by Congress; the Constitution itself 
confers the power. The courts’ power is thus as definitive as the officers’ 
duty. 
 So a more comparable directive would be something like this: 
“Your police power (to flash a badge and make arrests and so on) shall 
extend to all off-duty athletic events, parties, professional conferences, 
and other social affairs.” Just as the duty of decorum in Liebman and 
Ryan’s example categorically applies in those situations, so would the 
police power in this adjusted hypothetical. Nothing in the provision sug-
gests that officers need special permission to attend social events in the 
first place, or that once they are in attendance, a separate decision is 
needed to trigger their power. And so it is with the Constitution. What-
ever inherent qualities and constraints the judicial power may have,318 
the Extension Clause implies no external activation process for it and 
contains nary a hint that before exercising jurisdiction in the listed cas-
es and controversies, courts must first secure the substantive approval of 
the legislature.319 
 Aside from the confusion over duty and power, Liebman and 
Ryan’s interpretation is improbable in that it would seem to reduce the 
Extension Clause to a statement of the obvious. In their view, the clause 
serves to specify the method for adjudicating the listed cases and con-
                                                                                                                      
318 Liebman and Ryan may be correct in much of what they write about the judicial pow-
er’s qualities, but if there is one quality inherent to such a power, it is jurisdiction. Theoretical 
power with respect to certain cases and controversies without the authority to issue binding 
decisions would be meaningless. Just as, in their police directive, the officers’ ability to attend 
social events without receiving special permission is no less certain for being merely implicit, 
likewise courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over cases and controversies as to which their 
“judicial Power” extends is unquestionable. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text 
(describing the interrelationship of judicial power and jurisdiction). 
319 Neutral logistical regulation would of course be appropriate. See supra note 35 and ac-
companying text. As for the police directive, it does not foreclose the possibility that another 
directive might create a condition. Likewise, one might argue that other constitutional lan-
guage allows Congress to withhold appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court; indeed, 
many have advanced (albeit unconvincingly) such an interpretation of the Exceptions 
Clause. See Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1390–95 (discussing scholars’ views). But the Exten-
sion Clause in and of itself cannot be read to contemplate such subservience for the judicial 
power. 
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troversies, namely, through the exercise of the judicial power.320 In a 
vacuum, perhaps the clause could be read with that qualitative parame-
ter as its focal point.321 But because in context there is no mystery 
about which power federal courts are to use—the judicial power is the 
only one vested in them—such a reading would make the clause unre-
markable to the point of absurdity. 
                                                                                                                     
 What the Extension Clause would fail to do under that reading is 
even more problematic: it would set no ceiling on the cases federal 
courts can hear. After all, mandating that police officers act profession-
ally when attending off-duty social affairs does not bar them from 
spending free time alone or with their families.322 And so requiring 
courts to “deploy the included judicial qualities” when deciding the 
listed cases and controversies would presumably not bar them from de-
ciding unlisted ones. Do Liebman and Ryan believe that federal juris-
diction is infinite, and that the longest of Article III’s nine sentences is 
dedicated to providing that in a discrete set of disputes, adjudication 
must be faithful to the qualitative “judicial Power”? 
 They purport not to.323 But they cannot have it both ways. If the 
Extension Clause focuses, as they would have it, on prescribing how the 
listed cases and controversies are to be adjudicated,324 then it is a 
stretch to read into it a paradoxically secondary role of circumscribing 
what disputes may be adjudicated in the first place. More naturally, an-
swering the what question is the primary—and in fact the only— func-
tion of the clause. All it does is sketch the judicial power’s scope, which 
by negative inference is limited to the listed disputes. Likewise, all the 
police directive seems to do is sketch the scope of the duty of decorum, 
which by negative inference is limited (outside of working hours) to the 
listed events. 
 
320 See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 753 (“If the legislature were to tell federal 
courts to exercise something less than ‘the Judicial Power’ in cases within their jurisdic-
tion, the courts would be required to ignore that directive because the Constitution . . . 
dictates that ‘the Judicial Power shall extend to’ those cases.”). 
321 See id. at 769–70 (detailing five “qualitative attributes of ‘the judicial Power’”). 
322 As Liebman and Ryan stress, their hypothetical directive creates no attendance re-
quirement. Id. at 753. 
323 Id. at 753–54 (“[I]f the legislature were to assign anything other than the listed ‘Cases’ 
and ‘Controversies’ to the ‘Supreme’ and ‘inferior’ courts, those courts would have to de-
cline the assignment so as not to address a matter beyond that to which ‘shall extend’ (1) the 
only ‘Power’ Article III, Section 1 gives them and (2) the power by which they are defined.”). 
324 See id. at 753 (arguing that the Extension Clause serves “only to require that [fed-
eral courts] deploy the included judicial qualities when they do decide” the listed cases 
and controversies). 
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 Most importantly, even if the Extension Clause serves both pur-
poses claimed by Liebman and Ryan—explaining both the how and the 
what—nothing in its language or in the scholars’ analogy suggests the 
further counterintuitive gloss that the judicial power is a merely latent 
one that is to be superintended by the legislature. To be sure, Liebman 
and Ryan are correct in stating that the “judicial” nature of the federal 
courts’ “Power” connotes certain qualitative attributes. But contrary to 
their claim, the Extension Clause in no way implies that those qualities 
come at the expense of “quantitative . . . protection” of jurisdiction.325 
B. An Extended Stay in Article III 
 The drafting history of the Extension Clause shows the role of the 
word “extend” to be straightforward, without hidden meaning. Provid-
ing that jurisdiction would “extend” to certain cases and controversies 
was simply a more economical way of conveying that jurisdiction would 
“be to hear & determine” those disputes. 
 The weeks leading up to the appearance of “extend” saw a major 
storm, however, on the judicial front—a storm that sheds light on what 
the word does not mean. Unable to agree on whether the new national 
judiciary should include tribunals other than the Supreme Court, the 
delegates to the Federal Convention struck a delicate compromise that 
would explicitly save that question for Congress.326 The question of what 
cases and controversies the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction should “ex-
tend” to was also the subject of significant debate.327 One draft of the 
Extension Clause suggested allowing Congress to decide some of that 
content,328 but that idea was quickly scotched, and the debate was re-
solved without resorting to the crutch of future legislative discretion.329 
The delegates knew how to empower Congress with respect to the judi-
ciary if they wanted to, and it was not by using the word “extend.” Once 
that word entered an early version of the clause, it remained, without 
amendment or discussion, through the final version of Article III. 
                                                                                                                      
325 See id. at 775 (supporting the orthodox view of congressional power over Supreme 
Court jurisdiction on the ground that “[t]he Framers self-consciously swapped quantitative 
( jurisdictional) for qualitative ( judicial power) protections of the federal courts”). 
326 See infra notes 330–356 and accompanying text. 
327 See infra notes 362–368 and accompanying text (detailing the debate over the cases 
and controversies to which federal jurisdiction would apply). 
328 See infra note 393 and accompanying text. 
329 See infra note 397 and accompanying text. 
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1. From the Virginia Plan to the Madisonian Compromise 
 As discussed above, the Virginia Plan kicking off the Federal Con-
vention in May 1787 included a resolution about a “National Judici-
ary.”330 According to the most widely accepted source, the resolution 
conceived of “one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals 
to be chosen by the National Legislature”;331 according to an alterna-
tive credible source, the resolution was silent about the hierarchy or 
structure of any court system, referring only to an undifferentiated ju-
diciary.332 What is certain is that the resolution provided that the “juris-
diction” of the national courts “shall be to hear & determine” various 
types of disputes.333 
                                                                                                                     
 The word “extend” would not appear until two weeks later, after 
much heated discussion about the contours of the judicial branch and 
the resulting “Madisonian compromise.”334 But that discussion provides 
crucial context for understanding the eventual switch from the “hear & 
determine” construction to “extend.” And most directly, it shows that 
had the delegates wanted to open the determination of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction to the legislature, they knew how to do so without 
resorting to a putative crevice in a solid word like “extend.” 
 On June 4, the delegates amended the Virginia Plan’s resolution 
so that the judiciary would “consist of One supreme tribunal, and of 
one or more inferior tribunals.”335 The next day, after the phrase “one 
 
330 See supra notes 128–163 and accompanying text. 
331 See 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 21–22 (Madison’s notes). 
332 Jameson, supra note 132, at 106. 
333 Compare id. (“[The National Judiciary’s] jurisdiction shall be to hear and determine 
[the various types of disputes].”), with 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 21–22 
(Madison’s notes) (“[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & deter-
mine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the der-
nier resort [the various types of disputes].”). 
334 See infra notes 357–386 and accompanying text. 
335 1 Records, supra note 29, at 93 ( June 4), 95 ( journal), 104–05 (Madison’s notes). 
Depending on the original language of the plan, that change either eliminated the possi-
bility of multiple supreme courts or added wholly new language about the structure of the 
court system. Compare Jameson, supra note 132, at 103–06 (noting that both the official 
journal and Madison’s notes recorded the motion as being one to “add” language to the 
resolution), with 3 Records, supra note 29, at app. C, 594 (acknowledging uncertainty). 
Scholars have assumed that the change eliminated that possibility. See Engdahl, supra note 
142, at 465 (calling that decision “the first of several parliamentary steps by the delegates 
who maintained that all litigation should begin (and ordinarily end) in state courts, with 
only a single national tribunal to review certain classes of cases”); Liebman & Ryan, supra 
note 14, at 715 (noting that the decision to have but a single supreme court “com-
menc[ed] a trend towards diminished federal judicial capacity” that continued with the 
attempts to eliminate inferior courts). 
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or more” was struck,336 John Rutledge of South Carolina, who advo-
cated for a relatively weak national government,337 moved to strike the 
reference to inferior tribunals altogether, so as to leave the judiciary 
consisting only of the single supreme tribunal.338 State courts, Rutledge 
argued, should hear all cases originally; the appellate jurisdiction of the 
supreme tribunal would suffice “to secure the national rights & uni-
formity of Judgmts.”339 Inferior courts, he worried, would encroach on 
state courts’ jurisdiction and thus pose “unnecessary obstacles” to the 
approval of the Constitution.340 
 Fighting for a robust federal judiciary, James Madison countered 
with a broadside against Rutledge’s position. From a practical perspec-
tive, Madison raised the specter of a flood of litigation that would over-
whelm the single supreme tribunal if it were the only federal court.341 
                                                                                                                      
 
336 1 Records, supra note 29, at 115 ( June 5), 116 (journal) (including, in an apparent 
error, the word “to” between “inferior” and “tribunals”), 119 (Madison’s notes). James Wilson 
then noted that he would later ask for reconsideration of the issue of inferior tribunals. Id. at 
115 ( June 5), 116 (journal), 120 (Madison’s notes). Further consideration of the resolution 
was postponed, perhaps because of uncertainty about the status of inferior courts. See id. at 
115 ( June 5), 116 (journal), 121 (Madison’s notes). 
337 David O. Stewart, The Summer of 1787: The Men Who Invented the Consti-
tution 167 (2007). 
338 See Scott Douglas Gerber, A Distinct Judicial Power: The Origins of an In-
dependent Judiciary, 1606–1787, at 35 (2011) (observing that the debate centered more 
on federalism than on separation of powers). 
339 1 Records, supra note 29, at 115 ( June 5), 124 (Madison’s notes). 
340 Id. 
341 Id. In that vein, Madison commented that the supreme tribunal would be flooded un-
less inferior tribunals had “final juri[sd]iction in many cases.” Id. David Engdahl has taken 
Madison’s comment to mean that the eventual compromise was based on the notion that the 
Supreme Court could be divested of jurisdiction in favor of inferior courts; being “supreme” 
did not imply a hierarchy in which it would have the last word, but instead signaled simply 
that, unlike the regional inferior courts, its jurisdiction would be nationwide. Engdahl, supra 
note 94, at 155 (arguing that one goal of the Madisonian compromise was to prevent the 
need to travel to Washington for appeals and that Congress could not have achieved that goal 
without putative power to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction); Engdahl, supra note 
142, at 473–77, 491 (“Congress would be trusted, should it create other courts, to weigh 
against the benefits of speedier and less costly dispute resolution the possible inconvenience 
of inconsistent, yet unreviewable, ‘final’ judgments ‘in many cases’ by collateral, rather than 
hierarchical, federal tribunals.”); see also William S. Dodge, Note, Congressional Control of Su-
preme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Suggests an “Essential Role,” 
100 Yale L.J. 1013, 1016 & n.16 (1991) (interpreting Madison’s comment as a suggestion 
that litigants in inferior federal courts could be “without recourse to the Supreme Court”). 
The mere possibility of a further appeal to the Supreme Court, however, would not 
stop the decisions of inferior courts from, in many cases, being “final.” Indeed, most fed-
eral appeals today are final at the circuit court level, not in possibility but in fact. The abil-
ity to appeal cases from state courts to regional federal courts, or to initiate cases in re-
gional federal courts, would solve the logistical problem Madison raised, regardless of 
whether a further hearing before the Supreme Court was available. See infra note 354 (dis-
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The geographic dispersal of inferior tribunals, he argued, was essential 
to ensuring the feasibility of taking a case to federal court.342 His ally, 
Pennsylvania’s James Wilson, added that certain cases were not suited 
for state courts at all.343 Madison worried less about encroaching on 
state courts’ jurisdiction than about those courts’ encroachments on 
people’s rights. Judges without the independence that the Constitution 
would provide might be “biassed,” and state juries could view cases 
through “local prejudices,” leading to “improper Verdicts.”344 
 Madison’s other appeal for inferior tribunals was more abstract 
and sweeping. In his vision of the anatomy of the new system, the dif-
ferent branches needed to fit together properly to provide balance. It 
was essential, he insisted, that the judiciary be “commensurate to the 
legislative authority.”345 Eliminating inferior federal tribunals would 
stunt the judiciary and, by extension, the nation: “A Government with-
out a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body 
without arms or legs to act or move.”346 Connecticut’s Roger Sherman, 
however, was more concerned with the crippling expense he saw in the 
proliferation of federal courts. Why pay for new courts, he asked, when 
the existing state courts could do the job?347 
 With the two sides’ positions clear, Delaware’s John Dickinson 
echoed Madison’s point about interbranch congruity but edged toward 
a compromise. “[I]f there was to be a National Legislature,” he rea-
                                                                                                                      
cussing Rufus King’s comment that the establishment of inferior courts would “prevent[]” 
many appeals). Though “final” can, as Engdahl writes, mean “unreviewable,” Engdahl, 
supra note 142, at 476, it can also mean “unreviewed.” Cf. Claus, One Court, supra note 47, 
at 116–18 (interpreting Madison’s comment to mean that he contemplated legislative 
power to restrict the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction by “adjudicative stakes” if not 
by “issue,” yet entertaining the possibility that Madison envisioned discretionary review 
power in the Supreme Court over nominally “final” judgments of inferior courts). 
Of course, Madison’s view of what language would accomplish is not the constitutional 
touchstone. See Stewart, supra note 337, at 105 (dismantling the notion that Madison’s 
vision prevailed throughout the constitutional debates). In any event, Madison probably 
was anticipating that many litigants would seek a federal forum. If no inferior federal 
courts existed, those litigants would have no choice but to start in state courts (unless orig-
inal jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was available) and eventually appeal, in great num-
bers, to the national Supreme Court. If they could bring their cases to regional federal 
courts, however, then few would likely pursue a later appeal in the single—and prohibi-
tively distant, for most—Supreme Court. Hence the judgments of the inferior courts would 
generally be unreviewed, and their jurisdiction thus final. 





347 Id. at 115 ( June 5), 125 (Madison’s notes). 
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soned, “there ought to be a national Judiciary . . . ,” and the legislature 
should be empowered to “institute” courts.348 Still, Rutledge’s pending 
motion posed a stark choice: the judiciary would consist of either the 
supreme tribunal and inferior ones, or only the supreme one. And by a 
5–4 vote, with two state delegations divided, the motion to eliminate 
the inferior courts passed.349 
 By the slimmest plurality, the judiciary seemed destined to be but a 
single court. Perhaps the closeness of the vote inspired Madison and 
Wilson to try another tack. Evoking Dickinson’s earlier suggestion, they 
moved to adopt a provision empowering the legislature to “appoint”350 
or “institute”351 inferior tribunals. They stressed the distinction between 
legislative discretion and a constitutional mandate.352 
 Pierce Butler, Rutledge’s South Carolina colleague, was unswayed. 
He protested that even if preserving the possibility of inferior courts 
made some theoretical sense, as a practical matter, the states would “re-
volt at such encroachments.”353 But Rufus King of Massachusetts 
lauded the practicality of the compromise. Like Madison, he worried 
that a multitude of appeals would overwhelm the supreme tribunal 
were it the only federal court.354 King’s delegation, which had been di-
                                                                                                                      
 
348 1 Records, supra note 29, at 115 ( June 5), 125 (Madison’s notes). It is possible that 
Madison himself may have made that point as well; Rufus King recorded in his notes that 
“Madison proposes to vest the Genl. Govt. with authority to erect an Independent Judicial, 
coextensive wt. ye. Nation.” Id. at 115 ( June 5), 128 (King’s notes). King’s notes are spotty, 
however, and it seems more likely that King was confusing this with the later motion. 
349 Id. at 115 ( June 5), 118 ( journal), 125 (Madison’s notes). New Jersey, North Caro-
lina, and Georgia joined Connecticut and South Carolina in supporting Rutledge’s mo-
tion. Id. Dickinson’s Delaware cast its vote with Virginia and Pennsylvania, as did Maryland. 
Id. With the remaining two delegations (Massachusetts and New York) divided, the five 
ayes prevailed. Id. 
350 See id. at 115 ( June 5), 118 ( journal), 127 (Yates’s notes) (reporting that Wilson 
presented the motion). 
351 See id. at 115 ( June 5), 125 (Madison’s notes) (reporting that Wilson and Madison 
presented the motion). 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 See 1 Records, supra note 29, at 115 ( June 5), 125 (Madison’s notes). King pre-
dicted that the establishment of inferior tribunals would “prevent[]” many appeals and 
thus be less expensive than the alternative. Id. He presumably shared Madison’s hope that 
inferior tribunals would exercise “final juri[sd]iction in many cases.” See id. at 124 (Madi-
son’s notes). As discussed above, Madison—and by extension King—likely supposed that 
inferior tribunals would satisfy most litigants’ desire for a federal forum. See supra note 341 
(considering the import of Madison’s comment). The relative “expence” feared by King is 
less transparent. See id. at 125 (Madison’s notes). Perhaps it was the government’s need to 
pay multiple judges for each case before the supreme (but not an inferior) court. Or per-
haps King considered the parties’ perspective: “By creating inferior federal courts, Con-
gress ensured litigants less costly access to Article III courts.” Evan H. Caminker, Why Must 
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vided, cast its lot with Madison and Wilson, who also converted two 
other states to their side.355 Thus was struck the “Madisonian” —though 
perhaps it should be “Dickinsonian”356—compromise. 
                                                                                                                     
 The delegates had solved a seemingly intractable problem by, in 
essence, not solving it at all but instead leaving it open to future politi-
cal determination. They had done so by explicitly invoking the legisla-
ture and describing what it could do to shape the judiciary. No resort 
was made to the word that, in the eyes of many scholars today, implicitly 
allows similar control: “extend.” 
2. From “Hear . . .” to “Extend” 
 A week after the Madisonian or Dickinsonian compromise, the 
resolution about the judiciary returned to the Convention’s floor.357 
The compromise would not be revisited, but the battle was surely fresh 
in the delegates’ minds, and lingering issues remained. The legisla-
ture’s power to “appoint” or “institute” inferior courts was in place, but 
it was unclear what ripple effect the compromise might have on the 
description of federal jurisdiction. Moreover, aside from the question of 
what court or courts would exercise it, the substantive content of that 
jurisdiction was far from settled. Amid the ensuing edits would enter, 
quietly, the word “extend.” 
 First came a motion to amend the resolution to read, in part, that 
“the jurisdiction of the supreme Tribunal shall be to hear and deter-
mine in the dernier resort all piracies, felonies &ca.”358 Based on the 
account of the original Virginia Plan in the most widely accepted his-
torical source, that amendment would have eliminated the reference to 
the jurisdiction of inferior courts.359 The reference to such courts as 
part of the national judiciary had already been struck in favor of the 
 
Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817, 833 & n.68 (1994) (cit-
ing Madison’s comment about “final juri[sd]iction”). 
355 1 Records, supra note 29, at 115 ( June 5), 118–19 ( journal) (recording the margin 
as 7–3, with Georgia and North Carolina having switched sides), 127 (Yates’s notes). Madi-
son recorded that New Jersey switched sides as well. Id. at 115 ( June 5), 125 (Madison’s 
notes) (recording the margin as 8–2). 
356 One scholar has highlighted Wilson’s role by referring to the “Madison-Wilson com-
promise.” Robert N. Clinton, A Brief History of the Adoption of the United States Constitution, 75 
Iowa L. Rev. 891, 902 (1990) (referring to the usual label as “one-sided[]”). As the apparent 
intermediary between the nationalists and the protectors of state judiciaries, however, Dick-
inson may deserve more credit. 
357 1 Records, supra note 29, at 209 ( June 12), 211 ( journal), 220 (Madison’s notes). 
358 Id. 
359 See supra notes 335–349 and accompanying text. 
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provision empowering Congress to establish inferior courts,360 but still 
intact was the jurisdictional provision: “[T]he jurisdiction of the infe-
rior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance . . . .”361 
Based on an alternative historical source, according to which the origi-
nal plan did not refer to the jurisdiction or even existence of inferior 
courts, or to any allocation of jurisdictional form,362 the amendment 
sought merely to establish that the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would 
take the appellate form; perhaps pointedly, it omitted any reference to 
potential inferior courts. The motion was not voted on.363 
 The Convention then made several adjustments to the substance 
of federal jurisdiction. The Virginia Plan included an ambitious list of 
six categories of disputes to be heard by the national judiciary, includ-
ing the open-ended “questions which may involve the national peace 
and harmony.”364 Though details are unavailable, apparently some del-
egates found the list too inclusive. The category of “all piracies & felo-
nies on the high seas” was deleted, as was that of “all captures from an 
enemy.”365 The murky early sketch of diversity jurisdiction, for “cases in 
which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdic-
tions may be interested,”366 was clarified a bit by replacing “other 
States” with “two distinct States in the union.”367 
 The next day, the whole provision on jurisdiction was temporarily 
struck to allow a blank slate.368 Responding to the ominous develop-
ments, Randolph and Madison then made a move to strengthen the 
hand of the Federalists. The previous day’s still-pending motion posed 
a risk by proposing a jurisdictional resolution without any reference to 
the possibility of inferior courts. If the jurisdiction described in the 
Constitution applied by its explicit terms only to the Supreme Court, 
                                                                                                                      
360 See supra notes 335–349 and accompanying text. 
361 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 22 (Madison’s notes). 
362 Jameson, supra note 132, at 106. 
363 1 Records, supra note 29, at 209 ( June 12), 211–12 (journal), 220 (Madison’s notes). 
364 See id. at 15 (May 29), 21–22 (Madison’s notes); Jameson, supra note 132, at 106. 
365 1 Records, supra note 29, at 209 ( June 12), 211 (journal), 220 (Madison’s notes) 
(Randolph plan). Those categories represented the substantive jurisdiction authorized under 
the Articles of Confederation. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (summarizing 
the pre-constitutional national courts). 
366 See 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 22 (Madison’s notes); Jameson, supra 
note 132, at 106. That category was apparently the seed of diversity jurisdiction; New Jer-
sey’s William Paterson described it as “Disputes between Foreigners and Citizens, and the 
Citizen of one State and that of another.” See 1 Records, supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 28 
(Paterson’s notes). 
367 See id., at 209 ( June 12), 211 ( journal), 220 (Madison’s notes) (using the phrase 
“two distinct States of the Union”). 
368 Id. at 223 ( June 13), 232 (Madison’s notes). 
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inferior courts might appear to be a constitutional afterthought. In the 
face of that risk, Randolph and Madison deftly advanced another, more 
modest, compromise. 
 Defining the jurisdiction of any named courts per se could have up-
set the balance wrought by the Madisonian compromise by either spe-
cifically including or conspicuously omitting inferior courts. Instead, 
Randolph and Madison’s proposal reflected the substantive deletions of 
the previous day, did away additionally with diversity jurisdiction, and re-
ferred to the jurisdiction of the judicial branch holistically: “That the ju-
risdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the 
collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national offi-
cers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony.”369 
 Inferior courts were not unnecessarily highlighted, but their po-
tential jurisdiction was covered.370 Another bulwark for the judiciary 
was that, unlike the previous day’s pending motion, Randolph and 
Madison’s proposal declined to box the Supreme Court into appellate 
(“dernier resort”) jurisdiction; that omission left the door open to cre-
ating a floor of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, as Randolph 
would do in his later draft for the Committee of Detail.371 
 The only recorded statement about the merits of Randolph and 
Madison’s jurisdictional proposal was by Randolph, who referred to the 
previous day’s “difficulty” in defining the “powers of the judiciary.”372 
He downplayed that problem, stressing that a committee would later 
work out the details (and, in fact, he ended up on the Committee of 
                                                                                                                      
369 Id. at 223 ( June 13), 223–24 ( journal) (emphasis added), 231 ( journal) (compila-
tion of resolutions), 232 (Madison’s notes) (emphasis added); see also id. at 237 ( June 13), 
237 (Madison’s notes of the compilation) (prefacing “cases” with “all”), 238 (Yates’s notes) 
(prefacing “cases” with “all”). That holistic approach to jurisdiction echoed the provision, 
in the alternative historical source’s version of the Virginia Plan, that set out the jurisdic-
tion of the “national judiciary.” See Jameson, supra note 132, at 106 (“[I]ts jurisdiction shall 
be to hear and determine [various disputes].”). 
370 The Committee of Detail would later draft a provision specifying that the legisla-
ture could “assign” the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to inferior courts; that provision was 
eventually deleted in conjunction with the switch from “jurisdiction of the Supreme Court” 
to “Judicial Power.” See supra notes 140–142 and accompanying text (discussing the draft-
ing and eventual deletion of the assignment clause). 
371 See 4 Records, supra note 29, at 37, 48 (Randolph draft); see also 2 id. at 137, 147 
(Randolph draft); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 14, at 722 (noting this effect). 
372 1 Records, supra note 29, at 223 ( June 13), 238 (Yates’s notes). He appeared to be 
referring to jurisdiction, thus suggesting that he viewed jurisdiction and judicial powers to 
be roughly synonymous. 
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Detail a month later).373 Randolph’s exhortations calmed the storm, 
and the proposal passed unanimously.374 
 And thus “extend” made its Extension Clause debut. There was no 
recorded discussion of the word per se, nor was there any indication 
that Randolph or Madison—or any other delegate—intended the word 
to undermine the vision of a vigorous judiciary by injecting a stealth 
layer of congressional control over federal jurisdiction.375 
 Instead of using “extend,” Randolph and Madison could have kept 
the existing phrase, providing that jurisdiction “shall be to hear & de-
termine” the three sets of cases. The “hear & determine” wording was 
common, having appeared in an oath set out in the Articles of Confed-
eration.376 It had been in usage in American law since at least 1636, 
when a court in Massachusetts Bay proclaimed that magistrates would 
“heare & determine all causes according to the lawes nowe established, 
& where there is noe law, then as neere the lawe of God as they can.”377 
Once the Virginians were shortening the list of cases and rewriting the 
provision, though, they apparently took the opportunity to streamline it 
by substituting “extend to.” After all, “jurisdiction” would itself convey 
                                                                                                                      
373 Id. Randolph stressed that the aim of the proposal was simply to ensure “the secu-
rity of foreigners where treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of states 
and that of the citizens thereof.” Id. In order to focus on those basic goals, Randolph an-
nounced that he would “obliterate” the rest of the existing resolution. Id. That rhetoric (as 
recorded by Robert Yates) was somewhat overblown, as the provisions of the Madisonian 
compromise were safe in separate resolutions. See id. at 223 ( June 13), 236–37 (Madison’s 
notes). In light of the successful motions the day before to eliminate the references to 
piracies, felonies, and captures, the only substantive aspect of the resolution being obliter-
ated was the diversity category; perhaps Randolph had sensed resistance or at least confu-
sion in the previous day’s motion to change that language. Cf. Goebel, supra note 195, at 
216 (surmising that “something sufficiently disturbing had occurred” to cause Randolph 
to omit several jurisdictional categories from his amended resolution). 
374 1 Records, supra note 29, at 223 ( June 13), 238 (Yates’s notes). 
375 See id. 
376 See Articles of Confederation of 1781 art. IX, para. 2. 
377 1 Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New 
England 174–75 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., Boston, William White 1853) (recording the 
proceedings of May 25, 1636). John Adams claimed that the Massachusetts Constitution, 
enacted in 1780, formed the essential basis for the federal one and that his writings about 
his state’s document broke a logjam in Philadelphia at the Federal Convention. Letter 
from John Adams to William D. Williamson (Feb. 25, 1812), microformed on 2 The Adams 
Papers, supra note 254, at reel 118, no. 244. His take may be overstated, but the Massachu-
setts Constitution did use the same phrase. See Mass. Const. pt. II, ch. III, art. V (provid-
ing for certain cases to be “heard & determined” by the governor and a council); see also 
R.I. and Providence Plantations’ Royal Charter of 1663 (granting the General As-
sembly authority “to apoynt . . . courts of jurisdiction, for the heareinge and determininge 
of all actions, cases, matters and things, . . . as they shall thinke fit”); 1 Blackstone, supra 
note 29, at *354 (noting the authority of judges “to hear and determine all felonies”). 
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the power to “hear & determine.” With two minor exceptions, that se-
rial verb phrase never reappeared in the drafts of the Constitution.378 
 The hypothesis that stylistic elegance motivated this minor edit is 
somewhat speculative, but Randolph and Madison’s choice of the verb 
“extend” to follow the subject “jurisdiction” was thoroughly unremark-
able. As discussed above, revolutionary tracts of the previous decade 
had fulminated against Britain’s overzealous “exten[sion]” of “jurisdic-
tion.”379 Georgia’s Constitution of 1777 had used that same formula-
tion, providing “[t]hat the court of conscience [for small debts] be 
continued . . . and that the jurisdiction thereof be extended to try caus-
es not amounting to more than ten pounds.”380 Case law too had dis-
cussed jurisdiction in terms of its “extent” —simply to describe its 
scope, not to convey that it was subject to legislative approval.381 
 Moreover, at the Federal Convention, consideration of the legisla-
tive power often had been framed in terms of how far it should “ex-
tend.”382 For example, five days earlier, in a debate about whether the 
                                                                                                                      
 
378 One exception was in the parallel New Jersey Plan brought forward two days later, 
which had taken that phrase as well as others from the jurisdictional section of the Ran-
dolph plan. 1 Records, supra note 29, at 241 ( June 15), 244 (Madison’s notes) (New Jer-
sey Plan). The other was in an oath (as part of a procedure lifted from the Articles of Con-
federation) that was eventually eliminated. 2 id. at 159, 162, 170–71 (Committee of Detail 
documents); id. at 176 (Aug. 6), 184 (Madison’s notes) (Committee of Detail draft pre-
sented to the Convention after adjournment). 
379 See supra text accompanying notes 289–290. 
380 Ga. Const. of 1777, art. XLVI; see also 3 Blackstone, supra note 29, at *85 (discuss-
ing how far courts’ limited “jurisdiction” can be “extended”); Daines Barrington, Ob-
servations on the Statutes 247–48 (London, W. Bowyer & J. Nichols 1766) (noting the 
prevalence during the reign of King Henry IV of trusts that “courts of common law either 
could not reach, or were unwilling to extend their jurisdiction to”). 
381 For example, when refusing to exercise its jurisdiction on a writ of certiorari, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland noted that courts should use caution in “extending their 
jurisdiction.” Maryland v. Johnston, 2 H. & McH. 160, 166 (Md. 1786). Likewise, in a deci-
sion about whether the Court of Admiralty for Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over a dis-
pute, the state’s High Court of Errors and Appeals considered the “extent of . . . jurisdic-
tion” of a parallel court in England. Talbot v. Commanders & Owners of Three Brigs, 1 
U.S. (1 Dall.) 95, 106 (unnumbered footnote) (Pa. 1784). In fact, in a case before the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, Edmund Randolph’s father, the attorney general, had argued that 
the legislature had not intended to “extend” the court’s jurisdiction to include the instant 
case. Godwin v. Lunan, 1771 Va. LEXIS 1, at *29 (Oct. 1771) (no docket number). 
382 E.g., 1 Records, supra note 29, at 45 (May 31), 60 (Pierce’s notes) (noting Randolph’s 
comment about how far legislative power “ought to extend”); see also id. at 62 ( June 1), 64–65 
(Madison’s notes) (noting Charles Pinckney’s fear that the executive powers of the Conti-
nental Congress “might extend to peace & war”). Such comments continued later as well. 
E.g., id. at 460 ( June 29), 470 (Madison’s notes) (noting a comment by Abraham Baldwin of 
Georgia about whether the national legislature would “extend its cares” to state matters); 2 
id. at 312 (Aug. 17), 315 (Madison’s notes) (noting Gouverneur Morris’s comment that “it 
would be necessary to extend the [legislature’s] authority farther”); 2 id. at 544 (Sept. 8), 550 
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national legislature should have the power to invalidate improper state 
laws, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts had suggested that such power 
“ought to extend to all laws already made.”383 A fervent supporter of 
the congressional “negative,” Madison agreed that the power to negate 
should be expansive; it should not be limited to certain types of state 
laws but rather “must extend to all cases.”384 Gerry and Madison could 
not have implied that some superseding power would curtail the na-
tional legislature’s ability to nullify state laws. Likewise, nothing suggests 
that when the delegates decided that the Supreme Court’s “jurisdic-
tion” —and later the national “judicial Power” — “shall extend to all 
Cases . . . ,” they intended to curtail the authority of federal courts. 
 The congressional negative, of course, did not survive. Nor did the 
eventual list of legislative powers end up using the word “extend.” But 
that lexical distinction between the legislative and judiciary articles im-
plies no substantive difference. In listing the legislative powers, Article I 
uses the formulation “Congress shall have Power To . . . .”385 It would 
have been awkward and unnecessary to write “Congress’s Power shall 
extend to” while tacking “–ing” onto all the verbs. Conversely, the pro-
vision about the judiciary’s “Power” began as one about the Supreme 
Court’s “jurisdiction,” making “extend” a natural choice for Article III. 
                                                                                                                      
(Madison’s notes) (noting George Mason’s comment that it was “necessary to extend: the 
power of impeachments”); 2 id. at 621 (Sept. 15), 640 (Mason’s notes) (noting his complaint 
about how far legislators would be able to “extend their powers”). 
It is also possible that Randolph and Madison may have been influenced by the consti-
tutional plan submitted by South Carolina’s Charles Pinckney on May 29. Though the 
original was lost, Pinckney later gave a version to John Quincy Adams, claiming it to be the 
true original, so that Adams could publish it with the Convention records. That version 
provided that the Supreme Court’s “Jurisdiction shall extend to all cases . . . .” 1 Records, 
supra note 29, at 15 (May 29), 16 ( journal), 23 (Madison’s notes) (referring to the presen-
tation of Pinckney’s plan); 3 id. at app. D, 595, 600 (Pinckney plan). But Max Farrand, 
with good reason, doubted the authenticity of that version, suggesting that it referred 
anachronistically to the draft later prepared by the Committee of Detail. See 3 id. at 602–04. 
In a reconstructed version Farrand viewed as the closest possible rendering of Pinckney’s 
actual plan of May 29, the analogous language provided that appeals to the Supreme 
Court “shall be allowed” in certain cases. 3 id. at app. D, 604, 608 (reconstructed Pinckney 
plan); see also Beeman, supra note 131, at 97–98 (calling Pinckney’s claim to Adams “simply 
untrue”). Likewise, the outline of the Pinckney plan found with the papers of the Commit-
tee of Detail did not use that phrase. 2 Records, supra note 29, at 134, 136 (outline of 
Pinckney plan). In sum, it seems unlikely that Madison and Randolph got the phrase from 
Pinckney—whom Madison thought to be a shameless self-promoter. See Beeman, supra 
note 131, at 93–98 (summarizing the debate about credit deserved by Pinckney). 
383 E.g., 1 Records, supra note 29, at 162 ( June 8), 170 (Yates’s notes). 
384 Id. at 162 ( June 8), 164–65 (Madison’s notes). 
385 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
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When “jurisdiction” changed to “Judicial Power,”386 there was no reason 
to upend that phrasing; the sentence read just as well with the new sub-
ject. 
 In retrospect, one might question why the delegates did not recon-
struct the sentence to forge a more precise parallel with the article 
about the legislature, such as, “The judiciary shall have Power to hear 
and determine . . . .” Though wordier, that language would have pre-
vented confusion about whether “extend” connotes a legislative power. 
But such a misunderstanding was unforeseeable; nobody worried that 
the extension of the judicial power might be construed as a grant of a 
legislative one. In any event, without fanfare, “extend” was in Article III 
to stay. 
3. From Edmund Randolph’s Draft to James Wilson’s Draft 
 As the Convention continued through various drafts and amend-
ments, the word “extend” stayed in place. Other language, however, 
came and went. Perhaps the most compelling evidence that the final 
version of the Extension Clause does not confer discretion on the legis-
lature to control the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is that in a midsum-
mer draft, it did. 
 Edmund Randolph was part of the five-man Committee of Detail 
charged with compiling a working draft of the Constitution at the end 
of July.387 The first available draft was written in his hand.388 Its render-
ing of the Extension Clause began familiarly: “The jurisdiction of the 
supreme tribunal shall extend . . . to all cases, arising under laws passed 
by the general Legislature . . . .”389 The second jurisdictional category 
covered impeachments.390 That was a brazen move in that just the week 
before, the Convention had voted to eliminate that sensitive area from 
the judiciary’s purview.391 But Randolph was passionate about the need 
                                                                                                                      
386 See supra notes 138–163 and accompanying text (chronicling the August 27 shift). 
387 See supra note 136 (introducing the Committee of Detail). 
388 The Randolph draft was “undoubtedly a rough draft used” by the Committee of De-
tail. William M. Meigs, The Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787, at 21 (photo. reprint 1987) (1900). As with the Virginia Plan, it is unclear to 
what extent Randolph himself formulated the ideas expressed by his hand. See Stewart, 
supra note 337, at 168–69 (speculating that the draft was a “joint product” of the commit-
tee, by way of outline to set down initial thoughts). 
389 4 Records, supra note 29, at 37, 47–48 (Randolph draft); see also 2 id. at 137, 146 
(Randolph draft). The word “Legislature” was written by John Rutledge. See id. at 137 n.6, 
146 (noting emendations by Rutledge). 
390 4 id. at 37, 47–48 (Randolph draft); see also 2 id. at 137, 146–47 (Randolph draft). 
391 See 2 id. at 37 ( July 18), 39 ( journal), 46 (Madison’s notes). 
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for a judicial role in impeachments, even adding a reference to it in the 
part of his draft about the executive power.392 Randolph’s third juris-
dictional category was strikingly open-ended: “[T]o such other cases, as 
the national legislature may assign, as involving the national peace and 
harmony . . . .”393 
 Following that invitation were four more specific types of cases that 
presumably served as a finite list of what would meet the vague “na-
tional peace and harmony” standard.394 Though the “national peace 
and harmony” language had been in place since the Virginia Plan, each 
of Randolph’s four specific instances, such as “the collection of the 
revenue” and “disputes between citizens of different states,” had re-
cently been edited out by the Convention.395 
 However provocative Randolph’s unilateral expansion of the juris-
dictional list may have been,396 he leavened it by deferring most of the 
expansion (all but the impeachments) to the discretion of the legisla-
ture, at least for the time being, perhaps awaiting further political will 
to coalesce at the Convention. Particularly in light of the precarious 
Madisonian compromise on the issue of whether to have inferior tribu-
nals, it made sense not to push too hard but instead to punt to the leg-
islature much of the difficult decision about just how far the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction should extend. 
 The punt did not go far. The other coherent draft by the Commit-
tee of Detail was in the hand of James Wilson. Using Randolph’s draft 
as a starting point, Wilson added to the list of cases in the Extension 
Clause. But he subtracted the qualifier “as the national legislature may 
assign.”397 Nothing like it ever reappeared. 
 Just as the Madisonian compromise shows that the full Convention 
knew how to give Congress control of the shape of the judiciary, the 
Randolph and Wilson drafts show that the Committee of Detail knew 
how to cede control of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. The dele-
                                                                                                                      
392 4 id. at 37, 46 (Randolph draft); see also 2 id. at 137, 145 (Randolph draft); 
Glashausser, supra note 4, at 1407–08 (outlining Randolph’s passion about the importance of 
a judicial role in impeachments). 
393 4 Records, supra note 29, at 37, 48 (Randolph draft); see also 2 id. at 137, 147 (Ran-
dolph draft). 
394 4 id. at 37, 48 (Randolph draft showing two additional categories inserted by John 
Rutledge); see also 2 id. at 137, 147 (Randolph draft). 
395 2 id. at 37 ( July 18), 39 ( journal), 46 (Madison’s notes). 
396 Outside of the language about the judiciary, Randolph’s draft also included various 
other provisions with no basis in the resolutions agreed to by the Convention. See Stewart, 
supra note 337, at 169–74 (summarizing the “innovations” of the Committee of Detail). 
397 See 2 Records, supra note 29, at 163, 172–73 (Wilson draft) (fleshing out the Exten-
sion Clause but omitting the phrase about legislative discretion). 
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gates’ evident decision not to do so is unsurprising. Handing over the 
jurisdictional reins would have been a major concession by the Federal-
ists. Indeed, the stakes rivaled those of the Madisonian compromise. 
Even if Congress decided not to establish inferior courts, at least liti-
gants asserting a federal right would always have a chance to get to the 
Supreme Court, whether through original jurisdiction, on appeal, or by 
a discretionary writ.398 In contrast, if Congress were allowed to gut the 
Court’s jurisdiction, there would be no such guarantee. The Supreme 
Court itself could become what Madison had feared of a government 
without inferior courts: “the mere trunk of a body without arms or legs 
to act or move.”399 
 Such paralysis presents a separation-of-powers problem, and a 
limbless Supreme Court could also raise grave federalism concerns; 
depending on the existence and jurisdictional scope of inferior courts, 
litigants might need to rely on state courts to vindicate federal rights. 
Given the absence of recorded discussion about such a consequential 
outcome, the lack of any reference to the legislature in the final text of 
the Extension Clause, and the quick deletion of the one attempt in a 
draft to confer an explicit measure of legislative discretion over some 
components of the clause, it is inconceivable that the Convention de-
signed the clause to allow Congress to strip the Supreme Court of its 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Conclusion 
 When introducing his draft of the U.S. Constitution as part of the 
work of the Committee of Detail, Edmund Randolph summarized the 
first resolution the Convention had agreed on as “a declaration” that 
the three branches of the new government “shall be distinct, and inde-
pendent of each other, except in specified cases.”400 Though that lan-
                                                                                                                      
 
398 After all, a premise of the compromise, as stated by an opponent of inferior courts, 
had been that even without inferior courts, “the right of appeal to the supreme national 
tribunal” would be “sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts.” See 1 
id. at 115 ( June 5), 124 (Madison’s notes) (relating the comment of John Rutledge). 
399 See 1 id. at 115 ( June 5), 124 (Madison’s notes) (describing “[a] Government with-
out a proper Executive & Judiciary”); see also supra text accompanying note 346 (discussing 
Madison’s metaphor). 
400 4 id. at 37, 38–39 (Randolph draft); accord 2 id. at 137, 138 (Randolph draft). That 
language may have been inspired by state documents such as the Maryland Declaration 
and Charter of Rights, which provided that “the legislative, executive and judicial powers 
of government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.” See Md. Dec-
laration and Charter of Rights of 1776, art. 6. That idea was echoed in the New 
Hampshire Bill of Rights, which provided that “the three essential powers . . . , to wit, the 
1300 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:1225 
guage was not drafted to be part of the Constitution itself and thus did 
not survive,401 Randolph’s insistence on explicitness when it came to 
one branch’s power over another was likely shared by most if not all 
delegates to the Convention.402 Nothing in Article III’s extension of the 
judicial power specified subservience to legislative discretion. Yet today, 
the federal judiciary’s independence is threatened by the widespread 
assumption that much of the “judicial” power—including the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction—is controlled by the legislature. 
 The independence of federal judges, in contrast, has long been 
recognized as a cornerstone of the federal judicial power. Section 1 of 
Article III provides that they “shall . . . receive for their Services, a 
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office.”403 That guarantee has been interpreted as protecting 
federal judges from worrying about financial reprisals for unpopular 
decisions.404 Even more significantly, a companion provision holds that 
judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour.”405 Though 
“good Behaviour” might seem to be in the eye of the beholder,406 that 
constitutional text has generally been interpreted as guaranteeing life 
                                                                                                                      
legislative, executive and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from and independent of 
each other, as the nature of a free government will admit . . . .” N.H. Const. art. XXXVII 
(1784). The theory had many sources. See, e.g., 1 Blackstone, supra note 29, at *259–60 
(“In this distinct and separate existence of the judicial power, . . . consists one main pre-
servative of the public liberty; which cannot subsist long in any state, unless the administra-
tion of common justice be in some degree separated both from the legislative and also 
from the executive power.”). 
401 According to Thomas Jefferson, its “spirit” survived, as he later wrote in a letter to 
Madison: “[The] principle [of the Constitution] is[] that of a separation of legislative, 
executive and judiciary functions, except in cases specified. If this principle be not ex-
pressed in direct terms, . . . it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution . . . .” Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison ( Jan. 22, 1797), in 9 The Writings of Thomas Jef-
ferson 368 (Library Ed., Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh, eds. 1904). 
402 Rutledge edited the introduction without changing those words, other than that he 
or someone else crossed out the word “except” after “distinct.” 4 Records, supra note 29, 
at 37–39 (Randolph draft); accord 2 id. at 137–38 (Randolph draft). 
403 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
404 E.g., O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933) (“In framing the Con-
stitution, . . . the power to diminish the compensation of the federal judges was explicitly 
denied, in order . . . that their judgment or action might never be swayed in the slightest 
degree . . . .”). As Alexander Hamilton explained, “a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to 
a power over his will.” The Federalist No. 79, at 440 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter et al. eds., 1999) (emphasis in original). 
405 U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
406 See Robert Kramer & Jerome A. Barron, The Constitutionality of Removal and Manda-
tory Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judiciary: The Meaning of “During Good Behaviour,” 35 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 455, 455–56 (1967) (querying whether Congress may define what 
counts as “good”). 
2012] The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s Jurisdictional Independence 1301 
tenure407 (barring the sort of malfeasance that would trigger im-
peachment408). Together, the two clauses create a class of jurispruden-
tially independent judges.409 
                                                                                                                     
 But like rights without remedies, judges are useless without juris-
diction. Section 2 of Article III addresses that truism by providing that 
“[t]he judicial Power shall extend” to nine categories of cases and con-
troversies.410 And yet the conventional view of congressional power dis-
regards that parallel protection for jurisdictional independence, which 
if anything is more textually rooted than the life tenure provision. Ac-
knowledging “shall . . . receive” and “shall hold” (in Section 1) as man-
datory but twisting “shall extend” (in Section 2) into a legislative option 
leaves Congress room to undermine the judicial branch by withholding 
its power. Just as spurious is the argument that “[t]he judicial Power” in 
 
407 E.g., O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 549–50 (referring to the “good behavior” clause in a 
statute creating a non-Article III court as a “life tenure” provision tracking that of Article 
III); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 316 (1903) (referring to the constitutional 
provision of “life tenure” for Article III judges); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Im-
peachment Process: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis 83 (2d ed. 2000) 
(acknowledging the existence of a more stringent reading but noting the historical and 
structural support for a “life tenure” interpretation); Burke Shartel, Federal Judges—
Appointment, Supervision, and Removal—Some Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 Mich. L. 
Rev. 870, 904 & n.94 (1930) (noting that since the notorious 1804 impeachment and even-
tual acquittal of Justice Samuel Chase, the “good Behaviour” provision has been “generally 
understood” to be synonymous with life tenure); cf. McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 
174, 190 (1891) (referring to “[t]he principles of life tenure and good behavior”); Kramer 
& Barron, supra note 406, at 456 (interpreting McAllister as implying that life tenure is 
conditioned on good behavior). But cf. Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitu-
tional Problems 166–72 (enlarged ed. 1973) (arguing that misbehavior short of im-
peachable misconduct could warrant judicial removal). 
408 See Philip B. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes from 
History, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 697 (1969) (acknowledging room for uncertainty but con-
cluding that impeachment is the only constitutional method for removing judges); Letter 
from Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. to Harvard Crimson, reprinted in Note, Recess Appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court—Constitutional but Unwise?, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 124, 127–28 n.12 
(1957) (“‘Good behavior,’ of course, means for life, subject only to the extraordinary pro-
cedure for impeac[h]ment.”). Section 4 of Article II calls for removal of “civil Officers of 
the United States . . . on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 4. That provision has been widely 
assumed to apply to Article III judges. See Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove 
Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 209, 213 (1993) (not questioning 
that assumption); Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English 
and American Precedents, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 135, 136–37 (approving of that assumption). 
409 Gerber, supra note 338, at 28 (arguing that the Compensation Clause and the 
Good Behaviour Clause, as well as the Vesting Clause, “ensure the independence of the 
federal judiciary”); Gerhardt, supra note 407, at 83–84 (detailing the framers’ conception 
of “life tenure and irreducible compensation” as essential foundations of “truly independ-
ent judicial review”). 
410 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
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some sense extends but jurisdiction—the power to hear and determine 
cases and controversies—does not. 
 As is widely recognized, the drafters of the Constitution envisioned 
an independent judiciary that could operate without fear of legislative 
reprisal. What is often overlooked is that the judiciary necessarily con-
sists of not only the judges themselves but also the abstract judicial 
power—including jurisdiction—that they wield. Together, Sections 1 
and 2 of Article III declare for the Supreme Court a robust jurispru-
dential and jurisdictional independence.411 
 
411 See Claus, Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 47, at 459 (referring to jurisdiction 
and tenure as “the two great pillars that raise up a vigorously independent judiciary”). 
